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P R E F A C E
I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the 
scholarship of M. Gilson, and the extraordinary penetration 
of M. Maritain. I have also profited greatly by M. Gonhier’s, 
La Pensee Religieuse de Descartes (1924), and many other works 
to which I am more obliged than I can adequately say.
The references are to the Adam and Tannery edition 
of Descartes* works, the texts being indicated by volume, 
page, and line. The references to the Meditations are to 
the Latin edition (A.T.VII) since in that the lines are 
numbered, though the French version (A.T.IX) has often been 
followed in preference to the Latin. In translating passages 
I have made great use of Veitch*s version of Descartes* works, 
and a smaller and very cautious use of that of Haldane and 
Ross.
The terminal notes are a real part of the work, 
though numbers 66 and 80, which should be taken together, 
have far exceeded the length of notes, and may be read as a 
critical appendix.
It is hoped that something has been contributed to 
the concrete interpretation of the Cogito, and to a proper 
estimation of the problem of the cercle cartesien. The chief 
means employed has been reliance on the consecution of the 
Meditations. If considerable resort has been had to the 
writings/
writings of Cartesians like de la Forge, Arnauld, P-S. Regis, 
du Roure, and P. Nicholas Poisson, it has been with no con­
sciousness of distorting the meaning of the Meditations, on 
which this study is above all else a commentary.
A final remark: Cartesianism gave definition not only 
to a new philosophy but to a new kind of man. What kind of 
man this was, is perhaps the most absorbing of all the 
problems of the Cartesian philosophy as well to the present- 
day student of it, as perhaps it was to Descartes himself.
It is important that of all his writings upon meta­
physical subjects there is only one work to which Descartes 
refers as his Metaphysic,^ and that work is his Meditations 
on the First Philosophy. To the end of his life he showed 
no inclination to add to, or subtract from, what he had 
written there. Among metaphysicians he stands perhaps alone 
in having successfully elaborated his doctrine at an early 
age, and having remained quite satisfied with it.
The fourth book of the Discourse on Method can only 
be called metaphysics by using the word somewhat inexactly. 
This work is a discourse on method. But for Descartes 
methodological doctrine is not metaphysical doctrine, since 
metaphysics presupposes rules of method for seeking the truth 
The first aim of the Discourse, therefore, is not metaphysics 
nor any other branch of science presupposing the Method.
The aim of the Discourse cannot, therefore, be the exposition 
of metaphysics for its own sake. This work was written 
against Descartes1 will, at a period of his life when he 
ardently desired seclusion, and wished to avoid publication. 
The author*s motive in writing is clear. It became public 
after his famous meeting with the Neo-platonist Cardinal 
Berulle at the house of the Papal Nuncio, that Descartes had 
a wonderful new method of thinking with which he had secured
Qextraordinary results. The importunities of Berulle, and 
his own desire not to appear to have done more than he really 
had,̂
had,** forced. Descartes to declare how much he had done, and 
this he undertook in the Discourse on the method of rightly 
conducting the reason, and seeking truth in the sciences, a 
work consisting of a description of how this method was come 
by, and containing examples of the results of employing it.
The Discourse is, first and foremost, a description of results, 
not a treatise which has the actual attainment of truth as its 
proper end. The fourth book of this Discourse contains an ac­
count of what Descartes believes he has achieved by the help 
of his method in the sphere of metaphysics, but he does not
deny that from the strictly scientific standpoint this dis-
4course on metaphysics is imperfect. There is another fact
which goes to confirm this. The Discourse on Method is also
an autobiography. Descartes calls it the history of his 
5spirit, written in fulfilment of a promise, and undertaking
no more than to describe the way in which he has conducted
6his own reason. The Discourse is thus historical. If it 
speaks of doctrines, it is to tell us what in the main a cer­
tain man believed, and not actually to reproduce the scien­
tific search by which these doctrines were arrived at. We 
should, indeed, expect what is contained there to be put in 
the order of interest rather than in the order of discovery.
Furthermore, the aim of this Discourse is to give 
an account of a method, the first rule of which is that one 
must doubt of everything which one does not clearly and distinct 
ly know to be true. Because it is methodical, metaphysics must
commence/
commence by rigorously doubting everything obscure. But since 
the minds of the majority of people contain nothing but what 
is obscure, this might be sufficient to unbalance them com­
pletely. The Discourse is meant to be read by people of this
7kind as well as by the learned, and that is why it is written 
in French, the vulgar tongue, and not in Latin. The hyper­
bolical doubt, indispensable first step in a cogent, coherent, 
and methodical metaphysic, must thus be lacking in the fourth 
book of the Discourse, which is, therefore, not strictly 
speaking scientific.
Descartes, however, had the intention of writing a 
complete, scientific metaphysic; and to fulfil it he composed 
the Meditations. The purpose of the Meditations is not his-
Qtorical anecdote but systematic exposition. They elaborate 
the fourth book of the Discourse which can be properly under­
stood only from them. They are not on this account merely a 
commentary on the Discourse, as which they have so often been 
treated, but a work of a different kind and intention, a 
systematic work, in its nature more complete and coherent.
There is no good reason for believing that Descartes was in 
the least undecided about the details of his metaphysic when 
he wrote the Discourse. He merely did not consider it appro­
priate to reveal them. The completeness^ with which he con­
sidered his metaphysics to be presented in the Meditations, 
is well seen from this work1 s being unaffected in either form
or content by the Objections, whose only function was to clear |
away/
4.
away the adventitious impediments which prevented the reader 
from aeeing what was in itself perfectly luminous.10 It was 
to the Meditations that Descartes referred those who wished, 
or required, to be informed of his metaphysical doctrine.
It is true that the first book of the Principles of 
Philosophy is frequently regarded as an attempt of Descartes1 
to supplement the doctrine of the Meditations. It has been 
regarded as his Meditations reduced to dry formulae, their 
verve dissipated and their charm lost.11 But in spite of the 
difference in form of the Principles, there is no evidence 
for believing that Descartes considered the Meditations to be 
in the least respect inadequate to their proper end, namely, 
metaphysics for their own sake. The demands of pure truth 
and pure science had been met. As a matter of fact, Descartes1! 
intention in writing the Principles is easy to ascertain 
because it has been plainly stated. It is to present his 
philosophy in a form in which it can be easily taught.1^
We thus expect to find in the first part of the Principles a 
clear statement of the fundamental notions contained in his 
Metaphysic. We expect not so much the strict order of 
exposition obtaining in the Meditations, as the principles 
which emerge from them; and an elaboration of those things 
which, suppressed for the purpose of rigorous proof, neverthe­
less require some expansion if they are to be easily grasped. 
Some things may be abbreviated, and others appear at a greater 
length,1
length,1*-* since our preoccupation is now not so much with the 
order of proof as with the infirmities of the apprehending 
intellect. In this, the first part of the Principles shares 
in the motive of the Objections: both serve to remove diffi­
culties. The content of Principles I.is, indeed, probably 
influenced by the Objections. For instance, the difficulty 
felt by Hobbes and Arnauld14 with respect to Descartes1 doc­
trine of substance, and the distinction of mind and body,
might well be considered to account for the careful enuncia-
15tion of this doctrine in the Principles, and the classifi­
cation of the kinds of distinctions. Consequently the struc­
tural beauty of the Meditations, and the rigid dependence of 
proof on proof, is not aimed at in the Principles. Indeed, 
the latter are not intelligible without the Metaphysic,10 and 
can thus not be conceived as an independent piece of metaphy­
sical writing, or as a restatement by Descartes of his position.
The Recherche remains somewhat of a mystery. It is 
undated, but would appear to belong to the period succeeding 
the Principles. Descartes1 intentions in writing it are un­
known. It is in dialogue form, but is largely lacking in the 
literary graces of dialogue, and the heavy attacks on the 
position occupied by Epistemon, the representative of the 
Schools, seem to indicate that period when Descartes was in­
creasingly occupied in defending his position. The Recherche, 
too, does not give only a disinterested exposition of meta­
physical/
6 .
metaphysical doctrine, though it follows the systematic order 
of the Meditations. Its value lies in this that it exhibits 
with greater clearness even than the latter, the structure of 
Descartes1 metaphysics during the first stages of proof suc­
ceeding the Cogito, and dwells on aspects of the Cogito 
passed over in the Meditations.
To sum up, it is sufficiently clear, even from such 
evidence as that which has briefly been put forward, that of 
the Discourse, the Meditations, the first book of the Prin­
ciples, and the Recherche, it is only the Meditations which 
Descartes considered to be a full and scientific work on meta­
physics. The Recherche is critical and polemical, the first 
book of the Principles cannot be understood without the Medi­
tations, and the Discourse is an incomplete exposition whose 
arguments are said to receive their full statement only in 
the Meditations. Only the latter is a formal and complete 
body of science. This conclusion will be confirmed as 
Descartes* conception of metaphysics becomes clearer, but even 
on such evidence as is present, it is difficult to see what 
other conclusion is possible. Provisionally, it can be 
ac cepted as true.
82. Descartes* Metaphysic, then, in his own view, is fully 
contained in the Meditations . This work is his definitive 
exposition of llfirst philosophy.” It must next he asked what 
kind of knowledge Descartes considers metaphysics to be.
In the Regulae we read: ”We must not fancy that one 
kind of knowledge is more obscure than another, since all 
knowledge is of the same kind throughout, and consists solely 
in combining what is self-evident.”^  Again, ”Mankind has 
no roads towards certain knowledge open to it, save those of 
self-evident intuition and necessary d e d u c t i o n . M e t a p h y ­
sics is true knowledge. It must therefore follow the road of 
self-evident intuition and necessary deduction, that is, it 
must be pursued according to the Method.
It is true that in the Recherche, describing the path 
we must follow in the attainment of truth, Descartes plaees a 
knowledge of metaphysics before that of the m e t h o d , a p p a r ­
ently contradicting his attitude elsewhere, this being the 
only text in his works where a knowledge of metaphysics is 
said to precede a knowledge of the method. But since M.
Hamelin has already sufficiently explained this^O there is no 
need to dwell upon it. It may be noted, however, that the 
Recherche itself, in other passages, takes for granted that 
the method precedes the metaphysics . Thus Polyander, surprised 
at the ease of metaphysics when methodically treated says,
”  it makes me marvel at the exactitude of your method,
whereby/
whereby you conduct us little by little by simple and easy 
paths.”21 Again, Epistemon remarks, 11 All that Polyander has 
learnt by the help of this wonderful method --- consists 
solely of the fact that he doubts, that he thinks, and that 
he is a thinking b e i n g ” 2 2  - these being the fundamental meta­
physical truths.
The method by which Metaphysics is to be pursued, is 
that which Descartes has come by through observing the cer­
tainty with which mathematicians reason. We must study "the 
logie which teaches the right conduct of the reason, with the 
view to discovering the truths of which we are ignorant; and, 
because it greatly depends on usage, it is desirable we should 
exercise ourselves for a length of time in practising its 
rules on easy and simple questions, as those of mathematics. 
Then, when we have acquired some skill in discovering the 
truth in these questions, we should commence to apply our­
selves in earnest to true philosophy, of which the first part 
is Metaphysics.”23 A mathematical training is necessary for 
metaphysics .24 «pk© f0ur rules for correctly investigating 
the truth, prescribed in the Discourse on Method, must be used 
in the investigation of metaphysical things, as much as in the 
rest of the sciences.
When we investigate the truth in conformity with the 
demands of the true logic, we come by results which are worthy 
to be called exact science, that is to say, knowledge which 
has/
has the cogency of a mathematical demonstration. Metaphysics 
is therefore an exact science, whose propositions are demon­
strated with mathematical certainty. In the famous letter of 
April 15th, 1630, Descartes announces that he has discovered 
nhow one can demonstrate metaphysical truths in a manner more 
evident than the demonstrations of geometry.” ”Be assured,” 
he says on another occasion, "that there is nothing in my 
metaphysic which I do not believe to be perfectly clear to 
the natural light, or accurately demonstrated.”23 Metaphy­
sics is thus a knowledge of the same kind as, and even more 
evident than, geometry. It is more evident because, as we 
find when we examine the actual sequence of Descartes* meta­
physical proofs, a large body of metaphysical truths can be 
discovered before the doubt is lifted from the truths of 
mathematics:
”And hence the Sceptics, etc., believed that the 
existence of God cannot be demonstrated,' and many up to this 
time consider it indemonstrable, though on the contrary it Is 
highly demonstrable, and (like all metaphysical truths), can 
be more surely demonstrated than the demonstrations of mathe­
matics. For if the mathematicians were to call into doubt 
all which the author called into doubt in the Metaphysics, 
no mathematical demonstration could be made with certainty 
though the author nevertheless then gave metaphysical demon­
strations. Therefore the latter are more certain than the
former.”23
Metaphysics is the most certain of the sciences 
because it is ”the key to the rest of the sciences.!t̂  It 
is not necessary to labour this matter since the texts are 
quite clear. WI consider the demonstrations of which I here 
make use, to be equal or even superior to the geometrical in 
certitude and evidence.”2® nThe reasonings which conduct
us to the knowledge of our mind and of G o d  are of all
which come under human knowledge, the most certain and mani­
fest: a conclusion which it was my single aim in these Medi­
tations to e s t a b l i s h . ”29 These are but two out of numerous
passages.
Metaphysics is thus in its form a science of the same 
kind as mathematics. So much may safely be concluded. It is 
also the most certain, because it is rationally the most de­
monstrable of all the purely human sciences. Consequently 
its proofs have complete objectivity. Not only are the exis­
tence of God, and the real nature of the world, discoverable 
and demonstrable with mathematical precision, but the Meta­
physic is intelligible to all who sufficiently attend to its 
proofs nwith minds abstracted from the senses .**31 to under­
stand these proofs, Descartes is convinced, is to be sure of 
their truth.
There are several features of Descartes* mind which
can be understood only if this interpretation of what he
means by metaphysics be accepted; and they may be mentioned
in further support and illustration. In the first place, 
there/
there is Descartes* apparently dogmatic certainty in affirm­
ing God*s existence and the soul*s immateriality, and his 
strong resentment against the atheists. Since he believes 
that he has demonstrated the existence of God and the imma­
teriality of the soul with more than geometrical precision, 
it is only to be expected that he should assert these truths 
as positively as the truth that the three angles of any tri­
angle are together equal to two right angles. With those who 
denied these truths, he may well be expected to show an in­
tellectual impatience which could easily be mistaken for
32religious intolerance.
Secondly, it cannot be doubted that Descartes never 
saw any need to augment or revise the Meditations. Since the 
Meditations are a complete and perfect demonstration of meta­
physical truth, there could be no thought, once they were com­
pleted, of adding to, or subtracting from them. There is no 
more to be said on the matters there treated of. If Descartes 
wrote only a small amount of metaphysics, it was not from lack 
of interest, but because he thought he had accurately and 
finally demonstrated all that needed to be said on the matter.
He was not able to doubt that his alone was the "true metaphysic, 
and that mankind would need none after his. "I consider that all 
those to whom God has given the use of reason, are obliged to 
employ it principally for trying to know Him, and for knowing 
themselves ---; this is the matter to which I have devoted the
most study, and in which, by God*s grace, I am entirely satis-
33.field."
In publishing the Meditations, he says, !fI have done what I 
thought obligatory for God*s glory, and the discharge of my 
conscience. If my design has not succeeded and there are too 
few men in the world capable of understanding my arguments, 
that is not my fault, and they are not the less true for 
that."3^ nI believe/1 he says, speaking of the Metaphysic, 
"that I have omitted practically nothing of what is necessary 
for demonstrating the truth; and when the truth is once well 
grasped, all the particular objections that can be made have 
no f o r c e . L i k e  Eudoxus in the Recherche he considers 
that it is a diseased state of mind perpetually to be worked 
on by an insatiable curiosity.33 He himself no longer feels 
any desire to learn anything at all.3*̂ Only complete cer­
tainty could lead to such entire satisfaction, in a nature 
such as Descartes* .
In the third place, it is only by believing that his 
conception of metaphysics was that of a completely objective 
science, that it is possible to understand why Descartes 
should have thought that his metaphysical demonstrations 
could equally well have been discovered by someone else. He 
considers his metaphysics, he says, to be the only road for 
arriving at truth in the matters of which it treats, but it 
is a road which could equally well have been followed by 
someone e l s e . No more glory is due to him for having dis­
covered any truths, he says, than is due to a casual passer-by
for having accidentally discovered under his feet a rich 
treasure/
treasure which had for long successfully eluded the searches 
of many.3^ Metaphysics is claimed by Descartes to discount 
^personality. For him, imagination and memory do not belong 
to the essence of mind. The marks by which we ordinarily 
distinguish one individual frcm another are therefore not 
essential. We may say that Descartes pursues science as 
though he thought himself the impersonal thinking substance 
of his own Metaphysic
It is open to serious question whether Descartes* 
metaphysic is really objective and impersonal, though that 
is what he himself claims it to be, and it is only of that 
claim which has just been spoken. The metaphysic has, how­
ever, an implicit claim to be considered in relation to 
Descartes* personality, a complication which introduces great 
difficulties of interpretation. This must be remembered to 
avoid confusion in what follows.
§3. Since metaphysics is pursued "by the same method as
the other sciences, the knowledge of the metaphysician is not
different in kind from that of the physicist or mathematician.
It is only its objects which are different. Prom this point of
view, it is not superior to the other sciences. Indeed, it is
subordinate to them, since, merely the root of the tree of
knowledge,^1 it must be studied as an introduction to the rest
of the sciences. The proofs of the existence of God must be
grasped before we can be sure that mathematical propositions
are true. Furthermore, Descartes affirms that the six Medi-
42tations contain all the foundations of his physics. The 
ancillary duties of metaphysics in the philosophy of Descartes 
have led to its being often disputed among his interpreters, 
whether Descartes was a physicist or a metaphysician.
Since this dispute has ramifications of great impor­
tance, it is necessary to enter upon it. M. Liard was the 
first to pose the problem fully.^ Setting aside Descartes1 
statement that metaphysics is the root of the sciences, on 
the grounds that the physics is self-sufficient and is capable 
of independent exposition. M. Liard affirms that Descartes 
pursued physical investigations before metaphysical, and that 
the explanation of physical phenomena was the dominant and 
perpetual interest of his life. His physics differs from the 
medieval physics in being free from "metaphysical*1 ideas. 
Finally, it arises directly out of his method. But Descartes, 
M . Liard/
M. Liard continues, was not entirely free from Scholastic in­
fluences. Accepting the medieval idea of philosophy as the 
total of all we know, he had to construct a metaphysic to re­
tain the unity of his system. Physics and metaphysics being 
traditionally united, a physicist was bound to take the pre­
caution of supporting his physics by a metaphysic. Descartes 
submitted to a necessity external to his proper ends, and ex­
plicable by the demands of tradition. Being merely a safe­
guard it can be removed from the Cartesian philosophy without 
leaving any wound.
Thus M. Liard to whose view, however, are several 
objections. In the first place, it does not appear to be true 
that physics actually was Descartes* first love. A design to 
cultivate metaphysics seems to have had a definite place in 
his early purposes, fca? M. Gouhier has traced the development 
of the Meditations from an early plan for a "little treatise 
on divinity." Besides, it is very doubtful exegesis flatly 
to contradict Descartes1 own statements, that all further 
knowledge depends from the knowledge of ourselves and of God, 
questions peculiarly those of metaphysics. The arrangement 
of the sciences in the Discourse and the Principles is an 
earnest of the professions of the Preface to the Principles, 
since in both works the conclusions of metaphysics are stated 
before those of the other sciences. M. Liard*s theory sug­
gests a picture of Descartes as a man given to precautions and
expedients, and ruled by tradition, a portrait for which there
is much less evidence to be found than used to be believed.44
The philosopher who in the Regulae (VIII) affirmed that all 
the sciences united were but the human understanding was 
hardly the man to give a merely apparent unity to his works, 
nor to yield to any necessity but that of knowledge itself. 
Furthermore, the contention that the physics has an immediate 
source in the method, is weakened by the quantity of metaphy­
sics included, it seems inseparably, in Descartes* detailed
45treatise on method: the Regulae. Indeed, the method seems 
actually to preclude the immediate rise from it of physics, 
for it enjoins the entry into a doubt which, when thoroughly 
entered upon, leads to uncertainty about the existence of the 
objects of physics. But physics cannot demonstrate the exis­
tence of its own objects, this being the proper work of meta­
physics; so that the direct rise of physics from the method 
is forbidden by the method itself. In this is seen an essen­
tial difference between Descartes’ position and the traditional. 
No medieval physicist needed to demonstrate the existence of
i|
the objects of his science, since scholastic metaphysics 
depended on physics, proving God’s existence from the nature j 
of material things as revealed by a physics which took their 
existence for granted. Descartes is far from being influenced 
by tradition to construct his metaphysic, when he entirely 
reverses the rSle which metaphysics is to play in the system 
of our knowledge.4®
It is necessary to point out, however, that owing to
the/
17.
the difference between the Cartesian and the medieval physics, 
this reversal is not as simple as it may at first appear. The 
physics of Descartes, being mathematical, shares the nature 
of mathematical truths which Descartes declares to be indif­
ferent to the existence of their objects. There is room to 
doubt seriously whether Descartes’ physics actually requires 
the existence of the material world. It appears only to 
require the possible existence of this world, that is, as will 
be shown much further on, it requires to be a science of 
essences or natures which are other than our ideas. The real 
difficulty for physics, raised by the method’s prescribing 
doubt, is, therefore, not so much the difficulty of the cor­
respondence of our ideas with the existent, as with the pos­
sibly existent, or world of essences. But since it is the 
essence or nature of things which is that in them which we 
know, the insuperable difficulty for physics posed by the re­
quiring of doubt by the method, is not that it cannot prove j
that it is a science of the existent, but that it cannot prove I
whether it is a science of the essences of things, which con- j  
tain no more than the possibility of existence. It requires 
metaphysics, not to prove that its objects exist, but to prove 
that it is true.
The fact that the medieval relationship of physics 
and metaphysics was changed by Descartes has led more recent 
commentators to suppose that he believed metaphysics to have 
an/
18.
an actual priority to physics, tout that,precisely for that 
reason, it was no fundamental interest of his. Being relative 
to a certain end, the physics, it was something to construct 
and have done with. The metaphysics came into toeing only for
Artthe sake of the physics.
This view depends on certain otovious facts. In the 
Preface to the Principles, Descartes compares philosophy to 
a tree of which metaphysics is the root, physics the trunk, 
and medicine, mechanics, and morals the tranches. That he is 
in earnest with this arrangement, the Discourse and the Prin­
ciples hear witness. Metaphysics raises the doubt from 
mathematical truths, from which physics and mechanics depend, 
and establishes the mechanism necessary for the study of the 
human toody. It rids us of the substantial forms. And finally, 
in proving the substantiality of the mind, and the real exis­
tence of material things it points beyond itself to morals 
and physiology. The conclusions of metaphysics are useless 
except as the foundations of the other sciences.
But im answering the question, physicist or metaphy­
sician? we must ask whether these facts are really relevant.
It is true that metaphysics occupies a subordinate place 
among the Cartesian sciences, from the point of view of 
architechtonics. But what the question asks is, what the man 
was and where his interests lay; and, to Descartes* own 
attitude to his works the "hierarchy” of the sciences in his 
philosophy/
philosophy gives no straightforward clue.
The conception of hierarchy within the sciences is 
essentially scholastic. For scholasticism, the relation of 
the sciences to each other was determined by the nature of 
the objects of these sciences. The highest science was that 
which had the noblest object; the lowest, that which had the 
least. The hierarchy of the sciences was, therefore, fixed 
by an immoveable criterion, and the order in which they were 
to be pursued determined by absolute objective standards and 
not by subjective ones. This order was above the interference 
of the individual, since it depended from an objective order 
divinely appointed from the Creation. This doctrine implied 
the perfect connatural!ty of the mind with its objects. It 
was the very essence of man!s rational nature to know objects 
in a certain order. There was no question whether a man was 
primarily a physicist, a metaphysician or a theologian. These 
things were determined by his "definition,” and his definition 
was not something peculiar to himself, but something common 
to all humanity. In his scientific activities he was first a 
physicist, and finally a theologian. Yet not he, but the 
humanity in him, for the hierarchy of the sciences gives no 
clue to the mind of Peter as Peter, but only as a man. Peter, 
as an individual, is of no account.
But, as Ren£ Descartes, Peter loses his old humility 
and ceases to efface himself. In disturbing the traditional 
order/
order of the sciences, Descartes denied the objectivity of 
this order. He affirmed himself in opposition to the order 
of things established by God from the Creation. In assigning 
a new order to the sciences, he broke entirely with the old 
conception of hierarchy which placed itself entirely beyond 
the interference of the individual thinker. Strictly speak­
ing, the order he substituted is no hierarchy at all.
Descartes1 changes in the Scholastic hierarchy may 
consequently be regarded as marking not merely a change in 
the order of philosophising, but the emergence of a new kind 
of man. The very fact that there is a question whether 
Descartes was a physicist or a metaphysician marks an interest 
in Peter as Peter, which is quite incompatible with the whole 
doctrine of connaturality. Breaking up the divine concord 
between thought and its objects, Descartes conceives thought 
to be anterior to things; his thought in particular, rather 
than thought in general. Hitherto, a man had been what he was 
by definition, fitting into the eternal order of things by a 
supernatural necessity. Now it was no longer the order of a 
man1 s studies which determined what he was - though that had 
had little interest for him; but he who could determine this 
order conformably to the demands of his own intellect.
The sciences, in fact, were coming to have a connection 
with individuality; to involve the total being of the thinker 
in a manner unadmitted by the scholastics.49 The question, 
physicist/
physicist or metaphysician? involves the whole person of 
Descartes so deeply that it would he an oversimplification 
to try to answer it merely from the subservient part appar­
ently played by the metaphysic in the Cartesian arrangement 
of the sciences. Descartes, experiencing the effect of the 
pursuit of a science upon the whole man, affirmed the right 
of the thinker to make himself whatever kind of man he wished 
to be, by choosing upon what intellectual occupation he should 
lay most stress. Believing it to be within a man!s own power 
to shape himself, he considered science to be the implement 
by which it was to be effected. For better or worse, he did 
for the philosopher what the disappearance of the guilds did 
for the artisan: he threw upon him a vast responsibility for 
his own destiny. But if this is true, then the question, 
physicist or metaphysician? is to be answered in the light of 
Descartes1 conception of the human end; for, the will of man 
having been exalted in a manner entirely destructive of the 
doctrine of connaturality, it is not the divine order in the 
universe, but man1 s' moral end, in relation to which all his 
activities must be considered.
Descartes* innovations were not so great, however, 
that he did not retain many of the old forms . His arrangement 
of the sciences has, at least superficially, a resemblance to 
the scholastic. But the differences are of more Importance 
than the similarities, and we can best obtain some estimate 
of/
of them by considering the science of Theology which Descartes, 
like St. Thomas, considers the highest form of knowledge.
For St. Thomas, Theology is a science constructed by
the rational development of the truths of faith by reason
perfected by faith. But for Descartes, reason stands in no
intrinsic need of being perfected in order,to any of its
operations. The natural light shines by virtue of itself, not
by virtue of any supernatural light. Descartes, therefore,
does not reject the title of theologian because he feels the
lack of the perfection of his reason by faith. As' to the
revealed truths, which are the proper object of Theology,
these are the canmon property of all Christians, the truths
by which heaven is to be gained being in the possession even
of idiots and rustics.^0 The interpreter seems to be faced
with a dilemma. If reason requires no supernatural perfection
in order to any of its operations, then it should be capable
of constructing a theology provided that it was confronted
with the proper objects of that science; and there is no
reason to believe that Descartes did not consider these truths
to be accessible to all Christians. Quite the contrary. Why,
then, did he not consider himself fit to be a theologian?
It is true that Descartes affirms that theologians ”need to
have some extraordinary assistance from heaven and to be more 
52than men;n while his friend, P. Nicholas Poisson, was con~ 
vinced that Descartes would not pursue theology because it was
23.
a saint exerclce; ^  evidence which suggests the conception of 
the perfection of reason by faith. But there seems to be 
another explanation of Descartes’ refusal to pursue theology. 
It is this, that there are passages in Descartes which imply 
the rejection of the conception of Theology as the rational 
development of the truths of faith, and identify it with 
faith. Theology then becomes the corpus of the truths of 
faith, perhaps even only so far as these are apprehended by 
idiots and rustics. That is, it is a simple statement of the
truths necessary for our salvation, and ceases to be a science
in the strict sense. The truths of revelation, says Descar­
tes, are beyond our intelligence; and therefore he dares not 
submit them to the feebleness of his reason. Why, indeed, 
should he do so when theology has the practical purpose of 
directing us to heaven, the road to which lies open as much
to the most ignorant as to the most learned?^
The conclusion to be drawn from the famous passages^ 
in the Discourse and the Dialogue with Burman, seems quite 
clear. Theology has a practical end, to point the way to 
heaven. Since we know that the most ignorant can be saved, 
it follows that the truths accessible to them are sufficient 
for the end to which Theology serves. Theology need, there­
fore, not contain more than these truths. Obviously their 
rational development is not relevant to its proper end. Why 
all the confusion of the Scholastic Theology, says Descartes, 
wwhen/
”when we see that idiots and rustics can reach heaven as well 
as we? This certainly should warn us, that it is far better 
to preserve our Theology as simple as they.” Theology, then, 
is in the possession of idiots and rustics, a conclusion which 
agrees well enough with Descartes1 secularisation of human 
reason, as a result of which divine things are felt to be 
beyond ’’the feebleness of our reasonings.11
If this is true, then there is a difference startling 
enough between the Cartesian and Thomistic conceptions of 
Theology. For the former, it can hardly be called a science. 
Why, then, should Descartes rank theology as the highest kind 
of knowledge? Here again the solution lies in Descartes’ 
humanistic standpoint. St. Thomas ranked the sciences in 
respect of their objects, Theology being preeminent by virtue 
of its supreme object. But, for Descartes, thoughts are 
anterior to things, so that the branches of knowledge can be 
classified only from the side, not of the character of objects 
but of thoughts. But if Theology is nothing more than the 
corpus of the truths of faith, then it must be the highest 
kind of knowledge by virtue of the subjective criterion of 
clearness and distinctness since, ’matters which have been 
divinely revealed to us are more certain than our surest 
(sc. human) knowledge.”56 The Cartesian classification of 
the branches of knowledge relates to the certainty which we 
as humans can have of the truth, not to the object of which 
the/
the truth is affirmed. Thus, with respect to the preeminence 
of tiieology, Descartes’ doctrine differs from that of St. 
Thomas in this, that man, not God, is the measure. It is 
quite probabl/ that Descartes valued faith as the pattern of 
human certainty. He accorded it his admiration because it 
professed to give that kind of certainty, complete and 
absolute, which he regarded as the perfection of the human 
intellect. He admired theology as a scientist not as a man 
of faith, and he did not tire of attempting to gain by the 
sciences possible to the natural light that conviction of the 
nature of things, and that deep consolation which for the 
saints are the gift only of grace. Theology holds the place 
assigned to it by Descartes, by no secure tenure.
It may be objected to this exposition of Descartes’
conception of Theology that, in fact, he did not wish to
preserve theology simple, but that he had a secret desire to
crown his philosophy with a Cartesian Theology, like that of
which he has given an example in his writings on the 
57Eucharist. There is no reason to believe, however, that 
this nechantillon de la theologie cartesienne” is, in fact, 
a contribution to such a science. In the very passage from 
the dialogue with Burman where Descartes’ identification of 
Theology with the truths of faith most clearly appears, the 
following words occur: nWe can, however, and we ought to show 
that the truths of Theology are not at variance with those of 
Philosophy,/
Philosophy, hut we should not examine them in any other way." 
But this precisely describes the nature of Descartes’ writings 
on the Eucharist which are intended to shew that his philo-
58sophy supports rather than conflicts with the truths of faith. 
It is not an example of a theology built upon his philosophy, 
but a piece of apologetic whereby it is shown that there is 
an accord between his philosophy and that true and simple 
theology, which is nothing but the corpus of the truths of the 
faith.
Descartes’ humanistic conception of Theology carries 
with it profound consequences. The criterion by which the 
branches of knowledge are to be ranked is a purely human one.
It is the value which they have for us as truth which decides 
their status. But, for Descartes, truth is a thing which is 
primarily of moral value. Its possession, he writes to 
Elizabeth, is a moral perfection. Nothing, indeed, is to be 
valued except insofar as it contributes to this perfection.
M. Boutroux has discussed the relation of Descartes’ science 
to his moral preoccupations in a fashion so clear, and so well 
based on the texts that, for present purposes, little remains 
to be said on that head. One text, too much ignored, will 
serve as an illustration of the fashion in which Descartes 
subjected science to morals, his chief preoccupation, according 
to Baillet.^ ttThe whole conduct of our life depends on our 
senses. That of sight being the most universal of these and
the most noble, there is no doubt that the inventions which
serve to increase its powers are the most useful possible.”
The/____________________________________________________________
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The end of physics is -utility.
"It ought to be our first care to live well,"60 says 
Descartes, and moral philosophy teaches us hew this is to be 
done. Let us pause to note some characteristics of this 
science. Influenced by Stoicism, Descartes conceives morality 
from the point of view of living an earthly life which in itself 
would be pleasing and complete. How can a man live the life 
most acceptable to himself? Believing with the Stoics that 
nothing is in our power except our own thoughts, Descartes 
emphasises the power of natural reason to enable us to live 
in perfect happiness.^ Wisdom (la sagesse) can bring us 
complete happiness (la beatitude); and wisdom is nothing but 
the sum of the knowledge to which we can attain by the purely 
human sciences. It is human wisdom, attainable by human 
m e a n s . T h u s  morality is for Descartes something more of 
the earth than it is for St. Thomas. His "parfaite morale," 
a human science, is "le dernier degr£ de la Sagesse," the 
final degree of wisdom.^3 The Pagan inheritance of the Middle 
Ages, re-asserting itself in the Renaissance, has turned 
Descartes in the direction of that Humanism in which M.
Maritain sees the corroding vice of our times. Descartes 
believes that something which is in his own power can make 
him happy. There is, he thinks, a "beatitude naturelle" to 
which a Pagan philosopher could have shown us the way.6^
"While he leaves to religion, says Boutroux, the task,
of/
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of assuring our felicity in the next world, he himself takes 
up the work left him by the ancient philosophers of guiding 
and making happy the present life.”6® He belongs to an age 
when philosophers could no longer be canonised.®®
It is unnecessary, having regard to the results of 
modern scholarship, to dwell upon the fact of humanistic j
i
elements in the thought of Descartes. It is necessary only [
to call attention to the fact that moral science, being the 
human science par excellence was of peculiar interest to him.
In it, we garner the fruit of the tree of knowledge.
”By the science of Morals, I understand the highest 
and most perfect which, presupposing an entire knowledge of 
the other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom.”®^
Truth comes to be valued by Descartes for its moral 
uses. We judge it by the moral ends which it serves, just
I
as we judge a tree by its fruits. M. Boutroux has demonstrated! 
the fashion in which Descartes directed his physical researches 
to the human good.66 It remains to be remarked what is the 
relation of theology and metaphysics to moral values.
With respect to metaphysics the issue seems fairly 
clear. ”lt is in being superior to error,” says Descartes,
”that the highest and chief perfection of man consists.”6^
But in what, ultimately, lies the gain in being superior to 
error? In this, that the power of distinguishing the true 
from the false enables us to act clearsightedly, and proceed 
with/
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70with confidence' in this life. It is for the sake of action,
71then, that we must know what is true and what is false. We 
cannot but consent to the good which we clearly see.7^ But 
the power of distinguishing the true from the false is given 
us by metaphysics, which teaches the means of doubting the 
obscure and confused, and establishes the basis of all human 
certainty.^ As making this fundamental and necessary contri­
bution to the human good, it 316 s closer to Descartes1 dearest 
ends than physics.
Furthermore, truth itself, apart from the end which 
it subserves, namely action, has a moral sublimity. Descartes 
writes to Elizabeth that the greatest good lies in the exer­
cise of virtue, or what comes to the same thing, in the pos­
session of all the perfections of which the acquisition 
depends upon our free will.74 It is a very great perfection 
to know the truth, so great, indeed, that it is better to 
know it and be saddened than not to know it and be cheerful. 
The possession of truth, then, is a moral perfection. But the 
essential quality of truth is clearness and distinctness. The 
more clear and distinct it is, the greater its moral value. 
Since metaphysics is the science of immaterial things, and 
, since immaterial things can be better known than material,7® 
it is clear that metaphysics has a higher moral value as truth 
than the science of material things, and thus contributes more 
than physics to that greatest good which must be sought before 
all/
50.
all other things. A man, therefore, desiring before all else 
to live well, must necessarily value metaphysics more than 
physics.
In his correspondence with Elizabeth, Descartes, in 
telling how the best life on earth is to be lived, says that 
the first two things necessary for this are the knowledge of 
the greatness and goodness of God, and of the soul’s immor-
rtctality. The consciousness of the world’s vastness takes a 
third place. If we consider the first two truths as being 
demonstrated by metaphysics, the nature of the superior im­
portance of metaphysics over physics is once more apparent.
If we consider them as revealed truths, we will be in the 
presence of another instance of how humanised the Cartesian 
conception of theology has become. The truths of faith sub­
serve the human good. We believe in the life hereafter for 
the better satisfaction of the present life. Theology itself 
is subject to moral ends. No longer a science directed to 
God’s glory, it is a corpus of revealed truths having as its 
end man’s comfort and man’s salvation, man’s reassurance, and 
his peace of mind. We value it according to the force with 
which it reassures us. The path to heaven becomes a path to 
an idealised humanity, and the rational science of theology 
dwindles to a simple statement of the truths of faith, and is 
displaced by the perfect science of morality which has as its 
object the state of man as a creature of earth rather than of 
God.
"Since God alone knows all things perfectly we must 
content ourselves with knowing those which are of the greatest 
use to us” - God’s existence, since the love of Him elevates 
our own spirits and relieves our own afflictions; and the 
soul’s capacity to enjoy an infinite number of contentments in 
a future life,^7 so that detaching ourselves from the world by 
the aid of this knowledge we may better enjoy this world.^
Is it, perhaps, true that the secret of Descartes’" 
deference to Theology is that he was obsessed with a human 
science which in the course of history would make the very
truths of faith seem unnecessary? It is not a result which
he foresaw, and it is an intention he would probably have re­
pudiated with horror. But the seeds of it lie in his 
thought. ̂
In the light of the preceding discussion certain con­
clusions can be suggested as to extent to which the different 
branches of knowledge were of interest to Descartes. Whatever 
may have been his conception of theology, it is clear that he 
did not consider himself a theologian in the orthodox sense.
He did not wish to elaborate it as a science nor to teach it.^1 
Wholly preoccupied with moral values, he nevertheless construc­
ted no definitive science of morals. It is, however, clear
that morals determine the order of his interests, and, having 
regard to his conception of the human good, it is impossible
to deny that there are good reasons for considering that he 
valued/
valued metaphysics more than physics. Descartes was a man who 
loved himself too much to busy himself throughout his life 
with that which was of small significance to him. He always 
considered truth in its relation to himself.
g4. Metaphysics is for Descartes the clearest of the human 
sciences. On this account, it was, of the sciences which he 
completed, that in which he was most interested, since he 
always professed to love truth more than anything else in this 
world,82 and the first characteristic of truth is clearness 
and distinctness. Since metaphysics has its special virtues 
of clearness and distinctness because it is methodically pur­
sued, we find that Descartes1 chief interest in his metaphy­
sics lay in its methodological or formal aspect. Indeed, in 
all branches of knowledge, it was the structure rather than 
the content of the science which appeared to him of importance, 
since the first and chief requirement for reaching truth is 
that we should search for it in that orderly and methodical 
fashion of which we are told in the Regulae and in the Dis- |
■Icourse on Method. The test of a science, and the channel j
through which it compels our will and our understanding, is 
that its proofs should proceed with perfect consequence from I 
simple, self-evident truths. As M. Milhaud says of Descartes’ 
first scientific attempts: "It isn’t the fact of formulating a 
truth which counts for him; it is the fact of demonstrating it, j 
of grasping it, of unfolding it."8^ Thus we can understand 
why Descartes who regarded his method as novel, and as pecu- 1jliarly his own, nevertheless set no value on a truth merely
because it happened to be new.84 We find him saying, "I am
by no means of a like mind with those who desire that their
opinions should appear new; on the contrary, I accommodate 
mine/
mine to those of others, so far as the truth permits me."85 
To see truths in a system was Descartes’ endeavour. It did 
not matter whether they were old or new.88 Hence his criti­
cisms of Regius. "But now a manifold experience compels me 
to conclude that he is swayed not so much by love of truth as 
by love of novelty. He holds all he has learned from others 
to be old-world and outworn, thinking nothing sufficiently 
novel except what he has hammered out of his own brain.
In the Preface to the Principles, Descartes accuses Regius of 
having, in his Fundamenta Physicae, changed the necessary 
order of truth.88 Truth is seen in the structure rather than 
in the content of knowledge. The study of the Meditations is 
interdicted to those who read "without caring to comprehend 
the order and connection of the reasonings."8^ Of this, we 
may here consider an important consequence.
It was said earlier that, on the grounds of Descartes’ 
own expressed intentions, the Meditations could be considered 
to be his definitive metaphysical work, since he intended them 
to contain his whole metaphysics in their most truly scientific 
form. It is now possible to see how It follows, from Descar­
tes* conception of the characteristics of true reasoning, that 
the Meditations should be regarded as complete and self- 
contained. True science must consist of a perfect nexus of 
truths. Since metaphysics is a demonstrative science, an 
exposition of metaphysical science must contain no proofs too 
few or too many. To be cogent it must be coherent and conse­
quent,/
consequent, which it cannot possibly be if any omissions have 
been made from it. If to understand metaphysics it is neces­
sary to comprehend the interrelation and order of proofs in a 
complete system, then, in considering his Meditations to be 
scientific, Descartes presents them as lacking in nothing.
It follows that the proper study of the Cartesian metaphysics 
is the study of the formal order of the proofs of the Medita­
tions. This is more important than the study of its content, 
since that is the same both for the Meditations and the first 
book of the Principles. More important than to know what is 
proved, is to know how it is proved, to understand the Medita­
tions being to view at glance, or intuitively, the order and 
connection of the reasonings.90
The determination of Descartes’ intentions in any 
point of metaphysical doctrine must, therefore, always be de­
rived from the consideration of the fashion in which this 
point occurs in the nexus of proofs of the Meditations. It 
requires the concession ab initio that the Meditations are a 
complete body of truth, whose author was strongly aware that 
the least fault in his chain of reasoning must bring about the 
collapse of the whole system. Descartes’ other works touching 
on metaphysics must, If we are faithful to their author’s in­
tention, be regarded not as supplementing the Meditations, but 
as aids to our own deficient understanding in comprehending a 
work which pretends to be without formal deficiencies. They 
are useful rather than necessary. They have no logical, but 
only/
only a practical connection with the Meditations, and if they 
seem to contain anything not included in the Meditations, we 
must conclude that the omission from the latter is intentional, 
as in the instance of the Responses of which Descartes says:
WI do not consider it to the point, nor even possible, to in­
clude in my Meditations the reply to objections for that
»»91would break into their whole order."
g5. Before it is possible to -understand the Meditations
it is therefore necessary to determine as far as possible what 
their structure is. Descartes treats metaphysical truths as 
though they were geometrical truths. They are similarly de­
monstrated. What form does this demonstration take?
In his response to the authors of the second set of 
objections Descartes clearly explains his intentions about the 
structure of the Metaphysic. There are two things, he says, 
which he distinguishes in the geometrical mode of writing, 
namely, the order and the method of proof.
I. The order of proof. "The order consists merely in putting 
forward those things first that should be known without the 
aid of what comes subsequently, and arranging all other matters 
so that their proof depends solely on what precedes them. I 
certainly tried to follow this order as accurately as possible 
in my Meditations; and it was through keeping to this that I 
treated of the distinction between the mind and the body, not 
in the second Meditation, but finally in the sixth, and delib­
erately and consciously omitted much, because it required an 
explanation of much else besides."92 The order is thus an 
order of proof. It is an order of rational demonstration.
The order we follow is not influenced by the order in the real 
of the objects into whose nature we ard enquiring. The order 
is a purely logical one, in which we are concerned only with 
the order in which we apprehend things, apart altogether from 
the/
the ontological importance which we may assign to them after 
we have discovered their nature. According to the third rule 
of the Discourse on Method, we "assign in thought a certain 
order even to those objects which in their own nature do not 
stand in a relation of antecedence and consequence. ^  We 
start with the most simple things, not with the most real, 
and we prove, indeed we can prove, no more about them at any 
one step than the strict order of proof demands.
II The method of proof. In his reply to the authors of the 
second set of objections Descartes mentions that there are two 
methods of proof, the analytic and the synthetic. He himself 
employs the analytic method, because it represents the actual 
order in which metaphysical discoveries are made, and is 
therefore the best method of teaching. "If the reader care to 
follow It, and give sufficient attention to everything, he 
understands the matter no less perfectly and makes it as much 
his own as if he had himself discovered it. But it contains 
nothing to incite belief in an inattentive or hostile reader; 
for if the very least thing brought forward escapes his notice, 
the necessity of the conclusions is lost; and on many matters 
which, nevertheless, should be specially noted; it often 
scarcely touches, because they are clear to anyone who gives 
sufficient attention to them."94 Descartes’ intention is thus 
to take the reader with him on his journey of metaphysical
discovery. 95 He is not merely showing him the countries he 
has/
has discovered, or conducting him by easy ways from capital to 
capital. He is traversing with him the jungles and morasses 
of original exploration. The reader has no right to assume 
that these capitals have been discovered until they actually 
come in sight, and he seems himself to discover them. This 
method implies the willingness of the reader to follow. It 
cannot constrain a hostile reader. The interpreter of Descar­
tes’ metaphysic who takes the Method seriously is thus com­
pelled to put aside for the moment his personal metaphysical 
views. Above all else, Descartes’ system requires the sym­
pathy of those who wish to comprehend it. An unsympathetic 
critic betrays at once by his attitude his ignorance of the 
system he is examining. Descartes has made it quite clear 
that his system is not comprehensible until we have made it 
live in our minds as it lived in his own. This requirement 
is not by any means in the nature of a personal plea. It is 
the inescapable demand of the analytic method. It is impos­
sible to follow the intricacies of the proof if we are ham­
pered by a hostile attitude, because the method is a kind ofqgmental habit. At each step of the proof we have not only 
fully to grasp that step but to see completely all the pre­
vious steps, and how the last depends on them. The system 
has to be known at once in whole and in part. nI know how 
difficult It will be, even for one who does attend and 
seriously attempt to discover the truth, to have before his 
mind (intueri) the entire bulk of what is contained in my 
Meditations,/
Meditations, and at the same time to have a distinct knowledge 
of each part of the argument, and yet, in my opinion, one who 
is to reap the full benefit from my work must know it both as 
a whole and in detail."97 To forget the least detail results 
in our losing the necessity of the conclusion. That is why 
Descartes asks us to bestow weeks and even months on the first 
Meditation98 before going any further, and has told us that he 
despises those who think that they can learn in a day what it 
has taken others twenty years to discover.
Metaphysics is thus a strenuous and profound exercise, 
which is to absorb our whole energies leaving no room for hos­
tility and prejudices. So great is its difficulty that to 
disseminate its conclusions it is better to act through the 
channel of authority than to submit the work directly to the 
public. In a letter, Descartes says that he proposes "to 
elucidate what I have written in the fourth part of the Method, 
but to have only twelve or fifteen copies printed, to send to 
twelve or fifteen of our principal theologians and to await 
their judgment: for I compare what I have done in that field 
with the demonstrations of Apollonius, in which there is truly 
nothing which is not very clear and certain, when one con­
siders each point by itself; but because the demonstrations 
are rather long, and the necessity of the conclusion cannot 
immediately be seen, if one does not remember accurately 
everything which precedes it, it is with difficulty that a 
man is to be found in an entire country capable of understan­
ding/
understanding them. However, because those few who understand 
them assert that they are true there is no one who should not 
believe them. Thus I think I have completely demonstrated the 
existence of God and the immateriality of the human soul, but 
because it depends on several consecutive arguments, of which 
the conclusion cannot be properly understood if the least de­
tail of them be forgottem, I see that they will bear very 
little fruit if I do not find very capable people of a great 
reputation in metaphysics, who taking the trouble to examine 
my arguments carefully, and who, saying openly what they think, 
give the impulse to others, in this fashion, to judge of it as 
they do, or at least to be ashamed of contradicting them with­
out grounds;99 and it seems to me that I am obliged to spend 
more trouble to obtain some credit for this treatise which 
has regard to God1s glory than my temper would permit me to 
give It, did it treat of another matter.
The analytic method employed in the Meditations can, 
thus, satisfy only a few of the most capable minds. Yet it is 
the only method by which the matters there treated can be 
properly understood. Yet the Meditations were written for the 
general good of mankind, because they are intended to uphold 
the cause of God. Hence a dilemma: the more logically cogent 
the proofs are made, the more objective they become, the more 
worthily they defend the cause of God, the less capable are 
they of influencing the vulgar. The only solution is an appeal 
to authority, an appeal which illustrates the Discourse and 
Descartes1/
Descartes’ whole character. In the second hook of the Dis­
course Descartes speaks of "those who, possessed of sufficient 
sense or modesty to determine that there are others who excel 
them in the power of discriminating truth and error, and by 
whom they may be instructed, ought rather to content themselves 
with the opinions of such than trust for more correct to their 
own reason. For my own part," he says," I should doubtless 
have belonged to this c l a s s , h a d  I received instruction 
from but one master, or had I never known the diversities of 
opinion that from time immemorial had prevailed among men of 
the greatest learning," Dogma is necessary, not only in re­
ligion, but also in metaphysics, since few men can think for 
themselves. Curious fusion of pride and modesty’ Descartes’ 
choice of the analytic method shows how his undeviating alle­
giance to reason, which is only satisfied by the most cogent 
method of proof, goes together with a belief in the impotence 
of the popular reason, which, being nevertheless the mark of 
an immortal soul, must be influenced by authority to believe 
that the proofs of God’s existence are successful. Rather an 
appeal to authority than a poor demonstration. The rejection 
of the synthetic method seems to be explicable only by the 
high estimation in which Descartes held both his reason and
his religion.
The authors of the second set of objections have asked 
for a sample of the Metaphysic demonstrated by the synthetic 
method employed by the ancient geometers. Descartes concedes 
that/
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that this method wdoes indeed clearly demonstrate its con­
clusions, and it employs a long series of definitions, pos­
tulates, axioms, theorems and problems, so that if one of the 
conclusions that follow is denied, it may at once be shown to 
be contained in what has gone before. Thus the reader, how­
ever hostile and obstinate, is compelled to render his 
a s s e n t . Y e t  this method is not so satisfactory as the 
other and does not equally well content the eager learner, 
because it does not show the way in which the matter taught 
was discovered.11 In the Metaphysic, then, it is important, 
from the point of view of the natural reason, not so much to 
know what has been discovered but how it was discovered.
What is demanded is not assent but comprehension. If the 
synthetic method be employed, and a reader question a con­
clusion, he is bound to consent to its correctness when he is 
referred back to propositions to which he has already assented. 
Yet since this method does not demand from him the lively and 
constant comprehension of these earlier propositions, but 
merely the recollection that he once gave his assent to them, 
the mental gain of the reader is not very great. Again, even 
a willing reader is retarded by the comparatively mechanical 
arrangement of the matter demonstrated by the synthetic method. 
The final objection to this method is that it demands a state­
ment of first principles from which the proof may proceed, and 
though this causes no difficulty in geometry whose first prin­
ciples are obvious, it results in great difficulties for meta­
physics/
44.
metaphysics in which the trouble lies precisely in the com­
prehension of first principles-
45.
| {g A great many of the difficulties which interpreters
find in Descartes1 system would he avoided by our bearing in 
mind the easily understood account which Descartes gives of 
the analytic and synthetic methods in metaphysics. We bring 
upon ourselves nothing but confusion when we try to interpret 
the Meditations now in the light of the one method, now in 
the light of the other. The habit of keeping these methods 
apart has to be formed before Descartes can be read intelli­
gently .
It is clear that the order in which arguments are 
arranged in expositions after the synthetic and after the 
analytic methods necessarily differ from each other. The 
former is an order of exposition, the latter one of discovery. 
"These two methods," says Arnauld "differ only as the route 
which one takes in ascending from a valley to a mountain, 
from that which one takes in descending from the mountain to 
the valley; or as the two manners differ which we use for 
proving that someone is descended from St. Louis, one of which 
is to show that this person had such an one for a father, who 
was the son of such an one, and he of another, up to St. Louis 
and the other to commence from St. Louis, and to show that he 
had such and such children, and these children others, des­
cending from them to the person under discussion: and this 
example is all the better in this way that it is certain that, 
to trace an unknown genealogy, one must go upwards from son 
to/
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to father.”10^ Suppose that I am following an exposition 
after the analytic method and, forgetting what is so important 
for that method: to recall constantly and vividly the steps by 
which I have arrived at the point where I stand, I mentally 
substitute for these steps a first principle of the synthetic 
method, and then continue analytically, the cogency of the 
further argument is destroyed. It is a very common mistake 
of interpreters to treat what would for the synthetic method 
be the first principles of Descartes’ metaphysics, as though 
they were principles tacitly and unjustifiably assumed in the 
Meditations. There is clearly no end to the difficulties 
which could be raised against the Meditations if we believe 
that Descartes assumes principles which in fact he intends to 
establish there for the first time, metaphysics unlike geom­
etry requiring that its first principles be demonstrated.105 
It is true that the demonstration of principles like !!of 
nothing there can be no properties or qualities” consists, 
for the analytic method, in nothing other than positing such 
principles at the appropriate moment. Their proof consists 
in their appositeness. But it is precisely in this matter 
that the difference between the analytic and synthetic methods 
lies. In synthesis we pass from the general to the particular, 
from clearly formulated general truths to the nature of a par­
ticular thing. In analysis, on the contrary, we concern our­
selves with the direct examination of the particular thing 
whose nature we wish to discover, making explicit during our 
examination/
examination the general principles which reveal themselves 
during that examination. The truth is not visualised by the 
analytic thinker as deduced from these principles: it is these 
principles, rather, which are revealed and confirmed by the 
discovery of the truth in a manner which implies them.
Assuming, then, that if the Meditations are to be 
understood, the requirements of the analytic method must be 
borne in mind, it is clear that they must not be interpreted 
as though the sequence of the argument were being tacitly 
directed by principles prejudged to be efficacious, more 
synthetico. The Meditations must be considered as a closed 
system of metaphysical truth, rigidly demonstrated, proceeding 
from the examination of the particular thing insofar as it is 
clearly and distinctly known, and affirming nothing which 
does not follow from what explicitly precedes it.
| (* (A It appears, then, that though Descartes desired to 
have his Metaphysic generally accepted because of its content, 
namely the demonstration of GodJs existence and of the soul’s 
immateriality, yet it is by reason of its structure that he 
meant it to appeal to the natural reason. We are to be con­
vinced of the truth of its proofs not by faith but by reason, 
and in reasoning it is the consecutiveness of the proofs that 
constitute the guarantee of its truth. It is therefore to the 
order of proof in the Meditations that attention must be paid. 
It is chiefly in respect of the order of proof that the Medi­
tations can be profitably compared with the fourth book of the 
Discourse, and with Principles I. If the last two works are 
to be profitably read, they must be read with an eye not to 
supplementing the content of the Meditations, but to discover­
ing how by the contrasts and similarities of the order of their )
proofs, they throw light upon the structure of the Meditations.
An inspection of the Meditations shows that they can 
be dissected in the following fashion. The work falls natur­
ally into two parts (I) the statement of the doubt, occupying 
the first Meditation, and (II) the systematic body of metaphy­
sical proofs which make up the rest of the Meditations, for 
which the doubt clears the ground. This systematic body of 
truths which follows the doubt has two explicit aims: to prove 
God’s existence; and to prove the soul’s immateriality, i.e. 
to prove that it is a thinking substance really distinct from
body. A complete study of the Meditations would demand the 
examination/
examination in detail of how both these sets of proofs are 
effected. But since the aim of this essay is not to make, 
but rather to justify the making of such a study, the detailed 
examination of the whole of the Meditations will not be 
attempted. The proof of the soul’s immateriality, however, 
is peculiarly suited to illustrate the predominant importance 
of method in the Metaphysic. The second Meditation commences 
with the affirmation of my existence. In the sixth and last 
Meditation the real distinction of body and mind is concluded 
to, i.e. my immateriality is proved. The transition from the 
Cogito to the affirmation of the soul’s immateriality is thus 
a transition running throughout the last five Meditations.
By tracing the steps of this transition one would demonstrate 
one of the ways in which these five Meditations are connected 
with each other, that is, what their structure is. The further 
aim of this essay is to determine the place of the Cogito in 
the Meditations, and the nature of the transition to the con­
clusion that the mind is an immaterial substance really dis­
tinct from the body.
The very fact that there is such a transition has 
often been overlooked or denied. Millet suggested that the 
passage from the "thing that thinks” to the immaterial, sub­
stantial self was artificial, and that though Descartes pro­
bably felt the feebleness of the proof, he had nevertheless 
retained it both as a support to Christian beliefs, and as a 
means of preventing the fanatics from becoming excited against 
him.106/
him.106 We have seen, however, that it is precisely because 
Descartes refused to rely on the proofs of synthesis, even 
though they were easier to apprehend than those of analysis, 
that he preferred to depend on the authority of theologians 
to gain credence for the conclusions of the Meditations. If 
he was willing to go to such extremes out of respect for the 
most stringent method of proof, it is not likely that he would 
have employed artificial arguments.
Throughout the history of Cartesian criticism, it has 
been constantly said that Descartes assumes the distinction 
between mind and body. If so, then the Meditations are an 
empty parade of false logic. Descartes was always particu­
larly vigorous in rebutting the charge of assuming in the 
second Meditation what he proves in the sixth. So far from 
our knowing what our proper substance is at the stage of the 
Cogito, we arrive at this knowledge ttby degrees.”107 Every­
thing that he has written in the third, fourth, and fifth 
Meditations, says Descartes, serves to establish the real 
distinction of body and mind which is only concluded in the 
sixth M e d i t a t i o n . T h e  nature of the steps of this transi­
tion form one of the chief matters of discussion between 
Descartes and Arnauld. If Arnauld were successful in his 
criticism then not only would the Meditations be destroyed 
but the whole Cartesian method, since the method is a univer­
sal method. If it fails in metaphysics, if it merely serves 
to render foregone conclusions plausible instead of being a 
genuine/
genuine instrument of discovery, then its uselessness in all 
spheres of the search for truth is proved. It is precisely 
because it involves no assumptions that Descartes prefers his 
method to the scholastic logic which, he says, merely teaches 
a method of communicating unexamined knowledge to others.
The analysis of the Meditations, for the purpose of 
showing the nature of the transition from the Cogito to the 
real distinction of body and mind, is what is new to be 
attempted.
g7. Descartes claims that the first truth of which he is
certain when he issues from his doubt is the Cogito ergo Sum. 
This is the starting point of his positive metaphysical con­
struction. It is frequently objected that the Cogito is a 
conclusion from a syllogism, the major premise of which is 
Descartes’ assumed but unadmitted first truth. This is not a 
matter which need be discussed since it concerns not the 
structure of the Metaphysic but Descartes’ doctrine of method.
It is relevant to a discussion of Descartes’ doctrine of the 
syllogism, but not of the Metaphysic, which presupposes the ! 
acceptance of the doctrine of method. We accept, then, that 
Descartes’ first truth is not the major premise of a syllo­
gism, but an intuition.
There is another problem, however, which vitally con­
cerns the student of the Meditations. It is the problem which 
has come to be indicated by the name of the cercle cartesien.
The Authors of the Second Objections urge against Descartes a 
charge of circular reasoning: j
’Since you are not yet aware of the existence of God, j
and yet according to your statement, cannot be certain of any- !
thing or know anything clearly and distinctly unless previous- I
ly you know certainly and clearly that God exists, it follows
that you cannot clearly and distinctly know that you are a
thinking thing, since, according to you, that knowledge depends
on the clear knowledge of the existence of God, the proof of
which you have not yet reached at that point where you draw | 
the/ 1
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the conclusion that you have a clear knowledge of what you 
are.”109
How can Descartes affirm that any proposition is true 
before the existence of God is proved? How, indeed, can he be 
sure of that very proof?1-*-0 The discussion of this question 
usually centres round the Cogito, though the question is 
really much wider. By what right is the truth of the Cogito 
affirmed before the existence of God is proved? There seems 
to be a circle in reasoning: we arrive at the proof of God?s 
existence by affirming the truth of the Cogito in virtue of 
the clearness and distinctness with which it is known, and 
then conclude that God guarantees the truth of clear and dis­
tinct ideas. The objection is one of the most serious that 
can be brought against the Metaphysic. The cogency of the 
Metaphysic depends on the rigid order of its proofs. It is 
said to take nothing for granted, and to follow a mathematical 
order of proof. The proofs follow a strict order of progres­
sion, each stage depending on the one before it, in an ir­
reversible sequence. To follow this order of proof is to 
understand the Metaphysic. If there is a flaw in this order, 
if there is a petitio principii, then the Metaphysic is unin­
telligible.
It is small wonder, then, that all serious commenta­
tors of Descartes have felt that the charge of circular 
reasoning is false and have tried to explain what the true
position of Descartes is. The most profound attempt is pro­
bably/
probably that of M. Gilson, and it is an attempt which rests 
on very considerable evidence. In his reply to the Authors 
of the Second Objections, Descartes says:
’’When I said that we could know nothing with certainty 
unless we were first aware that God existed, I announced in 
express terms that I referred only to the science apprehending 
such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending 
further to the proofs which led me to make them.” The Cogito 
being an independent intuition, does not involve memory in its 
apprehension. M. Liard has distinguished two kinds of clear 
and distinct knowledge to which the doubt can apply.111
I. By the hypothesis of a God who is a deceiver we can doubt j
whether a clear and distinct idea is a true idea, i.e. whether 
the essence of the thing conceived really corresponds to the |
clear and distinct idea which we have of it.
II. We can doubt also of the truths obtained by chains of 
reasoning, i.e. of the connections of clear and distinct ideas, 
such as we have in a science. The doubt in the second of 
these cases is the more real. In the first case the doubt can 
only be ’metaphysical.” But with regard to the second, there
is a more than ’metaphysical” doubt. In chains of reasoning, j
memory is involved. In proving a proposition in the fifth
book of Euclid we do not clearly and distinctly call to mind
all the actual proofs which have gone before. Though the
proposition we are proving depends so closely on what has gone |
before that If the smallest preceding detail were wrong our | 
proof/
proof would fail, nevertheless we do not recall all this 
detail, but only certain main conclusions. But how are we to 
be sure of these conclusions, if we are not attending to the 
detail? We say that we are sure of them only because we 
remember that we had a clear and distinct knowledge of them 
grounded in intuitions not involving memory. But what can 
guarantee the truthfulness of memory? Our memory itself can­
not guarantee its own truthfulness. We require knowledge of 
a God who will not let this faculty deceive us, in order to 
be certain of scientific truths.112 That is why the possi­
bility of mathematics demonstrated in the second half of the 
fifth Meditation is essentially a proof of the reliability of 
Memory.
M. Gilson emphasises the importance of thus guaran­
teeing the reliability of memory. He believes that the pro­
blem of the cercle cartesien is solved thereby. Only truths 
depending on memory require the divine guarantee. The Cogito 
does not require it, .
There are two insuperable objections to this explana­
tion. The first is the wide scope of the problem of the cercle 
cartesien. It arises not only in the case of the Cogito, but 
in the case of all propositions preceding the proof of God1s 
existence. The transition from the Cogito to the certainty of 
God1s existence is itself a long chain of proof, requiring 
much application, and involving memory to as great an extent 
as any chain of mathematical demonstrations.. Even if the 
Cogito/
Cogito did not require the divine guarantee, the problem 
would remain regarding the chains of demonstrations consequent 
upon it.
The second objection is that there seems no reason to 
suppose that Descartes ever distinguished between two kinds 
of clear and distinct ideas. The distinction does not occur 
in the first Meditation, when the hyperbolical doubt is 
raised. The only mark of true ideas is the clearness and dis­
tinctness with which they are conceived, and with respect to 
this mark there is no difference between the kogito, and the 
most recordite mathematical proposition. Further, in the 
Regulae, Descartes takes away the possibility of this dis­
tinction by showing that it is the ideal of all knowledge to 
become intuitive. All truth is essentially capable of being 
intuitively apprehended. There is no intrinsic difference in 
this respect between the truth of the Cogito, and that of the 
squares on the sides of a right-angled triangle.
In view of these difficulties, it will be best to turn 
back to the texts in the Meditations where the nature of the 
truth of the Cogito is expressly set forth. These occur near 
the commencement of the third Meditation.
WI am certain that I am a thinking thing; but do I 
not therefore likewise knov; what is required to render me 
certain of a truth? In this first knowledge, doubtless, there 
is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth except the 
clear and distinct perception of what I affirm, which would
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not indeed be sufficient to give me the assurance that what 
I say is true, if it could ever happen that anything I thus 
clearly and distinctly conceived should prove false, and ac­
cordingly it seems to me that I may now take as a general 
rule, that all that is very clearly and distinctly apprehended 
is true.”11’5
But Descartes has an idea of an all-powerful God, and
Mas often as this preconceived opinion of the sovereign 
power of a God presents itself to my mind, I am constrained to 
admit that it is easy for Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to 
err even in matters where I think I possess the highest evi­
dence; and, on the other hand, as often as I direct my atten­
tion to things which I think I apprehend with great clearness,
I am so persuaded of their truth that I naturally break out 
into such expressions as these: Deceive me who may, no one 
will yet ever be able to bring it about that I am not, so long 
as I shall be conscious that I am, nor at any future time cause 
it to be true that I have never been, it being now true that 
I am, or make two and three more or less than five, in sup­
posing which, and other like absurdities, I discover a mani­
fest contradiction.
There are several very interesting features in these 
passages, which have not been properly appreciated in the past. 
The first is that our certainty of the truth of the Cogito 
rests on no different grounds from our certainty of the truth 
of other clear and distinct ideas. have no assurance of 
its/
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its truth except the clear and distinct perception of what I 
affirm.” To repeat, the kind of truth and the mark of truth 
which we find in the Cogito and in other clear and distinct 
perceptions differ in no way. We must note how in the second 
passage quoted the Cogito is coupled with and spoken of as 
being a truth of the same kind as other clear and distinct 
ideas: ”Deceive me who may, no one will yet ever be able to 
bring it about that I am not, so long as I shall be conscious
that I am, --  or make two or three more or less than five.”
The Cogito is therefore a truth of the same kind as the sum 
of two and three. Again, it is of the utmost weight to note 
that in the first passage quoted the truth of the Cogito is 
made conditional. The clearness and distinctness with which 
it is perceived ”would not indeed be sufficient to give me the 
assurance that what I say is true, if it could ever happen 
that anything I thus clearly and distinctly conceived should 
prove false.”
The Cogito is therefore no more and no less true than 
other clear and distinct ideas. It seems to me that as a con­
sequence it becomes subject to the metaphysical doubt. Its 
truth is conditional. It is significant that in the corres­
ponding passages in the Discourse, where there is no hyper­
bolical doubt, the clauses in which this condition is attached 
to the truth of the Cogito are lacking.115 The solution of the 
problem of the cercle cartesien thus requires that we should 
show how a truth which is affected by the hyperbolical doubt 
can/
*
I fear that I have mot seated the 
matter suffic i ently fully. Certeimly Des­
cartes is reasoning in a circle if the 
truth of the Cogito is conditional. But 
this ceases to be a charge against Mr. 
if the circularity is intentional, and 
if it is compatible with the Method. In­
deed, the-fact shat there Is a circle In 
reasoning most he accepted if the meta- 
physique is to he understood. But If the 
circle Is vicious, it must he proved vic­
ious on grounds other than those hitherto 
adduced by the critics.
can yet serve as a first principle. Descartes lias placed the 
Cogito on the level of the other clear and distinct truths, 
it makes its truth dependent on theirs. The other clear and 
distinct perceptions are not true because the Cogito is true,
- which is the usual interpretation but the Cogito is true 
only provided that I cannot find a clear and distinct idea 
which is false.
It would appear that if this be borne in mind the 
ordinary charge of circular reasoning can be disposed of more 
effectively than ever before. All that stands in the way of 
Descartes1 being able to use the Cogito as his first positive 
truth is the possibility of finding a clear and distinct idea 
which is false. How strong are the grounds of this possibil­
ity? I have an idea of a God who may be a deceiver, and since 
omnipotence is included in my idea of him, it may be that he 
can bring it about that the essence or nature of things does 
not correspond to my clear and distinct ideas of them. But to 
what extent is this of weight? My clear and distinct ideas 
may be false if there is a God who is a deceiver. The falsity 
of my clear and distinct ideas would only result if I could 
prove that there was a God who was a deceiver, and who actually 
was deceiving me with respect to these ideas. But I have as 
yet made no such proof, and I cannot as yet see the possibility 
of any such proof. I have only a npreconceived opinion of the 
sovereign power of a God,” and further ,!I have no ground for 
believing that Deity is deceitful. The proof of the exis­
tence/
existence of a God-deceiver would itself demand that we start
from the Cogito. So flimsy and fantastic is the possibility
of finding such a God, that it cannot have nearly the strength
by which our certainty of the Cogito coerces us. If we are to
set aside as false all that admits of the smallest doubt, it
is the hypothesis of an evil genius or a God-deceiver which
falls to the ground long before our certainty of the Cogito.
It is thus on the very extravagance of the hyperbolical doubt
that the justification of the structural position of the Cogito
isin the metaphysics rests. The Cogito/to be taken as true, and 
to be trusted for purposes of metaphysical proof, until we can 
find a clear and distinct idea which is false, or a God who 
has deceived us. The reliability of the Cogito does not 
depend directly on our finding a God who is no deceiver, but 
on our not finding a God who is. The proof of the existence 
of a God who is no deceiver, is thus of negative and indirect 
significance. It is a guarantee that there is no God-deceiver, 
and therefore that no clear and distinct idea can be false, 
the latter being the condition under which the Cogito was to 
be relied on. It is the fact that we can rely on the Cogito 
under a negative condition which lifts the charge of circular
f
reasoning. The imputation of circular reasoning would be j
justified if we knew that the Cogito was true only when we had j
proved God’s existence. However, we know that the Cogito is j
true until a clear and distinct idea which is false be found,
and this possibility is finally removed by the proof of God’s 
existence./ ;
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existence. Tims the structural position of the Cogito in the 
Meditations is not owing to its being independent of the 
divine guarantee, as M. Gilson affirms, but actually to its 
being dependent, not directly which M. Gilson assumes to be 
the only possible alternative, but indirectly and negatively.
It remains, however, to give an explanation of the 
treatment of truths depending on memory in Meditation V.
Simple intuitions not involving memory, and the clear and 
distinct perceptions dependent on memory have been shown to 
be truths of the same kind, since the criterion of clearness 
and distinctness reduces all truths to a homogeneity of char­
acter. There is nevertheless a difference between them which 
arises not out of the truths themselves but out of the nature 
which apprehends them. There is a difference which arises out 
of our human infirmity. The truths of memory i.e. remembered 
truths may appear to be false !lbecause my constitution is also 
such as to incapacitate me from keeping my mind continually
”  Itfixed on the same object.-*--̂  I am conscious of the weakness
of not being able to keep my mind continually fixed on the
same t h o u g h t . T h e r e  is, then, a sense in which the truths
of memory are in greater need of God’s guarantee than the
theCogito. Nevertheless the true explanation of/emphasis which 
Descartes lays on the trustworthiness of memory is to be found 
in the essential similarity of remembered truths and of in­
tuitions . The Cogito was found to be true on condition that 
no clear and distinct idea could be found which was false.
We/
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We must therefore secure our metaphysic hy showing that this 
is not possible. But the case where we have most reason to 
fear that a clear and distinct truth may not be tt>ue is, 
human nature being weak, the case where the memory of the 
grounds of a truth are involved. When it can be shown that 
there is no need to doubt of a truth of this kind, then, all 
truths being essentially the same, there is no possibility of 
finding any clear and distinct truth which is false. Thus 
the Cogito and the succeeding chains of proof are finally 
justified.
This explanation of the cercle cartesien rests on the 
supposition that the truth of the Cogito is conditional, and 
is affected by the hyperbolical doubt; but that nevertheless 
we are justified in using it to prove God’s existence. It 
remains still to reply to an objection to this explanation 
which cannot but suggest itself: if Descartes has decided to 
set aside as false all that admits of the least doubt, then 
the Cogito as affected by the metaphysical doubt must be set 
aside as untrustworthy.
The important point to note, in resolving this diffi­
culty, is that a clear and distinct idea, unlike the ideas of 
sense, is only extrinsically and not intrinsically capable of 
doubt. A clear and distinct idea in itself admits of no doubt
whatever. Doubtfulness is never an intrinsic quality of clear
fashionand distinct ideas, in the/of the ideas of sense. The hyper­
bolical doubt consists in asking whether what cannot possibly
W
be doubted can yet be false. We are compelled to assent to 
what we clearly and distinctly conceive. The will is not free 
to refrain from assenting to what is clear and distinct. 
nI am of such a nature as to be unable, while I possess a very 
clear and distinct apprehension of a matter, to resist the 
conviction of its t r u t h . F u r t h e r ,  the freedom of the will 
consists in being thus compelled to assent. The will can only 
suspend judgment by indifference, which is not true freedom.
To say that God has given us the power of assenting only to our 
clear and distinct ideas does not mean that we have the power 
of not assenting to them, but only that we have the power of 
not assenting to obscure ideas. God whas at least left it in
my power --  firmly to retain the resolution never to judge
where the truth is not clearly known to me.,t12̂
It is thus a false interpretation of Descartes’ meta­
physic to suppose that his doctrine of freedom makes possible 
the withholding of our assent to clear and distinct ideas.
If the freedom of the will lies, as Descartes declares, in the 
compulsion which the will feels to assent to what is clearly 
and distinctly known, then the hyperbolical doubt arises from 
the will’s doubting its own freedom. The will is free to 
doubt if it is free, but not to cease to be free. Failure to 
resolve the doubt would not enable us to cease from assenting 
to our clear and distinct ideas, but would involve us in the
intolerable contradiction of not being able to believe in what
122we must believe in.
This/
This interpretation of Descartes’ thought seems to he 
contradicted in the Principles. Principles I : V, proves "why 
we may also doubt of mathematical demonstrations," followed in 
the succeeding paragraph by the observation, "that we possess 
a free will, by which we can withhold our assent from what is 
doubtful, and thus avoid error.n Since it has been said that 
we can doubt of mathematical demonstrations, it seems we must 
conclude that we can withhold our assent from them.
However, this clearly disagrees, on the face of it, 
with the third Meditation. "Deceive me who may, no one will
yet ever be able to --  make two and three more or less than
five, in supposing which, and other like absurdities, I dis­
cover a manifest contradiction." God, however, cannot make 
a contradiction intelligible.1^  We cannot help assenting to 
the truth that two and three are five. How, then, are the 
passages in the Principles to be explained? As follows: we 
must assent: but we are free to ask, may we assent? I am free 
to withhold an affirmative answer to the latter question, 
though to do so would result in the total destruction of 
reason. Therein precisely lies the seriousness of the hyper­
bolical doubt. It questions whether I may believe what I do 
and must believe. My suspense ceases only when I know God’s 
nature, but in the meantime I cannot help believing what I do 
believe, and so strong is my belief that in comparison with it 
"the ground of doubt   is very slight, and so to speak, meta­
physical,"1^^ even though this ground of doubt threatens the 
validity/
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validity of all human reason. This "slight” or "metaphysical” 
nature of the hyperbolical doubt must be interpreted to mean, 
not that Descartes does not seriously doubt of mathematical 
truths, but that he doubts them with an almost unexampled 
seriousness, since he doubts what we must assent to. The 
doubt is so deep as to seem superficial since it is beyond 
our normal comprehension. The sense, then, in which it is 
possible to say that we can withhold our assent from mathe­
matical truths is thus apparent.
In order to confirm still further this interpretation 
of the doubt it is worth citing the following passage from 
the Responses:
"As soon as we think that we clearly conceive some
truth we are naturally brought to believe it --  . We have
assumed a belief or persuasion so strong, that it cannot be 
removed, and this conviction is consequently the same as the 
most perfect certitude. But it can be doubted whether there 
is any certitude of that nature, or any persuasion firm and 
immovable. It is indeed certain that no one can have such 
conviction In respect of things obscure and confused, however 
little obscurity or confusion we may remark there: for that 
obscurity, such as it is, is a sufficiently good reason for
making us doubt of these things . If then there is any
certainty, It must reside only with regard to those things 
which the mind conceives clearly and distinctly. But among 
these things there are some so clear, and at the same time so 
simple/
To explain more fully:
It is true that ultimately our olear/
and distinct ideas receive our confidence by 
an act of external imputation. They are in­
trinsically tainted in the sense of requiring 
an external guarantee of their truth. On the 
reality of the hyperbolical doubt there will 
be reason to insist later. But that is not 
the point here, where we are not speaking of 
truth absolutely, but of the compulsion exer­
cised upon our will by the proper virtues of 
clearness and distinctness in ideas, to assent 
to these ideas as if they were true. Clear and 
distinct ideas have an intrinsic power of com­
pelling assent, and in this sense of not being 
doubted which is lacking to the ideas of sense 
because of the material falsity of the latter 
exposed by the doubt of the senses. The hyper­
bolical doubt is a contradiction in the mind 
which makes the interpreter appear to say con­
tradictory things. It is precisely in this 
tension that Descartes’ modernity consists and 
if we seek comparisons we may find them in the 
tension between Rousseau’s belief in his good­
ness, and his sense of his vileness, and between 
Luther's confidence in Christ, and his belief 
that our concupiscence is invincible.
simple that it is impossible for us to think of them without 
believing them true: for example, that I exist when I think, 
that things once done cannot be undone, and other things of 
a like kind, of which it is manifest that we possess perfect 
certainty.
"For we cannot doubt these things without thinking of 
them; but we can never think of them without believing them 
true, as I upheld. Hence we cannot doubt them without believ­
ing them true, that is, we can never doubt them.”125
The hyperbolical doubt, then, is not such as to taint 
intrinsically our clear and distinct ideas, which must be 
accepted for purposes of metaphysical proof; proof being 
nothing but the order in which we are compelled to assent to 
Ideas. The Cogito is the first truth removing our doubt 
whether there are clear and distinct ideas. But it is no 
truer than other truths *. it is merely the truth which first 
compels our assent. This fact is of considerable importance 
for the proper understanding of the Metaphysic. The Metaphysic 
is constructed according to the method, and the method is a 
method of discovery. The order of the metaphysic is therefore 
an order of discovery. A first truth has no virtue superior 
to that of other truths, except that it is found first. We 
must remember therefore that the order of proofs in the Medi­
tations does not depend on any peculiar inner virtue of the 
Cogito, but on the necessity of assenting toand using any clear 
and distinct idea as soon as it is clearly and distinctly con­
ceived./
conceived. The Cogito is the first truth which we come upon 
when we philosophise in order^® and that is the only reason 
why the Cogito, and not the certainty of God's existence, 
occupies the structural position in the Meditations which the 
Cogito does in fact occupy.
An interesting commentary on this conception of the 
Cercle cartesien is provided by a study of the position occu­
pied by the ontological proof of God’s existence, in the Medi­
tations, which goes to show that Descartes’ use of the Cogito 
is essentially a use justified by the fact that his method 
prescribes the attainment of knowledge by the order of neces­
sary assent, not by the order of things, and that the use of 
the Cogito as a first truth is thereby justified. This, it 
will be seen, is the only reason why the certainty of God’s 
existence by the ontological proof cannot occupy the struc­
tural position of the Cogito.
One of the difficulties which arises in the study of
the ontological proof is that in the Principles, and in the first
proposition of Responses II, the ontological proof precedes
the other proofs of God’s existence, while in the Meditations
book.it occurs only in the fiftiy. Furthermore, if the position 
which it occupies in the fifth Meditation is not its true 
position in the system of Descartes, then that system collap­
ses, because its intelligibility depends on its being a rigid 
sequence of proofs. How then is the primacy assigned to the 
ontological proof in the Principles and the Responses to be 
explained?
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The ontological proof is incorporated in the fifth 
Meditation in such a fashion that it could occur in no other 
place. The fourth Meditation establishes that the clear and 
distinct conception which we have of an object truly reveals 
the essence, though not the existence of that object. It is for 
this reason that the ontological proof cannot occur previously. 
For the doubt, it is to be remarked, has two distinct elements: 
there is a doubt whether material things exist, and there is a j  
doubt whether clear and distinct ideas are true. The second
doubt must be resolved before we can resolve the first, because; 
we must first know truly what material things are before we 
can prove that they exist. At the stage where the ontological 
proof commences we are precisely in a position to be able to 
state that what is contained in the clear and distinct idea 
of an object can be affirmed of it with truth. j
The ontological proof of God’s existence concludes 
from the clear and distinct idea which we have of his essence, I
to his existence. From the clearness and distinctness with 
which the idea of God reveals to us that his essence is to 
exist, we conclude that he really exists. Thus the proof !
depends on our having a clear and distinct idea of God’s
essence. But however clear and distinct our idea may be, the 
ontological proof would not be possible did we not first know 
that the natures of things corresponded to our clear and dis­
tinct ideas of them. The hyperbolical doubt compels us to 
prove this. Now the ontological proof establishes the corres­
pondence/
correspondence of essence and existence in the being of God:
iit presupposes the proof of the correspondence between essence, 
and clearness and distinctness of conception. That is why the ' 
ontological proof is introduced by the sentence: "But now if 
because I can draw from my thought the idea of an object, it
I
follows that all I clearly and distinctly apprehend to pertain 
to this object, does in truth belong to it, may I not from 
this derive an argument for the existence of God?”-*-̂  The 
other proofs of God’s existence and the Meditation on error 
are thus necessary to establish the ontological proof.
How, then, is one to explain the primacy assigned to 
the ontological proof by the Principles, and Responses II?
To reach an explanation it is necessary to go back a long way, 
to the beginning, in fact, of the third Meditation; and to 
recall what Descartes has said there about the certainty 
attaching to clear and distinct truths, a certainty such that 
we are justified in using the Cogito in spite of the hyper­
bolical doubt. This being recalled, it is necessary to take 
note of the following passages from Meditation V.
a. ” ... I have already shown the truth of the principle, 
that whatever is clearly and distinctly known is true. And 
although this had not been demonstrated, yet the nature of my 
mind is such as to compel me to assent to what I clearly con-
T O Oceive while I so conceive it.
b. "It is certain that I no less find the idea of a God 
in my consciousness, that is, the idea of a being supremely 
perfect,/
perfect, than that of any figure or number whatever; and I 
know with not less clearness and distinctness that an actual 
and eternal existence pertains to his nature than that all 
which is demonstrable of any figure or number really belongs 
to the nature of that figure or number; and, therefore, 
although all the conclusions of the preceding meditations were 
false, the existence of God would pass with me for a truth as 
least as certain as I ever judged any truth of mathematics to 
be.**l29
We have now to ask ourselves two important questions;
I. How it can come about that Descartes can say that the onto­
logical proof of God’s existence would pass for him as true 
even though all the preceding Meditations were false, when 
that proof has been seen to depend on the fourth, and there­
fore on all the preceding Meditations.
II. How Descartes can follow this with the statement that this 
is because he is as certain of God’s existence as of mathema­
tical truths, seeing that he has doubted of mathematical 
truths, and that by the help of the preceding Meditations he 
has just become certain of their truth, and as a consequence 
has embarked on the ontological proof. One recalls that his 
mathematics are forbidden to atheists.
It has been seen that the certainty of the Cogito is 
precisely the same as our certainty of mathematical truths, 
beeause the Cogito is known to be true by precisely the same 
mark as that by which we feel certain of mathematical truths, 
namely,/
namely, clearness and distinctness of conception. There is 
no difference between our certainty of the Cogito and our cer­
tainty of mathematical truths. nDeceive me who may, no one 
will yet ever be able to bring it about that I am not, so long
as I shall be conscious that I a m  or make two and three
more or less than five.” In the passages from Meditation V 
under discussion it has just been affirmed once more that 
though it had not been demonstrated that what was clearly and 
distinctly conceived was true, yet we are compelled to assent 
to such conceptions. Thus three things must be accepted: 
i. The Cogito has precisely the same certainty as mathematical 
truths, no more, and no less; ii. Our will is compelled to 
assent to truths which, like the mathematical, are clearly and 
distinctly conceived, even though we have not yet proved that 
clearness and distinctness of conception truly reveal the 
essence of the thing conceived: iii. Our certainty of God’s 
existence, by the inspection of his idea, is the same as our 
certainty of mathematical truths. Prom this it follows that 
we can be as certain of the truth of God’s existence from the 
idea which we have of him, without any preceding proof, as we 
can be sure that the Cogito is true. For I am compelled ”to 
assent to what I clearly conceive while I so conceive it,” 
even though I do not yet know that clear and distinct concep­
tions are true. In this way it is true that the knowledge of 
God’s existence, like the Cogito, depends on no proofs; and 
that the knowledge of God’s existence through his idea, like 
that/
72.
that of my existence through my perception of myself, is 
primary and depends on no other proofs.
It is clear, therefore, why in the Principles and in 
the Responses which are not rigidly systematic in the proper 
Cartesian sense, some departure from the order of the Medita­
tions was possible to Descartes.
It follows further that we are able equally to doubt, 
in the sense explained, whether the Cogito is true, whether 
mathematics is possible, and whether God exists. The only 
reason why we have to lay the foundations for an ontological 
proof, and not for the proof of my own existence, is not that 
the Cogito has any inner superiority with respect to truth, 
but that it is the first truth that we come upon when we 
philosophise in order. With respect to our certainty of 
truth, the truths of mathematics and of God’s existence are 
as primary as that of the Cogito. But with respect to the 
necessary order of proof, by which the hyperbolical doubt is 
to be vanquished, there is a strict sequence in the order in 
which these truths are to be affirmed. That which is found 
first is ipso facto affirmed first, since to find a clear and 
distinct truth is necessarily to affirm It. In this sequence 
the ontological proof of God’s existence is only possible in 
the fifth Meditation, as has been shown. We do not affirm 
this supreme certainty of God’s existence any earlier, because 




Some further consequences for the ontological proof 
may be mentioned, not merely for the light thus thrown on the 
proof itself, but also because such a deduction serves further 
to confirm the preceding explanation of the cercle cartesien.
It is interesting to note that the possibility of 
mathematical knowledge is not concluded as a result of the 
ontological proof of God’s existence, but that the possibility 
of the ontological proof, and the possibility of mathematical 
knowledge are taken together as following from the previous 
proofs of God’s existence. To put it differently: I do not 
conclude that a mathematical knowledge of nature is possible in 
virtue of the ontological proof, but I conclude at one and the 
same time both that mathematical knowledge is true and that the 
ontological proof is valid, in virtue of the reliability of 
clear and distinct ideas of which we are assured by the pre­
vious proofs of God’s existence. If the certainty of the 
ontological proof is the same as that of a mathematical truth, 
as has been said, then the certainty of the latter could not 
follow from the former, and an Inspection of the sequence of 
proof in Meditation V reveals that it is not expected to do so.
It has been remarked above that the ontological proof 
is very closely bound up in the sequence of thought of the 
Meditations, and that it is impossible for the proof to occur 
at any earlier stage. Thence arose the difficulties arising 
out of the Principles, and Responses II. In this way, there­
fore, the position of the ontological proof in the Meditations 
is/
is iritegral. On the other hand, it is just as clearly to be 
seen that its presence is not necessary to the aim of Medita­
tion V insofar as that is taken to be the proof of the relia­
bility of a mathematical knowledge of nature, because the on­
tological proof is not used to establish this reliability, but 
merely has its own validity proved in the same way and at the 
same time as that of mathematics. Further, since the ontolo­
gical proof contributes nothing to the sixth Meditation, how 
are we to account for its presence?
The answer is one which is fatal to the view that 
Descartes’ desire is to prove the existence of God for the 
sake only of science, and not of religion. The ends of science 
are sufficiently served by the earlier proofs of God’s exis­
tence. The ontological proof contributes nothing to the proof 
of the validity of a mathematical knowledge of nature In Medi­
tation V, nor to the proof of the real existence of bodies in 
Meditation VI. It is only possible to explain its presence 
by assuming that one of the aims of the Meditations is to 
prove the existence of God In the cause of religion. That Is 
the only hypothesis on which it is possible to account for the 
presence of the proof of God’s existence in Meditation V. The 
reason why Descartes should be anxious not to exclude the onto­
logical proof from his Metaphysic, even though his doubt had 
rendered it impossible that this proof should be indispensable 
to him, has two reasons. The first is the great part which 
the ontological proof had played in the thought of metaphysi­
cians/
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metaphysicians since the time of St. Anselm^. Thus we read 
in the Dedication of the Meditations:
’’Moreover, I am aware that most of the irreligious deny 
the existence of God, and the distinctness of the human mind 
from the body, for no other reason than because these points, 
as they allege, have never as yet been demonstrated. Now, 
although I am by no means of their opinion, but, on the con­
trary, hold that almost all the proofs which have been adduced 
on these questions by great men, possess, when rightly under­
stood, the force of demonstrations, and that it is next to im­
possible to discover new, yet there is, I apprehend, no more 
useful service to be performed in Philosophy, than if someone 
were, once for all, carefully to seek out the best of these 
reasons, and expound them so accurately and clearly that, for 
the future, it might be manifest to all that they are real 
demonstrations.”130
Thus Descartes clearly shows his intention of demon­
strating God’s existence not primarily for the sake of science 
or for the cogency of his metaphysic, but for the sake of the 
proofs themselves. Moreover, these proofs must be perfect 
demonstrations, that the Faith may be better served. It is 
thus clear how the proof of the great Anselm^ can come to be
included In the Meditations though it contributes nothing to
the order of proof of the Metaphysic. It is also clear, fur- I
Ither., why it is included at that point where it can be com- j




Secondly, and perhaps principally, this proof appeared 
to Descartes to be the most appealing of all. ”Although all 
the conclusions of the preceding Meditations were false, the 
existence of God would pass with me for a truth at least as 
certain as I ever judged any truth of mathematics to be.”
Since the other proofs of God’s existence are contained in the 
preceding Meditations, it follows that Descartes considers 
that the ontological proof compels the assent of our wills in 
a stronger fashion than the other proofs. Though it is neces­
sary to prove the existence of God by the ontological proof 
only at a certain point in the order of proofs, yet the cer­
tainty of God’s existence has the same certainty as that of 
our own existence. Our wills are compelled to assent to it, 
as soon as the proof is presented. It is so clear and distinct 
that our wills cannot be sufficiently indifferent to refuse 
their assent. Had this truth come first in the order of dis­
covery instead of the Cogito, we should have affirmed it with 
the same certainty, and in the same place, as now the Cogito. 
Since this certainty is as great as can be required to evoke 
complete assent, it is clear that the ontological proof is the 
proof par excellence to convince the atheists, and Descartes’ 
highest aims, so far as he explicitly states them, are satis­
fied .
77.
g8. Descartes seems, therefore, to be justified in the use 
he makes of the Cogito. If this is true, it is possible to 
look at the Cogito from a point of view which, not doubting 
that the structural position of the Cogito is logically jus­
tifiable, asks what can be learnt from this position. Let us, 
then, assume that we have just been conducted through the 
doubt, and that, like Polyander, we have just discovered that 
we exist because we think, and that we know nothing as yet of 
the truths still to be discovered. But instead of enquiring 
what truths can be deduced from the Cogito, it would be well
J [  to enquire what can be said about the Cogito, making abstrac­
tion of the truths that can be deduced from it, and considering 
it precisely at the moment of its discovery.
Though the Cogito is the first positive proposition of 
the Metaphysic, nevertheless it does not follow that it is 
true in any peculiar or unique fashion. The order of philoso­
phising which is being followed is the order of discovery.
Thus, to be discovered first is only the extrinsic mark of a 
truth. If the Cogito is the first truth which we cannot doubt, 
it is not because it is the most indubitable. It is a first
ttruth only from a methodological point of view. But if the 
Cogito is not true in any peculiar fashion, it is nevertheless
|\ first in a peculiar fashion. For the analytic method, the
r . -----
order in which truths are affirmed is the order of their dis­
covery, and it can therefore be said that, making abstraction 
of the truths that follow, it is solely in its nature as a 
first/
first affirmation that the Cogito so taken is significant.
Its significance is methodological.
It follows that at the precise moment that the Cogito 
is discovered the metaphysical emphasis lies in existence 
being affirmed of something, and not in the something, nI,n of 
which existence is affirmed. It is not the fact of having 
discovered this truth in particular that matters, but the fact 
of having discovered any truth at all. For the moment, we can 
make abstraction of its content. This is easily understood if 
a pause be made to consider the seriousness of Descartes’ 
doubt. Descartes desires that we should spend weeks and even 
months on the first Meditation before reading any further. It 
is a kind of moral and intellectual via purgativa, a night of 
despair for the intellect. During this night of intellectual 
cleansing, our greatest desire is to find something, no matter 
what, which we cannot doubt to be true.131 once this is dis­
covered, not only is it possible to cease fearing for the 
capacity of reason, but it is possible to hope for great dis­
coveries in the fields of metaphysics, physics, and morals.
If we regard the Meditations in the manner in which Descartes’s 
choice of the analytic method forces us to regard them, 
namely as the actual passage of a mind from the false or 
doubtful to the true, then it is clear that it is the fact of 
having discovered something certain, of having made the first 
step in the vast and wished-for land of certain knowledge, 
which is of supreme importance. It is the mere fact that the 
Cogito is an affirmation which is indubitable, on which the 
emphasis/
emphasis falls, It becomes the focus of attention because it 
represents truth in general, and not because of the being about 
whom it affirms a truth.
Of what importance is the nI,n when abstraction is 
made of all which follows upon the first affirmation of the 
Cogito? Clearly its importance is very scant. It merely 
happens to be that of which the all-important first affirmation 
is made. I know that I exist and that I doubt, but this is of 
less importance to me than the hope that I am now able to 
escape from the night of doubt. I do not know that I am not 
a body, neither have I as yet seen any reason for calling to 
mind the things of which I am usually conscious. If I wish to 
discover further truths, I have as yet no reason to believe 
that my next step must be to examine my own nature.
The Cogito, taken dynamically at the moment of its 
discovery, thus appears to yield no reason for the importance 
of the self for Descartes1 metaphysics. Further, it is to be 
noted that nothing can be inferred from the Cogito, thus taken, 
as to the self's place in reality. In metaphysics the order 
of proof is not the same as the order of things. Thus the 
things, whose existence is affirmed first for reasons of 
method, do not necessarily come first in the real. Ontologi- 
cally, God is the supreme reality, but that the existence of 
God should be affirmed before that of any other reality is not 
required by the analytic method.
But if at the moment when the Cogito is first affirmed,
the/
the self is so meagrely known, how is it possible for the self 
to assume so great an importance for the second Meditation, 
which confines itself to defining clearly the idea of a think­
ing thing? What is the reason for making the transition from 
the Cogito considered generally in its nature as a truth to 
the unimportant being, nI,M which serves as the occasion for 
enunciating this first truth? Since at the point where the 
Cogito is affirmed, we-are in possession of no metaphysical 
truths beyond the bare truth that we exist, it is clear that 
no metaphysical explanation can be sought without involving a 
petitio principii. Since we cannot seek an explanation in the 
nature of things which is as yet quite unknown to us, we must 
seek it in the demands of the analytic method. The step in 
the Meditations where Descartes seeks to discover what he is, 
has its explanation not in the nature of the nIw of the Cogito, 
as it is revealed in the first affirmation of the Cogito, but 
in the method which Descartes is using in the search for truth.
§9. That Descartes1 method demands an emphasis upon the
,TItt of the Cogito becomes more evident when the question is 
asked what the first principle is which that method requires. 
It is commonly believed that the Cogito ergo sum is itself 
Descartes1 first principle. Thus M. Gilson says: nThe Cogito 
is the first principle of the whole philosophy, including 
physics. Thus: since I doubt, I am; but the ascertainment of 
this imperfection of doubt presupposes in me the idea of the 
perfect, and as a consequence the existence of God who is the 
sole conceivable cause of it. It presupposes also the exis­
tence of a perfect, therefore a truthful, God who, guarantee­
ing my clear and distinct ideas, guarantees the real distinc­
tion of soul and body, whence we proceed to the mechanistic 
physics of extension and movement, and thus to all the sciences 
which are derived from it.n13^
It is true that the Cogito is the first affirmation 
made in the field of certain science. It is the proposition 
on which the metaphysics depends, and metaphysics is the 
foundation of the rest of the sciences. But though it is un­
deniable that the Cogito is the first proposition which can 
be affirmed with certainty, it can nevertheless be questioned 
whether the Cogito corresponds to the first principle demanded 
by the method.
There are considerable grounds for concluding that 
Descartes1 first principle is not the proposition, Cogito ergo 
sum, but a being, the res cogitans. It is the thinking thing 
which/
which is the fruitful starting point of our discoveries in 
metaphysics. Thus at the point where the Recherche breaks off 
Polyander has been asked to set forth what he can derive from 
Endoxus1 principle. ”So many things11 he replies ’’are contain­
ed in the idea of a thinking thing that whole days would be 
required to develop t h e m . ”133 Earlier in the dialogue Poly­
ander asks, ’’Tell us, then, the order you will follow in your 
explanations;” and Eudoxus replies, ”We must commence with the 
human mind because all our knowledge depends on it.”l ^
Eudoxus then explains how all that can be known derives from 
our knowledge of the human mind.
The affirmation of the Cogito, however, can only be 
said to be equivalent to the affirmation of the mind in retro­
spect. When the Cogito is affirmed, making abstraction of 
what follows, I know nothing about myself except that I exist 
and that I doubt. Though I can conclude from this that I am 
a thing that thinks, I cannot conclude that I am not a body, 
since it remains to be proved that bodies cannot think. 
Furthermore, in the second Meditation, Descartes interposes a 
considerable body of argument between the first affirmation of 
the Cogito, and the conclusion that he is a thinking thing or 
mind. These arguments can be summed up as follows. After I 
have doubted of all that I am able to doubt, I can affirm with 
the utmost certainty that I am, because I cannot doubt my own 
existence. Dubito ergo sum. But I must ask what I am. 
Descartes commences this enquiry with an enumeration of the 
things/
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.things which he formerly took himself to be. He will not waste 
time, he says, with subtleties like the definition of a man as 
a rational animal, but will attend to the natural thoughts 
which he used to have. He used to believe that he had a body 
whose nature was such as the senses reported it to be. He had 
also observed that he was nourished, and that he walked and 
perceived and thought; and these actions he referred to the 
soul, whose nature he did not stop to consider, except perhaps 
to imagine that it was something extremely rare and subtle, 
like wind or flame. Since he can doubt of the existence of 
bodies but not of himself he cannot say that he is a body.
He then asks what the properties or qualities of a soul are, 
not in order that, finding some one of these properties or 
qualities to be appropriate to himself, he may conclude that
he is a soul;155 but simply in the hope£ that during thisI
enumeration he may find some quality appropriate to himself.
He used to refer the powers of nutrition and walking to the 
soul, but since these functions are impossible without a body 
they cannot belong to him. Of all the properties of the soul, 
it is only thinking that can properly be said to belong to 
him, because, were he to cease to think, he would cease also 
to exist. He is, therefore, a thinking thing.
The second Meditation is thus far advanced before 
Descartes affirms that he is a thinking thing. Since it is 
necessary to give great weight to the order of argument, it 
follows that if the idea of a thinking thing can be shown to 
be/
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be Descartes1 first principle, then the Cogito cannot be so 
named, since the propositions: I am; and, I am a thinking 
thing, are by no means self-evidently equivalent.
It is to be observed that, from the mere fact that I 
exist and that I doubt, it can be concluded that I am a thing 
that thinks, since doubting is a kind of thinking, and must 
be a quality of something. It is nevertheless possible that 
I may be a body, since a body may be a thing that thinks.
When, however, as a result of the argument summarised above,
I conclude that I am a thinking thing, I have refused to re­
cognise my bodily nature as proper to me, insofar as I am 
aware of myself. With reference, therefore, to the course of 
the argument of the Meditations, it is necessary to distinguish 
the proposition, I am a thing that thinks, from the proposi­
tion, I am a thinking thing, since in the second instance I 
have made a step towards recognising my independence from my 
bodily nature. There is thus a greater precision in the idea 
"thinking thing,” than in the idea ”thing that thinks.”
In the Preface to the Principles, Descartes says: ”By
considering that he who strives to doubt of all is unable
nevertheless to doubt that he is while he doubts, and that 
thuswhat reasons/ in not being able to doubt of itself and doubt­
ing nevertheless of everything else, is not that which we call 
our body, but that which we name our mind or thought, I have 
taken the existence of this thought-*-56 for the first principle.”! 
It is quite clear from its content that this passage refers to j 
the/
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the argument of the Meditations summarised above, in the light 
of which the distinction was drawn between the terms wthinking 
thing,tt and nthing that thinks,” the latter being an idea 
standing closer to the Cogito in the order of argument, than 
the former. But it is an existent thought or mind, a thinking 
thing, of which bodily properties are denied, which is stated 
to be the first principle; whence it is necessary to conclude 
that this first principle is by no means self-evidently con­
tained in the idea of our proper existence, and therefore that 
the Cogito is not a true first principle. This conclusion is 
supported by a letter to Clerselier in which Descartes defines 
what he means by a first principle. After dismissing the 
claims of the law of non-contradiction, he says, nthe first 
principle is that our mind exists.{|3-57 rp-̂g first principle is 
thus, not merely that I exist, but that I, a mind or thinking 
thing, exist. The first principle must be ”a being, the exis­
tence of which is better known (plus connue)to us than that of 
any others, so that it can serve us for a principle for know­
ing them. But that the mind is better known than anything else 
is a conclusion only drawn in the last paragraph of the second 
Meditation. It would seem, therefore, that it is only at this 
stage of the Metaphysic that we are in possession of the first 
principle of metaphysical proof.
It would thus seem that the Cogito does not supply the 
first principle of this philosophy. It is true that it posits ;i
the being whose existence is to be considered the first princi- ! 
Pie,/ !
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principle, but at the time of the affirmation of the Cogito,
1 7 0this being is conceived by a confused and obscure idea.
The idea of a wthing that thinksis an idea of something that
may or may not be a body. Even the affirmation that I am a
thinking thing (A.T.VII,27, 15-17) is immediately followed by 
the reservation that it is nevertbeless still possible that I 
may be a body (loc.cit. 11.18-27); and by the effort to reach 
a greater precision in the idea of what I am. But if the first 
principle is the existence of a being, it follows from the fact 
! that I know beings only mediately - having an immediate know­
ledge only of my ideas - that I mus t have a clear idea of this 
being, before I can be sure of its existence, since we cannot 
with certainty posit the existence of that whose nature is un­
known to us. Hence the affirmations of my existence, at first 
sight superfluous, which occur at the end of the second Medita­
tion, when I have a clear idea of myself.
It is usually taken for granted that the third rule of
the Method indicates that the Cogito is the first principle.
I must ”conduct my thoughts in order, commencing with objects 
the most simple, and the most easy to know (plus ais^s a con- 
nai tre ) . The text is worth examining.
The Cogito appears to have all the characteristics of 
that from which we must commence. No ground of doubt can 
shake it. It is an intuition and not a conclusion from a syl­
l o g i s m . - ^ 0  Nothing so certain can be found before it in the 
order of truth. An interpretation of this kind, however, is 
possible/
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possible only by not taking the passage quoted quite literally. 
In the letter to Clerselier already quoted, Descartes says 
that his first principle must be na being, the existence of 
which is better known (plusconnue)-^^ than that of any others.” 
It is impossible to see in what sense the Cogito fulfils the 
requirement of being un 'etre. It is a self-evident proposition 
affirming the existence of something, my self, the nature of 
which is still obscure and unknown, and therefore incapable of
serving as a first principle. At the stage of the Cogito, mak-
,!
ing abstraction or the rest of the Meditations, neither the 
Cogito nor the thing that thinks fulfils the requirements of a 
first principle. But further, the existence of the being which 
is to serve for a first principle must be better known, more 
easy to know (plus connue, plus aisee a connaltre) than that of 
any other thing. The argument of the Meditations reveals that 
Descartes does not consider the certitude attaching to the Cog­
ito to be itself sufficient to prove that my existence is better 
known than that of any other thing. The argument of the second 
Meditation first shows that I am a mind or thinking thing, the 
existence of which is more certain than that of the bodies I 
imagine. It then shows, by the aid of the piece of wax, how
body can be clearly and distinctly conceived. Nevertheless,
the hyperbolical doubt prevents my being sure of the exist-)
ence of the object thus conceived. Yet I cannot doubt my 
own existence. Descartes concludes, "But, finally, what shall
I say of the mind itself, that is, of myself? for as yet
8 8 .
I do not admit that I am anything hut mind. What, then’. I 
who seem to possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece 
of wax, - do I not know myself, both with greater truth and 
certitude, and also much more distinctly and clearly? For if 
I judge that the wax exists because I see it, it assuredly 
follows, much more evidently, that I myself am or exist, for 
the same reason: for it is possible that what I see may not in 
truth be wax, and that I do not even possess eyes with which 
to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or which 
comes to the same thing, when I think I see, I myself who 
think am nothing. So likewise, if I judge that the wax exists 
because I touch it, it will still also follow that I am; and
if I determine that my imagination, or any other cause, what-
\ '
ever it be, persuades me of the existence of the wax, I will 
still draw the same conclusion.”142
It is thus clear that it is only at the stage of the 
argument marked by this passage that I am more certain of my 
existence than of the existence of other things. It is also 
clear that this certainty cannot be arrived at prior to some 
investigation into what my nature is, and what the nature of 
bodies. This is well illustrated by the sentence, nif I de­
termine that my imagination, or any other cause, whatever it 
be, persuades me of thê  existence of the wax, I will still 
draw the same conclusion (sc. that it cannot be that I who 
think am no thing),11 where there is a reference to the argument 
by which it is shown that imagination is one of my faculties; 
so/
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so that the conclusion that I am more certain that I exist, 
than bodies clearly and distinctly conceived, presupposes 
knowledge already possessed by me of my nature, namely, that 
I possess the faculty of imagination, and that I am a thinking 
thing or mind, nothing of which I have explicitly recognised 
when the Cogito is first affirmed. In short, to obtain his 
first principle, Descartes must make an analysis of thinking 
and bodily natures, in order to discover what in them is 
known most clearly, the Cogito now ccaning to be taken not as a 
truth from which other truths can immediately be deduced, but 
as positing a thing from the analysis of whose nature we can 
arrive at a clear idea of a being which can serve as a princi­
ple. In the Cogito there is no clear idea; therefore nothing 
which can serve to a deduction.
The concluding arguments of the second Meditation give 
still further confirmation of the belief that it is the clear 
idea of something real, namely, a thinking thing, and not the 
affirmation of the existence of an unknown nature made by the 
Cogito which Descartes requires as a first principle. My hav­
ing clear and distinct ideas of extended things not only serves 
to assure me of my existence, but to give me a clearer idea of 
myself.-**^ I conclude that I am of all things, not only the 
most clearly known, but also the most easy to know. nI readily 
discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly appre­
hended than my own mind,” concludes this Meditation, according 
with its title: tt0f the nature of the human mind, and that it
is easier to know than the body.1
Now it is required by the Discourse on Method, that we 
must commence to philosophise from objects the simplest and 
most easy to know. But the terms T,plus connue ,” ”plus aise a 
connaitre.,” as M. Gilson shows in his Commentary, are highly 
technical terms. In the Metaphysic of Descartes they are used 
only of the mind or thinking thing. If the first principle is 
to be the most easily known of all things, and if the latter 
characteristic is ascribed only to the mind, then the conclu­
sion is inevitable that the first principle of metaphysics is 
the mind or thinking thing. This explains the second postulate
of Responses II. ”l ask them to consider their own mind --
and I beg them not to cease from considering it, until they 
have first acquired the habit of conceiving it distinctly and 
of believing that it is easier to know (plus aise'' a connaitre) 
than all corporeal things.” Since we are certain only at the 
end of the second Meditation that our mind is easier to know 
than bodies, it is only then that we possess our first princi­
ple .
What serves to confirm this conclusion is the phrase 
”habit of conceiving” in the text just quoted. Descartes, by 
his choice of the analytic method, makes of metaphysics a 
strenuous exercise. Its utility is to form in us a way of 
thinking. Thus Descartes writes to Elizabeth: ”lt seems that 
there can be only two things necessary for being always dis­
posed to judge correctly; the one is the knowledge of the 
truth,/
truth, and the other the hahit which brings it about that one 
remembers and concurs in that knowledge whenever the occasion 
requires it.tt̂ ^^ Explaining the aims of the second Meditation 
in Responses II, he says ”1 thought I should do more than a 
little, if I showed how the properties or qualities of the 
mind are to be distinguished from those of the body. For 
although many have already maintained that, in order to under­
stand immaterial or metaphysical things, the mind must be 
withdrawn from the senses, no one, so far as I know, has yet 
shown how this is to be done. The true, and in my judgment, 
the only way to do this is found in my second Meditation, but 
such is its nature that it is not enough to have seen once 
how it is done. Much time and many repetitions are required 
if the habit of confounding intellectual with corporeal things, 
rooted in us during the whole course of our life, is to be 
effaced by a contrary habit of distinguishing them.”^ ^  If the 
mind is to be better known than any other thing, the idea of 
it must be firmly grasped through habit and exercise, and it 
is this exercise which the second Meditation provides. To be 
able to use the mind as a first principle, it is not so much 
necessary to have seen once that the mind exists, and is better 
known than any other thing; we must ourselves by practice have 
come to know it better. Hence the conclusion of the second 
Meditation. f,I readily discover that there is nothing more
easily or clearly apprehended than my own m i n d  . But it
will be well to tarry for some time at this stage, that, by 
long/
long continued meditation, I may more deeply impress upon my 
memory this new knowledge."147
But all this argument seems of small avail in the face 
of a text in the Discourse:
,fAnd observing that this truth, I think, hence I am, 
was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, 
however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable 
of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, ac­
cept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was 
in search.
This passage, however, in spite of the apparently in­
superable difficulty it presents to an interpretation of Des­
cartes 1 first principle such as that given above, can be easily 
explained. The Discourse does not pretend to be a systematic 
exposition of Descartes1 thought. Conformably with the nature 
of the whole Discourse, the fourth book is a narrative rather 
than a metaphysical demonstration. Furthermore, it is of the 
highest importance to observe that, having regard to the cir­
cumstances under which this narrative was written, the proofs, 
which Descartes considers necessary for establishing what has 
been said above actually to be his first principle, could not | 
possibly be given. Because he has written the Discourse in 
French, and intends it to be read by the vulgar and unlearned, 
Descartes has not carried his doubt very far in this work. He ; 
admits that this omission impairs his proofs, but he says that 
the deficiency is intentional. From consideration for the 
vulgar,/
vulgar, he has omitted the hyperbolical doubt from the Dis­
course. ̂-49 There is thus no reason why he should be at great 
pains to stress exactly what those clear and distinct ideas 
are which this doubt calls into question. Therefore there is 
no reason why he should define how bodies are to be truly con­
ceived, - in the fashion of the Meditations where the wax is 
examined. But the ascertainment of the nature of bodies in 
the second Meditation is an integral part of the proof that 
the mind is the most easily known of all things. It is thus 
impossible for the Discourse to establish what is really the 
first principle of Descartes1 philosophy. The assertion that 
the Cogito supplies such a principle is, under the circum­
stances, the best compromise that can be effected between the 
truth and the infirmities of the vulgar, since it at least 
posits that being which is in fact the first principle.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the 
reason which Descartes gives in the Discourse for accepting 
the Cogito as a first principle is that no argument of the 
Sceptics can shake it. The reason given is not that it is the 
simplest and easiest thing to know, but that it is a proposi­
tion whose truth cannot be doubted. But if that were the 
criterion of a first principle there would be no reason for 
not accepting, say, the law of non-contradiction for a first 
principle since that cannot be doubted. Since the requirement, 
laid down in the Discourse itself, is that we should commence 
to reason from objects the s implest and easiest to know, it 
cannot/
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cannot "be said to be without significance that Descartes does 
not -use of the Cogito the technical phrase nplns aise a con-
Anaitre,” in proposing it as a first principle. , n
§10* It oan "be concluded that the Cogito is not Des­
cartes1 first principle, hut the clear idea of a thinking thing.
At the moment that the Cogito is first affirmed, I have not suf­
ficient knowledge of what I am to he able to say that my exist­
ence and nature are better known than those of body, it is true 
that "I” am the being whose certain existence is affirmed in the 
Cogito. But I am not with certainty in possession of a first 
principle until the end of Meditation II, and this first principle 
is not the Cogito but the being rlI,IT of whose existence affirma­
tion is made by the Cogito. We know our first principle not in 
the flush of discovery of the Cogito, but only by the succeeding 
proofs forming in us a certain intellectual habit.
It has been remarked, however, that at the stage of 
the Cogito, nothing whatever is known about the nature of the 
MIn except that it exists and doubts. On the other hand, this 
being, the mind^comes to be taken by Descartes as his first prin­
ciple, the second Meditation being chiefly devoted to the dis­
covery of its nature. The question remains to be answered why 
the emphasis passes from the proposition, Cogito ergo sum, to the 
being whose existence is there affirmed, since there is no em­
phasis on this being at the moment when the Cogito is affirmed; 
nor is anything known of it sufficiently positive to make it an 
object of interest. Why should Desoartes insist on "un 3tre" 
for his first principle?
Descartes1 temper is realistic. His rejection of
abstract/
abstract notions as first principles is made quite explicitly, 
in a passage so clear that it is well worth citing:
”1 only add that the word principle can be taken in 
different senses, and that it is one thing to look for a 
common notion, which shall be so clear and so general that it 
can serve as a principle for proving the existence of all the 
beings, the entia, of which knowledge is gained afterwards; 
and another thing to look for a being, the existence of which 
shall be better known to us than that of any others, so that 
it can serve us for a principle for knowing them, in the 
first sense, it can be said that ”it is impossible that the 
same thing can at one time be and not be” is a principle, and 
that it can serve in a general way, not properly to make pos­
sible knowledge of anything, but only to make it possible that 
when one knows the thing, one can confirm its truth by an argu­
ment of this sort: ”It is impossible that that which is should
not be; but I know that such a thing is, therefore I know that 
it is impossible that it should not be.” A thing which is of
very little importance and makes us none the wiser, in the
other sense, the first principle is that our mind exists, be­
cause there is nothing the existence of which is better known
to us.” ”The fashion in which other propositions are reduced
to this, that it is impossible that the same thing can at one
150time be and not be, is superfluous and useless.”
The law of non-contradiction and other abstract
truths of a like nature are to be rejected as first principles.
Thus/
Thus Eudoxus says "Here, if I do not mistake, you must begin
to see that he who knows how properly to avail himself of
doubt oan deduce from it absolutely certain knowledge, better,
more certain, and more useful than that derived from this
great principle which we usually establish as the basis or
centre to which all other principles are referred and from
which they start forth, that it is impossible that one and
151the same thing should at one time both be and not be.”
They are not to be rejected because they are obscure or 
doubtful. In the Conversation with Burman, it is stated 
that common principle;* and axioms, for example, it is impos­
sible for the same thing both to be and not to be, can be
doubted only when confusedly conceived, and not when
*  152separata a materia et singularibus. They are both clear
and indubitable. This, however, is not sufficient to quali­
fy them for first principles, since principles must be such
153that we can deduce truths from them, while the manner in 
which other truths are reduced to the law of non-contradiction 
is "superfluous and useless.” Such laws give us no knowledge 
of existents, but only serve as a kind of formal confirmation 
of the certainty we may already have that a thing exists,
"a thing which is of very little importance and makes us none 
the wiser.”
Descartes1 rejection of truths such as the law of 
non-contradiction thus emphasises his demand for a first 
principle/
principle which is both concrete and fruitful. Thus Poly- 
ander remarks of Eudoxus1 first principle, that so many 
things are contained in the idea of a thinking thing that 
whole days would be required to develop them. It also em­
phasises Descartes1 break with the Scholastic method of 
philosophising. It would seem that it is purely for reasons 
of method that Descartes requires a being for a first prin­
ciple. Is it possible to discover Just what the method is 
which makes this demand? Gould this be discovered, it would 
probably be known why the ”1” plays so important a part in 
Meditation II, since it is by comprehension of its method 
and structure that the Metaphysic is to be understood. But,
as M. Hamelin has well observed, we know very little of what
194Descartes1 method actually was. In Responses II Descartes 
says that he employs the analytic method of proof. He dis­
tinguishes it from the synthetic method. Both agree in 
being logically rigorous. But the analytic method has the 
advantage of being a method of discovery. Further, it makes 
much greater demands on the intelligence and sympathy of the 
reader. Indeed, it is the demand which this method makes on 
the personal attitude of the reader which is most strongly 
stressed in Responses II. We are told certain consequences 
of the employment of the analytic method in metaphysics, but 
not what the method is. We do not discover new truths by
chance. We discover them only when we look for them methodi­
cally.
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But what in detail is this method? Hi/hat is the 
ohart by the aid of which we must guide our voyage of meta­
physical discovery? So deep is Descartes* silence that we 
may well believe that there is no such chart, and that the 
Metaphysic was constructed by a spontaneous impulse of cre­
ation which 3mew no law except its own inner necessity. How­
ever, Descartes believed that the inner structure of thought 
was mathematical. He tells us further, in the Discourse, 
that he believed so strongly in the necessity of thinking in 
conformity with a method, that he spent years in exercising 
himself in his method, chiefly in mathematical matters, be­
fore he felt himself fit to embark on his great constructive 
enterprises. One feels Justified in believing, therefore, 
that the Meditations embody a method which influenced their 
form more deeply than would have been the case had Descartes 
set to work with no plan for their structure beyond the very 
general ideas about the analytic method set forth in Re­
sponses II. There is no open and explicit evidence of this, 
but there are nevertheless features in Descartes’ writings 
which exercise a cumulative persuasion.
The aim of the second Meditation is to show that we
have distinct ideas of mind and body, as will be confirmed
later. This Meditation does not attempt to show that bodies
exist, nor that, actually, mind is not body. The result of 
our/
our methodical thinking is the forming of ideas. To dis­
cover what the method is by an inspection of the second Medi­
tation is to trace the process by which we come by a clear 
and distinct idea of the mind, conceived as distinct from 
body.
This Meditation, however, is not a treatise on 
method, but a body of knowledge arrived at by methodical 
reasoning. Explicit references to the method employed are 
therefore not to be expected. The most one can look for 
are hints, and a very suggestive hint is, in fact, forthcom­
ing. When Descartes has affirmed that he exists, he immed­
iately proceeds to try to discover what he is; and he at­
tempts to discover this by first enumerating the things which 
he used to take himself to be. "What then did I formerly 
think I was? Undoubtedly I judged that I was a man. But 
what is man? Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not; 
for it would be necessary forthwith to enquire into what is 
meant by animal, and what by rational, and thus, from a 
single question, I should insensibly glide into others, and 
these more difficult than the first; nor do I now possess
enough of leisure to warrant me in wasting my time amid
155subtleties of this sort.” This is the first attempt at 
a definition; and one would therefore expect that it contains 
the clue to the method of definition to be used, or, at 
least, to that which is not to be used. The definition of 
man/
man as a rational animal has been rejected, and, since reason­
ing is right or wrong according as the method of reasoning is 
correct or incorrect, the rejection of the method by which 
this definition is formed is implied* What this method is, 
and why it is rejected, is not explicitly told us in the 
Meditation, beyond the very brief remarks made in the passage 
quoted: that the definition so far from satisfying us merely 
starts us off on a whole train of definitions.
In the Recherche, however, the argument of the
second Meditation is recapitulated, with differences; and
perhaps the most outstanding difference is the emphasis placed
on that stage of the argument, now under discussion, which is
so briefly attended to in Meditation II. The Recherche must
therefore be resorted to for further light on the matter.
The persons in the Dialogue are EUdoxus, who represents the
position of Descartes himself; Polyander, the plain man in
whom the natural light is undiramed and unperverted; and
Epistemon, who represents the opinion of the Schools. Let
us break into the middle of their conversation. Polyander
has been led through the doubt, and is now convinced that he
cannot doubt his own existence. He exists, it is true, but
what is he? How is he to be defined? He ventures the opinion
156that he is a man: Itaque dicam hominem me esse. Eudoxus
replies that this would lead to difficulties. He says that 
Epistemon, the Schoolman, if asked what a man was, would reply 
that/
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157that he waa a rational animal; and would then proceed to 
define the words ’rational1 and ’animal* in terms which would 
stand in like need of being themselves defined. To explain 
what an animal is, for instance, he would have to say that 
an animal is a living thing possessed of sensations, that a 
living thing is an animated body, that a body is a corporeal 
substance, his definitions, like the branches of a genealogi­
cal tree, finishing in sheer tautology and leaving us in our
158original ignorance. Epistemon replies that he is sorry
to see that Eudoxus despises the tree of Porphyry which has
for so long been the received method of the Schools, and
than which no better has been found. Our knowledge cannot go
further than this iteming up of our nature.
We may pause to remark that it is now quite clear
what method of definition Descartes finds himself opposed to.
He believes that he has found a method which is better than
the received method of the Schools. Through the mouth of
Polyander he repeats his objections to this method. ”lf for
instance we say that a body is a corporeal substance, and
do not however indicate what a corporeal substance is, these
two words, corporeal substance, render us no wiser than the 
159word body.” Similar difficulties arise when we try to 
define what lives as an animate body. We become involved 
in metaphysical degrees but we arrive at no clear and distinct 
idea. It is clear that Descartes’ doubt makes this method 
impossible/
impossible for him. It would be foolish for him to try to 
arrive at clearness and distinctness of conception by in­
volving himself in an arborescence of terms which he has 
rejected as obscure. The doubt aims at ridding us of our 
preconceptions, but the Scholastic method of definition is 
impossible without preconceptions. I cannot say that I am 
a man, and that a man is a rational animal, unless I had re­
tained these ideas from my state of early prejudice. This 
method assumes the nature of the thing which is being defined, 
and is nothing other than a mere explication of the assumptions 
involved in the unexamined idea we have of that thing.
Let us, however, follow the argument of the Recherche
160further. Up to the point where Polyander concludes that 
he is a thinking thing the argument does not relevantly differ 
from that of the Meditations. There is thus no need to say 
more about it. After Polyander concludes that he is a think­
ing thing, Eudoxus attacks principles like the law of non­
contradiction, and arouses Epistemon to a criticism of the 
method of reasoning which Eudoxus has been employing. Epistemon 
says "I shall show that nothing of what Polyander has said 
rests on a legitimate foundation or leads to any conclusion.
You say that you are and that you know that you are and that 
you know it because you doubt and because you think. But, 
indeed, do you know what doubting is, and what thinking? And 
as you do not wish to admit anything of which you are not cer­
tain/
certain, and do not know perfectly, how can you be certain
that you are from attributes so obscure and consequently so
uncertain? You should first have taught Polyander what doubt
is, and thought, and existence, so that his reasoning could
161indeed have the force of a demonstration."
Eudoxus appears to have been caught in a trap of his 
own devising. How are we to predicate any attribute of a 
thing without becoming entangled in a whole web of definitory 
propositions? What Epistemon desires are definitions of the 
terms doubt, thought, and existence after the scholastic method. 
Once more we are witnessing the clash of Descartes1 method 
with that of the Schoolmen. Eudoxus replies that there are 
some terms which are too clearly known to require definition.
Ho one who gives attention to it, he says, can fail to see 
clearly what doubt, thought, and existence are. "I declare 
that there are certain things which we render more obscure by 
trying to define them, because, since they are very simple 
and clear, we cannot know and perceive them better than by 
themselves. Nay, we must place in the number of those chief 
errors that can be committed in the sciences, the mistakes 
committed by those who would try to define what ought only 
to be conceived, and who cannot distinguish the clear from 
the obscure, nor discriminate between what, in order to be 
known, requires and deserves to be defined, from what can be 
best known by itself. And in the number of the things which
are clear in the way above explained, and which can be known 
by themselves, we must place doubt, thought, and existence.
I do not think that anyone has ever existed who is stupid 
enough to have required to learn what existence is before be­
ing able to conclude and affirm that he is; the same holds 
true of thought and doubt. Indeed, I add that one learns 
those things in no other way than by onefs self and that noth­
ing else persuades us of them except our own experience, and 
that Conscience1 (conscientia) or internal testimony that 
each one finds within himself when he ponders things, in vain 
shall we define what white is in order to make it comprehensible 
to him who sees absolutely nothing, while in order to know it 
it is only necessary to open one’s eyes and see the white; in
the same way in order to know what doubt is, or thought, it
162is only requisite to doubt and think."
Here we have the reply of Eudoxus quite plainly
stated. It is driven further home by the remarks of Polyander
which follow it, in which the contentions of Eudoxus are re- 
163iterated. The Recherche is not the only text in which Des­
cartes asserts that there are some notions which stand in no 
need of definition. In the letter to Clerselier concerning 
the criticisms of the Meditations made by Gassendi, Descartes 
says "The second objection which your friends remark is: that, 
in order to know that I think, I must know what thought is; 
which I certainly do not know, they say, because I have de­
nied/
denied everything. But I have denied nothing hut prejudices,
and by no means notions like these, which are known without
164any affirmation or denial." The authors of Objections VI 
raise the same difficulty as Epistemon. "In order to be sure 
that you think you ought to know what to think, or what think­
ing is, and what your existence is; but since you do not yet
know what these things are, how can you know that you think 
165or exist?" Desoartes replies in words greatly resembling 
those of Eudoxus, saying that however much we may pretend not 
to know what these words mean we cannot really be without that 
knowledge, which is innate in all men. Finally, in principle 
I:X Desoartes affirms "That the notions which are simplest 
and self-evident, are obscured by logical definitions; and 
that such are not to be reckoned among the cognitions acquired 
by study." He says, "I frequently remarked that philosophers 
erred in attempting to explain, by logical definitions, such 
truths as are most simple and self-evident; for they thus only 
rendered them more obscure.” He does not deny that it is 
necessary to know what thought, existence and certitude are, 
and that it is true that to think it is necessary to be; but 
that since these are the simplest of notions affording of 
themselves the knowledge of nothing existing - and therefore 
not being doubtful - it is not necessary even to enumerate 
them.
Several characteristics of Descartes' method have
emerged/
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emerged quite clearly. It is opposed to the Scholastic method 
of definition. It rejects a method which, in fact, assumes 
instead of discovering the nature of the thing it defines. It 
is a method admitting the existence of notions which are 
clearly known in themselves, and stand in no need of defini­
tion, which would simply obscure their meaning. Finally, Des­
cartes believes that his procedure will be very fruitful.
When Epistemon declares that, after all, the principle "I am
166a thinking thing11 is sterile, and leads one no further,
Eudoxus replies that this is the first of the things which
we come to know by the help of a method, and that all other
167truths will follow from it. ' "So many things are contained
in the idea of a thinking thing," says Polyander "that whole
168days would be required to develop them." A very differ­
ent fruit is expected from this principle, from that which 
is borne by the tree of Porphyry.
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§ 11# Pascal, in the fragment nDe 1*esprit geometrigue" 
says that the most perfect method of demonstrating any truth 
is the geometrical. Geometrical demonstrations are the type 
of all perfect demonstrations. The method of Geometers is 
the surest method within human grasp of reaching the truth.
In such demonstrations it is necessary, first, to use no 
term of which the sense is not exactly apprehended; and, 
secondly, to demonstrate every proposition by truths already 
known. Everything must be defined and everything must be 
proved.
Geometry knows only one kind of definition, that, 
namely, called the "definition de nom" by logicians. It con­
sists in the giving of names to things which one has clearly 
designated, in terms which are perfectly known, if one wishes 
to distinguish numbers which are divisible by two without re­
mainder from those which are not, one gives to the first 
class the name, even numbers, saying: I call every number
divisible by two without remainder an even number. Here we 
have a geometrical definition. For after having clearly 
designated something, namely, a number divisible by two with­
out remainder, I have given it a name destitute of all other 
sense. Such definitions are perfectly free, since I am at 
liberty to bestow what names I like on the thing designated, 
providing I mean no more by that name than is contained in 
the idea of the thing designated. To uae the example of 
Arnauld, I may call a triangle a parallelogram, providing
1/
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strip the word 1 parallelogram1 of all its former meaning,
and then mean no more by that name than is contained in the
170idea of the thing designated, the triangle. nothing, says 
Pascal, is more capable of silencing the sophists than this 
method.
In geometry there are primitive words which we can­
not define, and principles so clear that we can find no clear-
171er principles by which to prove them.
The order of proof in geometry, the most perfect 
known to man, does not consist in defining everything and 
proving everything. It is not necessary to define things 
which are clearly known to all, not to prove thing3which 
everyone clearly knows. There is, for instance, no need to 
define any of the things: space, time, movement, number,
equality, and the like, since these terms so naturally desig­
nate the things which they signify, that an explanation would 
bring in its train obscurity rather than enlightenment, noth­
ing is more stupid than the discourse of those who wish to 
define primitive words. What necessity is there to explain, 
for instance, what we mean by the word "man"? Everyone knows 
to what the word refers. It is likewise foolish to try to 
define "existence"; since one must always commence the defin­
ition by saying "it is," using the very word to be defined 
in the definition.
It is not true, of course, that all men have the 
same idea of the nature of the thing which it has been said
is/
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is useless and Impossible to define. All that has been said 
is that the correspondence between the name and the thing 
designated is known to all. Definitions are only meant to 
point to the things which are named, and not to reveal their 
nature. But blindness as to the true nature of definition 
leads to complete confusion in science and in argument. Many 
people believe they have defined time when they say that it 
is the measure of movement, while leaving the word its ordin­
ary sense. This, however, is not a true definition, which 
is free and acceptable by all, but a proposition, unaccept­
able to all, and requiring proof. Such propositions, or 
false definitions, are called "definitions de chose." These 
propositions must be contrasted with true definitions of 
the geometrical type, the "definitions de nom." The former 
assume the nature of the thing 1defined,* and then proceed 
to make positive affirmations about its nature, when in truth 
these affirmations are at best hypotheses to be proved.
We must thus not be surprised, says Pascal, to 
find that the wonderful science of geometry takes the most 
simple things as its point of departure, the quality which 
makes them worthy of being its objects being precisely that 
which makes them incapable of definition, the lack of which 
is a perfection rather than a fault because it has its 
ground not in obscurity but in extreme evidence. Geometry 
presupposes/
presupposes that one knows the things indicated by the 
words: movement, number, space, etc.; and without delaying 
to define them uselessly, it penetrates their nature and 
discovers their wonderful properties.
There is thus a similarity between the doctrines of 
the Recherche and those of Pascal. By using geometrical 
definitions we escape the obscurity of the science of the 
Schools which has defined light as the luminary movement of 
luminous bodies. A method merely assuming the nature of the 
thing to be defined must be rejected. There are certain 
things which stand in no need of definition, the attempt to 
define the clear and apparent being one of the chief sources 
of error in the sciences. When Eudoxus says that his method 
is very fruitful of new truths, and when Polyander affirms 
that much time will be required to derive from it all the 
things contained in the idea of a thinking thing, whose 
meaning is known to us without the aid of a definition; then 
we are clearly in the presence of the mathematical doctrine, 
of which Pascal*s exposition has been given. Where the Re­
cherche breaks off, I have established that I am a thinking 
thing; I know that the words *thought* and •existence* need 
no definition; and I am just about to penetrate the nature
172of a thinking thing and discover its wonderful properties.
§ 12. The Recherche, then, rejects the Scholastic method 
of definition, and its argument proceeds in a fashion which 
suggests the doctrine of the geometers. This doctrine is, 
however, not definitively formulated by Descartes, and the 
chief reason for believing that the rejection of the tree 
of Porphyry implies the acceptance of the geometrical doctrine 
is that the followers of Descartes are explicit in stating it. 
This geometrical method, they say, can and must be used in 
metaphysics. Thus Arnauld, in the Port-Royal Logic, contrast­
ing the geometrical and the scholastic methods, says that a 
nominal definition is a necessary preliminary to the demon­
stration that the soul is immortal: "I call mind that which
173is in us the principle of thought."
The dispute about definitions was one of the chief 
points at issue between the Cartesians and the upholders of 
the received philosophy. The Cartesians accuse the latter, 
first, of not defining the terms of which they make use in 
a scientific fashion; and secondly, of defining terms - and 
that by a wrong method - which needed no definition, as there 
could be no doubt as to what were the ideas for which they 
stood. To define man as a rational animal would be an error 
of the first kind; to try to define terms such as thought 
or space would be an error of the latter kind. The point of 
difference between the old and the new methods which is of 
the greatest importance to subsequent thought is that for 
the/
the geometrical method, definition was a preliminary to the
demonstration of the nature of a thing, while the old method
of definition was the actual search itself. When the Schools
defined man as a rational animal, and then defined frational»
and •animal,1 forming a whole tree of propositions, they
thought that by so doing they were arriving at a perfect know-
174ledge of man*s nature. From the Cartesian point of view 
they were in fact only revealing the assumptions contained 
in the really unexamined idea, man. Thus the tree of Por­
phyry is a progressive revelation of ignorance rather than 
a search after truth.
The Cartesian doctrine is that when a name has been 
attached to an idea in the geometrical fashion we do not on 
that account have any knowledge of the nature of the thing 
represented by the idea, which we did not have before. Thus 
I cannot discover whether it is the nature of the soul to be 
immortal merely by defining the term "mind." Something fur­
ther' is required. If, says Arnauld, the question is pro­
posed: whether the soul of man is immortal, we must, in order
to discover it, apply ourselves to considering the nature of 
175our mind. In what does this examination of our mind con­
sist? "We cannot know what we are" says Arnauld, "except by
176attending seriously to what takes place in us." In this 
latter remark is revealed the really important characteristic 
of the geometrical method, the characteristic which decides 
why/
why general truths and Scholastic definitions must he laid 
aside in the search after truth: namely, that to solve any 
problem we must attend solely to the examination of the pro­
per nature of the particular thing with which the problem is 
concerned.
It follows that to form definitions, or to discuss 
the nature of definition, is not the primary duty of Car­
tesian philosophy, which desires, rather, to penetrate the
177nature of particular things by direct examination. The
formation of definitions or the use of terms requiring no
definition plays an important part in methodical thinking,
but we do not emphasise this procedure precisely because
our attention is fixed upon things rather than upon questions
of logic. Rejecting the definition of man as a rational
animal, Descartes says, "I prefer here to attend to the
thoughts that sprung up of themselves in my mind, and were
inspired by my own nature alone, when I applied myself to
178the consideration of what I was.”
For the Cartesians the natural way of thinking was 
ipso facto the mathematical way of thinking. Thus, if I am
fruitfully examining the nature of a particular thing, then
I will naturally avail myself of nominal definitions and 
terms requiring no definition. The formation of an explicit 
doctrine of definition is thus unnecessary for discovering 
new truths in any field. The utility of formulation is only 
secondary/
secondary: by making clear the processes of our thinking
when engaged in the search for truth, it is possible to give
an absolutely convincing demonstration of the truths we have
already discovered. Analysis, says Pascal at the beginning
of his tfDe 1*esprit g^ometrique,w is the discovery of unknown
truths, and of that he does not wish to write. His aim in
formulating the doctrine of definition, is to show how to
demonstrate truths already found, and so to make them clear
179that their proof shall be invincible; whence the secondary 
aim of the doctrine is clear.
It is now possible to suggest the relationship be­
tween the Meditations and the Recherche. The Meditations 
embody the search for new truth by the analytic method. They 
do not therefore depend upon a formulated doctrine of defi­
nition, since such a formulation is necessarily secondary to 
the direct examination of particular things. Such a doctrine 
can, however, be derived from the Meditations by a reflexion 
upon its reasonings. Such a process of reflexion forms part 
of the Recherche, where, side by side with the proof by 
analysis, there takes place a process by which the logic of 
this proof is disengaged from the proofs themselves. The 
proof is thus supported not only by its own consistency, but 
by the supposed superiority of the doctrine of logic derived 
from it, over that of the Schools.
Therefore, while it would be a mistake to suppose 
the Meditations to have taken shape under the influence of a 
formulated/
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formulated doctrine of definition, it would nevertheless be 
quite justifiable to see in its reasonings the doctrine of 
definition which is beginning to take shape in the Recherche 
in opposition to the Scholastic doctrine. In other words, 
it would be possible to find particular examples of what this 
doctrine states generally.
It has been pointed out that it is an implication of 
this doctrine itself that knowledge starts not with defini­
tions but with particular things. Descartes, we find, com-
180mences his search for truth by enquiring into h ± 3  own nature. 
In the first place, he says, he must be careful not to substi­
tute some other object for what is properly himself. He will 
therefore consider anew what he formerly believed himself to 
be, retrenching everything to which the doubt extends. He 
used to imagine that he was a body apparent to the senses, 
and perfused with a confusedly perceived soul. But he cannot
be a body since he can be sure of his own existence while
     --
doubting the existence of bodies. When he examines the pro­
perties of the soul he finds that all which the doubt does 
not force him to reject is the property of thinking. He 
concludes that he is a thinking thing.
Descartes thus commences his enquiry into what he is, 
by asking what he is not. His first step, is to remove 
ambiguities about what he is, not to prove that he is this 
thing or that. Thus he replies to an objection of Bourdin,181 
denying that he has been enquiring whether he is a mind, or 
that/
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that he has concluded that he is a soul. He has concluded 
from the nature of the doubt that he is a thinking thing, 
and to this thinking thing he has given the name of mind or 
understanding or reason, signifying no more by the term ’mind’ 
than by the term ’thinking thing.’ There is no reason as yet 
for crying "Eureka’." So far has he been from harbouring the 
express aim of proving that he is a mind or thinking thing, 
that he had concluded this, the significance of these terms 
was unknown to him.^88
In this fashion, then, is established the truth: I am 
a thinking thing or mind. But the terms ’thinking thing,’ 
and ’mind’ have not been assumed to have any content of their 
own. They are, in fact, mere sounds until they come to be 
attached to the clearly designated thing ”1,” for which 
henceforth they stand. It is clear that were we employing 
another manner of demonstration we could state this result as 
a nominal definition which could serve as a first principle 
for that demonstration: nI call that of whose existence I 
first am certain a thinking thing.n By so doing, nothing is 
affirmed about the nature of the "I,” which is merely posited 
for further examination.
It appears clearly from the following stage in the 
argument of the second Meditation that the reasoning by which 
I conclude that I am a thinking thing is merely a means of 
fixing my attention upon my proper nature, and avoiding the 
danger of substituting something else for myself when I regard 
myself./
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myself. Nothing as to my nature is concluded from the argu­
ment summarised above. I must have a more positive knowledge 
of my nature before I can conclude finally that I am not a 
body: "But it is true, perhaps, that those very things which 
I suppose to be non-existent, because they are unknown to me, 
are not in truth different from myself whom I know. This is 
a point I cannot determine, and do not now enter into any 
dispute regarding it. I can only judge of things that are 
known to me: I am conscious that I exist, and I who know that 
I exist enquire into what I a m . " ^  Entering then upon the 
direct investigation of what takes place in me, I ask, "But 
what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But 
what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, under­
stands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also 
and perceives
Prom this stage a second example of the geometrical 
doctrine of definition can be derived. A schoolman would 
stop to enquire what was meant by the term ’thinking.’ But 
this is not what Descartes does. He assumes that this is one 
of a class of terms which require no definition, because its 
connection with the idea it stands for is self-evident. Free 
from the fear of confusing himself with what he is not, free 
from any assumptions as to his nature, and unhampered by the 
necessity of forming useless definitions, he is able by direct 
examination to discover what this thought, or mind, or self 




its nature, and discovering its wonderful properties. j
)As a result of this examination he shows that he knows himself j 
better than bodies, proves God’s existence, and establishes j 
the immateriality of the human mind. j
It will be recollected that the above enquiry into 
what Descartes’ method was, commenced with the observation j 
that in the second Meditation a clear and distinct idea of a 
thinking thing was formed. This was to be the clue for dis- j
i
covering the method employed in this Meditation. The Recher- jf
che shows distinctly how this idea is not to be formed, con- S
demning the Scholastic method of definition, and hinting un- |
mistakeably at the geometrical doctrine explicitly stated by j
jDescartes’ followers as the only alternative to the Scholastic{ 
doctrine. The Cartesian doctrine contains within itself the j
reason why, in seeking knowledge of a thing, a doctrine of j
definition is less important than a direct acquaintance with j
jthe thing itself. This doctrine, in fact, implies the !1
analytic method for the direct examination of particular j
facts, the doctrine of definition being reflexively derivative;£
\from this examination. Descartes’ method is, then, a method |
for the direct examination of the natures of things in a 
fashion involving none of the assumptions contained in the 
ordinary employment of t e r m s . '
It is now possible to answer the question put some 
time ago, why Descartes should desire ffun “ttre" for a first 
principle, and how the emphasis of the second Meditation 
comes/
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comes to fall upon the nI.n The analytic method discards
•  ithe general and demands the particular as its starting point, j
; Just as the geometer commences his search for truth not with j
1 \ abstract truths, which can at the best serve only as axioms, I
î but with something real and concrete, space; so Descartes 
sets aside the claim of general, abstract truths to be first 
principles, and takes his departure from a real being whose
properties are to be investigated by direct examination. jI
But metaphysical enquiry is to be preceded by a profound j
state of doubt, in which all our assumptions perish. The j
)order of discoveries succeeding the doubt is the order in 
which a mind, thinking systematically, is able to find true 
propositions. But the first truth that we discover when we (
... . . . . .  I
philosophise in order is the Cogito. The only real being j
whose existence is thereby affirmed is the wI.n The order 
of discovery thus predetermines that it shall be the self 
which is the real being from the investigation of whose 
nature the succeeding truths are to spring. Stripped as our ; 
minds are by the doubt, of all assumptions as to our nature}®*^;
j
we must for that very reason be careful not to confuse our- ‘ 
selves with anything else since as yet we can assume for our- j 
selves no distinguishing feature except that we doubt. Then, 
in the security that we are fixing our attention, upon our- ! 
selves and not on other things, and in the certainty that we 
are examining something real and concrete, we can form a true 
idea of ourselves by attending to what takes place in us.
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§13. Here it is convenient to review what has so far been i
done, or at least attempted, in this study. It has been em- j 
phasised that Descartes believes that metaphysical truths j
have the same kind of certainty and evidence as geometrical j
truths, and are discovered by the same method. It has also j
Ibeen remarked that the Meditations are DescartesV definitive ! 
metaphysical work, and that for the proper understanding of 
his doctrine it is necessary to concentrate on the Meditations j  
paying special attention to their form and to the order of |
i
their proofs. One of the most serious difficulties that can j
jbe urged against this order of proof is the charge of circular j
reasoning in the deduction of the criterion of truth. An !
!
attempt was made to vindicate the position assigned by |
i
Descartes to the Cogito, and the opportunity taken to account ! 
for the position and presence of the ontological proof of i
God1 s existence in the Meditations. It was then remarked ji
that though the Cogito was vindicated as a first truth, it |
I
did not follow that it was Descartes1 first principle. j
Descartes requires for a first principle a being, whose exis­
tence is better known that that of any other. This is to be 
accounted for by the geometrical structure implicit in the 
second Meditation.
It was said that the transition from the Cogito to
i
j the conclusion that the self is an immaterial substance pro­
vided the best illustration of the structure of the Medita­
tions. The explication of the steps of this transition was 
thus/
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thus undertaken as the chief end of this study. A number of 
results have already been reached. The lack of content of 
the idea of the self at the stage of the Cogito has been 
pointed out. The reason for the transition from the Cogito 
to the examination of the content of this idea has been sug­
gested; and finally, the actual examination into the self’s 
nature, as it is made in Meditation II, has been followed and 
remarked on, strictly in the light of the suggestions made j
about the nature of the method determining the structure of i
|
the Meditations.
But the steps of this transition have been by no means j 
sufficiently traced. Descartes wishes to prove that the mind j
jis an immaterial substance, wholly distinct from body. But j 
hitherto the notions of substantiality, and of the distinctness: 
of mind and body, which largely determine the orientation of ! 
the proofs in the Meditations, have not been dwelt upon. It 
is now necessary to speak of the transition from the Cogito, 
to the real distinction of mind and body in Meditation VI, 
keeping these notions clearly in view.
The Meditations can be looked at largely from the 
point of view of the conclusion that the mind is an immaterial 
substance really distinct from body. Providing that we avoid 
the error of reading the Meditations backwards, we may ask at 
every stage of the proofs how far we have advanced to this 
conclusion, what has been contributed to it, and what remains 
to be done. The real distinction of body and mind, as will 
be/
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be seen, largely dominates the trend of the proofs of the 
Meditations, and these proofs are best understood in the 
light of it. This fact will be uppermost during the rest of 
this study.
The critics of Descartes, especially the Objectors to 
the Meditations, realising how much the arguments of the 
Meditations t^end to this distinction, with one voice charge 
Descartes with having prejudged the issue. The argument, 
they say, is made to conform to the desired conclusion. The 
truth that the mind consists only in thinking and is not 
corporeal, is assumed, and the proof is a false proof. The 
method pretends to assume nothing, and to prove everything; 
but since this, they say, is not the fact, it is a false 
method. Since this is the severest charge which could be 
brought against Descartes, it is not surprising to find that 
the main theme of the Responses to the Objections against the 
second Meditation is the denial that the issue of the real 
distinction of body and mind has been prejudged.
The nature of the real distinction is explained in 
Principles I-XI. The real distinction subsists between two 
substances. If we can clearly and distinctly conceive two 
substances as mutually distinct, then we can be sure that 
they are really distinct, because God can bring it about that 
they exist independently such as we conceive them. The first 
step towards the real distinction is therefore to form clear 
and distinct ideas of the things to be distinguished. The 
method/
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method to he employed and defended is therefore in the first 
place a method of forming clear, distinct, and sufficiently j 
adequate ideas. j
It is in the second Meditation that Descartes intends 
to complete the task of forming a clear and distinct idea of !
thinking substance, as he himself attests. In the second !
Response he says that our early Ideas of what mind is are 
confused, and attributed to mind much that belongs to sensible 
bodies. It is therefore his desire to show how the properties I 
of mind are distinguished from those of body. ”lt seemed to 
me very appropriate to treat of nothing else in the second 
Meditation.” "̂®® When his interlocutors ask how it is possible 
to form an idea of any incorporeal thing whatever, Descartes 
replies that he has succeeded in forming such an idea of the 
mind. ’’When you ask me to add something which can raise us 
to the knowledge of an immaterial or spiritual being, I can 
do nothing better than refer you to my second Meditation ... . 
For what could I achieve here in one or two paragraphs, if I 
could achieve nothing in a long discourse designed specially 
to that end, a discourse to which I think I have devoted as 
much work as to any other writing which I have published?”189 
Then, in Meditation VI itself, Descartes concludes the real 
distinction in the following fashion: '’Because, on the one 
hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as 
I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as on the 
other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as 
it/
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it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain 
that I, that is, my mind by which I am what I am, am entirely 
and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it."^99 
But though the real distinction is only made In the sixth 
Meditation, the clear and distinct idea of the mind has been 
formed in the second, and nothing is added to this idea by the 
intervening demonstrations, which are concerned solely with 
the proofs of God’s existence, the nature of error, and a 
further precision of the idea of extended s u b s t a n c e i t  is 
to be remarked that the idea of the mind must be the idea of 
a substance, since the real distinction subsists between 
substances; so that, if the second Meditation serves to the 
formation of such an idea, it must imply a doctrine of sub­
stance in terms of which it will be possible to form the 
clearest possible idea of a particular thing.
Descartes defines substance in the following manner:
"By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which 
exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond 
itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can 
be conceived but one substance which is absolutely indepen­
dent, and that is God.192 We perceive that all other things 
can exist only by help of the concourse of God. And, accor­
dingly, the term substance does not apply to God and the 
creatures univocally, to adopt a term familiar in the schools; 
that is, no signification of this word can be distinctly 
understood which is common to God and them."
"Created/
"Created substances, however, ... may be conceived under this
common concept; for these are things which, in order to their
193existence, stand in need of nothing but the concourse of God." 
One created substance does not stand in need of another in 
order to its existence, though all depend upon God. Indepen­
dent existence is thus always contained in the idea which we 
have of a substance, the term substance being applicable uni- 
vocally to all created substances.
But problems relating to substance in general were not 
of primary interest to Descartes. In the Meditations, his 
definitive metaphysical work, Descartes gives no attention to 
the problem of substance for its own sake. A certain theory 
of substance appears in the Meditations but it receives no 
elaboration there. Descartes’ temper, let it be insisted on, 
is realistic or positivist. His method is one of investiga­
tion rather than of speculation, of discovery of the nature 
of things by an examination of the things themselves, rather 
than a deduction of their nature from general principles. He 
is not primarily concerned to know what substance in general 
is, but rather to know of what particular substances he is 
able to have a detailed knowledge.
It is necessary to explain that, in the following 
pages, the language used may suggest that Descartes formulated 
a theory of substance which exerted an influence from the out­
side on the proofs of the Meditations, as though he had first 
formulated the theory, and then constructed the Meditations 
conformably/
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conformably with it. This, however, is a mere vice of expo­
sition, harmless when explained. The analytic method does 
not permit the postulation ab initio of general doctrines.
It proceeds from the examination of the particular. The doc­
trine of substance, implicit in the proofs of the Meditations, 
is supposed by the analytic method to be a doctrine made 
necessary by this examination and not vice versa. It is the 
doctrine which is natural to our minds in the examination of 
particular things; it occurs to us during this examinationj1^  
and it can be recovered afterwards and stated more fully, as 
it is in Principles I, by an act of reflexion upon the natural 
procedure of the mind in the analytical investigation of meta­
physical objects.196 It does not predetermine the way in 
which I shall examine my nature, nor was it invented to justi­
fy that examination. Though, in the following pages, Descar­
tes^ theory of substance has first been briefly stated, and 
though it is then shown how this theory is involved in the 
proofs of the Metaphysic, it must be remembered that this is 
a purely reflexive process, since in their living nature the 
Meditations involve no hidden doctrines.
To continue, if the nature of particular substances is 
to be truly examined, it is necessary that a theory of sub­
stance be arrived at which makes the nature of substance com­
pletely transparent to human thought.196 Descartes’f criticism 
of the Scholastic theory of substantial forms, is precisely 
that they make clear knowledge impossible. "But no natural 
explanation/
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explanation of any happening can be given by means of the
substantial forms, since the champions of these say that they
are occult, and not understood a se; for should they say that
any happening proceeds from a substantial form, it is the
same as if they were to say that is proceeded from a thing
197not understood a se, which is no explanation." If we 
really wish to know what substances are, and to use the con­
ception of substance for exact reasoning, then it is necessary 
to be in possession of a theory of substance which makes this 
possible.
It is in this need that Descartes’c theory of the prin­
cipal attribute has its origin. This doctrine goes much
198
further than the Scholastic doctrine of inseparable attributes 
and enables Descartes to be certain that a clear and distinct 
knowledge of substance is possible.
illustrated in the following passage from Principles I:LII. 
"Substance cannot be first discovered merely from its being 
a thing which exists independently, for existence by Itself 
is not observed by us.” Here the interesting feature is the 
expression: animadverti. From this the trend of Descartes’ 
thought is quite clear. Descartes’ aim is the discovery or 
observation of substances. But to this end the definition 
of substance as that which is able to exist per se (Pr.I:LI) 
cannot serve, since "substance cannot be first discovered 
merely from its being a thing which exists independently."
Descartes’ attitude to the theory of substance is well
In/
In order to be able to infer to the existence of any substance 
in particular a further principle is required. This principle 
is stated forthwith (Pr.I^LII). ”We easily, however, discover: 
substance itself from any attribute of it, by this common 
notion, that of nothing there are no attributes, properties 
or qualities: for, from perceiving that some attribute is 
present, we infer that some existing thing or substance to 
which it may be attritubed is also present.” In Responses II, 
definition V, this is, indeed, the only definition of sub­
stance given. ^Everything in which there is present immed- I
lately as in a subject, or through which there exists any- |
thing which we perceive, that is, any property, or quality, I
or attribute, of which there is a real idea in us, is called 
a substance. For we have no other idea of substance precisely 
taken, than that it is a thing in which exists, formally or 
eminently, that something which we perceive, or which is 
objectively in some one of our ideas; since it is known by 
the natural light that no real attribute can be an attribute 
of nothing.” The formal definition of substance given in 
Principles I:LI is omitted. The omission is easily explained 
if we remember that Descartes is not so much concerned to 
define substance in a formally complete manner, as to obtain 
a definition of it which Is useful to a particular end, 
namely, the discovery of the nature of this or that particular 
substance. There seems to be no other way of explaining >




From the definition of substance given in the second 
set of Responses and in Principles IrLII, it is clear that 
we can Infer to the presence of a substance from any attri­
bute, property, or quality, since ”of nothing there are no 
attributes, properties, or qualities.” Every substance, 
however, has one principal attribute. ”But, although any 
attribute is sufficient to lead us to the knowledge of sub­
stance, there Is, however, one principal property of every 
substance, which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon 
which all the others depend.”1"  According to this doctrine 
of the principal attribute, proper to Descartes and stated 
in the Principles, all the other attributes, properties or 
qualities of a substance are conceived through this principal 
attribute. The substance itself is not known apart from this 
principal attribute, since it is the nature or essence200 of 
the substance whose attribute it is. The substance is simply 
the principal attribute substantialised. Between the sub­
stance and the attribute there is only a distinction of 
reason.201 Thus though we can make a distinction of reason 
between a substance and its principal attribute, and though 
we can have no knowledge of a substance thus distinguished, 
it is nevertheless certain that there is nothing occult in 
substances, since the principal attribute constitutes their 
nature or essence. It is more than inseparable from the 
substance, as is clear from a passage in the Principles, 
where the particular case of thought and extension which are 
said/
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said to be the principal attributes of thinking and extended
substance, is being considered. lfThought and extension can
be regarded as constituting the natures of intelligent and of
corporeal substance; and then they ought to be conceived not
otherwise than as that very thinking substance and that very
202extended substance, that is, as mind and body.” Since the 
principal attribute is capable of being clearly and distinctly 
known, we are in possession of a doctrine of substance accor­
ding to which substance is thoroughly intelligible, and by 
which we are enabled to proceed to a knowledge of particular 
substances.
There is a further feature of Descartes’ doctrine of 
substance which must be remarked upon. In Principles I:XI it 
is stated to be Ma matter that is highly manifest by the 
natural light, that to nothing no affections or qualities 
belong; and, accordingly that where we observe certain affec­
tions, there a thing or substance to which these pertain is 
necessarily found. The same light also shows us that we know 
a thing or substance more clearly in proportion as we discover 
in it a greater number of qualities.” The last sentence con­
tains a doctrine which has not yet been mentioned. Although 
substance is thoroughly intelligible, our knowledge of it is 
nevertheless something to which we attain by degrees. Having 
found a substance by observing an affection of it, we have 
not on that account an immediate, clear, and distinct know­
ledge of that substance. It is necessary further to investi­
gate/
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investigate the qualities of the substance, since we have a 
clear and distinct knowledge of a substance in proportion as 
we discover more qualities of it.^0^ This is the principle 
which Descartes uses in the second Meditation to prove that 
the mind is the most clearly known of all things.20^
In this principle we observe once more how suited 
Descartes^ theory of substance is to his urge to approach the 
real as an investigator and discoverer, increasing his know­
ledge of objedts by the gradual process of discovering their 
qualities. There is no royal road for knowing objects at a 
stroke. As with material things, so with our own minds: for 
though our own existence is the first truth which presents 
itself to us, we can never adequately know ourselves; and our 
knowledge of ourselves, lacking in adequacy as it is, is only 
obtained by an empirical attention to our faculties. We know 
the depths of the soul in the fashion in which we know the 
viscera of a calf.205
To conclude, then, there are two definitions of sub­
stance in the Metaphysics; and it is not the classical defini­
tion of substance as that which can exist per se which 
represents the true spirit of the Cartesian philosophy. It
U s  ■ ■ • ( ’
must not be thought that this^definition has not its part to 
play. But it comes into use only in the sixth Meditation, 
when the real distinction of mind and body is concluded; and 
the manner of its employment is made clear in the Responses 
to the objectors. 
nBut/
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,fBut it must now be explained how, from this alone 
that I clearly and distinctly understand one substance apart 
from another, I am certain that the one is excluded by the 
other.
"Now the notion of substance is precisely this: that 
which can exist per se, that is, without standing in need of 
any other substance. No one who perceives two substances 
through two different concepts has not judged that they are 
really distinct.”
This notion of substance is here seen to confirm our 
right to draw the real distinction after we have formed clear 
and distinct conceptions of the things to be distinguished, 
but it cannot in the least help us to form these conceptions. 
To this end we require the definition of substance as that 
which is known through its attributes, properties, and 
qualities. But having formed the ideas of two different sub­
stances by the actual observation of their properties, we can 
be sure that it is the nature of these substances to exist 
apart, by virtue of the definition of substance as that which 
can exist per se.
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§14. How, then, does Descartes, in the course of the 
second Meditation, arrive at the clear and distinct idea of 
a thinking substance?
It has always been a point of dispute at what stage 
of the metaphysic Descartes first concludes that he is a 
substance. In order to understand the matter, however, only 
two things need be borne in mind, the one, that for Descartes 
res and substantia are synonymous; and the other, that the 
questions: am I a substance? and, am I substance whose whole 
essence is to think? are separate questions.
iThe fact that I am a substance follows immediately 
from the Cogito, since the Cogito alone suffices to assure 
me that I am something, res quaedam, and therefore a substance.j 
I am certain that I am and that I think, but since my thinking j
i
cannot be a quality of nothing, I must be a thing or substance^ 
The extremely close connection between my certainty of my j
existence and of my substantiality, for the Cartesians, 
appears clearly from a text of Arnauld: "I am assured that I 
am, because I think; and thus, that I am a substance that [•
thinks. !,207 i
It is to be remarked that, if the analytic method be 
properly understood, Descartes cannot be said to have com­
mitted an error often attributed to him, that, namely, of 
assuming a principle not previously stated: that no quality 
can be a quality of nothing; and deducing by its aid what in 
the Meditations he pretends to be spontaneously presented to 
his/
his mind. Synthesis explicitly states the most general 
principles as preliminaries to its proofs, and deduces the 
consequences. But analysis proposes certain "questions,” and 
proceeds to answer them by the examination of something par­
ticular. Thus, in proposing the question ”whether the soul 
of man is Immortal” we do not start from general maxims such 
as: no substance can, properly speaking, perish; but we apply 
ourselves to directly considering our selves. Again, in dis­
covering "whether or not I am a thinking thing,” my first 
step is to observe in myself certain properties or qualities 
which are straightway seen to belong to something.
I am not, however, debarred from the use of general 
maxims in analysis; but these are only proposed at need, 
whereas for the synthetic method they are proposed as pre­
liminaries. Their use in analysis is subservient to my direct 
examination of something particular. They are the principles 
by which I think rather than from which I think; the way my 
thought naturally acts in the discovery of the truth, rather 
than first principles which it explicitly posits.
The whole plan of the Metaphysic of P.S. Regis bears 
witness to this. Regis appends to some chapters "Reflexions” 
in which he makes explicit the axioms which he has naturally 
used in the demonstrations made in these chapters, finally 
proving synthetically the conclusions he has discovered 




"After having hitherto used Analysis in the discovery 
of the truths I have examined, I still wish, the further to 
convince myself of them, to demonstrate them by Synthesis, 
using only the Axioms I have posited, and truths already 
proved. This is how I demonstrate the existence of the mind: 
Nothing has no properties (reflex.I, ax.I). I know by experi­
ence that I have the property of doubting and of being sure, 
for I am sure of my existence and doubt that of other things. 
Therefore I am and exist," etc.200
When, however, I first discover analytically that I 
am something, T do not deduce it in this fashion, but posit 
the axiom, "that nothing has no properties" merely as explain­
ing the way my thought acts when it directly observes my 
nature. Thus, to repeat something which has already been 
said, Descartesdoctrine of substance must be understood in 
accordance with the demand of the analytic method, when it is 
brought into contact with the arguments of the Meditations. 
Descartes considers this doctrine to be, not something which 
he has arbitrarily formulated and used as a concealed general 
principle, but as something which the true method posits dur-
oi Qing its examination of the nature of particular things.
But if Descartes can conclude, and rightly conclude, 
that he is a substance, so early in the second Meditation, 
this remains for him a conclusion to be accepted with con­
siderable reserve. I know that I am a substance which thinks, 
but I am still very far from knowing that I am a substance 
whose/
whose nature or essence is thinking. Descartes forms no
211rapid conclusions from the Cogito as to what his substance 
is. It may quite well be his body which thinks. He feels 
the scruple uttered by Regis and urged as an insoluble diffi­
culty by the Objectors: "I am, however, so accustomed to con­
sidering extension and thought as two attributes of the same 
substance, that I feel myself inclined to believe that it is 
the same substance which thinks and is extended,"2'*'2
It is necessary, therefore, that I should try to dis­
cover what, more precisely, I am. This examination Is made 
by considering the Cogito in relation to the doubt. "I wrote 
that we could not doubt that our mind existed, because, from 
the very fact that we doubted, it followed that our mind 
existed, but that meantime we might doubt whether any material 
things existed; whence I deduced and demonstrated that mind 
was clearly perceived by us to be an existent thing or sub­
stance, although we should have no concept whatever of the
body, and denied that any bodies existed: and thence that the
213concept of mind did not involve any concept of body."
Arnauld, in his objections to the Meditations, describes 
Descartes1 proof in a manner to which Descartes takes no 
exception: I am able to doubt whether I have a body or whether 
any body exists at all; y©t while I think I cannot doubt that 
I exist. Hence I who think cannot be a body, since in doubt­
ing about body, I do not doubt about myself. Even though I 
maintained that no body at all existed, it would remain true 
that/
214that I am something, and therefore that I am not a body.
Though I am not the assemblage of members called the human 
body, nor a thin and penetrating air, or wind or flame or 
vapour or breath, nor anything else imaginable, it remains 
true that I am, and that I am something not imaginable, that I
Iis, not a body.^-^ |
This argument is, as Arnauld remarks, very ingenious. I
But the importance of the conclusion reached must not be ex- |
Iaggerated. I know that I am a substance which is the subject f 
of thoughts, and I know that, as conscious of myself, I am j 
not a body, but I am not yet certain that I am a substance j
Iwhose whole nature or essence consists solely in thinking. |
On this matter Descartes retains an ultimate doubt. ttBut it |
iis true, perhaps, that those very things which I suppose to I
be non-existent, because they are unknown to me, are not in I
truth different from myself whom I know. This is a point I |
cannot determine, and do not now enter into any dispute re- I
garding it. I can only judge of the things that are known I
Ito me: I am conscious that I exist, and I who know that I |
exist inquire into what I am.”^"^ order to discover I
whether or not his nature or essence consists only in thinking| 
Descartes proceeds to enquire more closely into what he is j
insofar as he is conscious of himself. This enquiry is made 
in the famous passage commencing: ’’But what, then, am I? A
;,lthinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking
thing? it is a thing that doubts, understands, conceives, j
in
affirms^ denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also, and |
Pi 7perceives.”
This examination is conducted by a method of direct 
observation, and involves the principle already noticed "that 
we know a thing or substance more clearly in proportion as we J!ift ‘discover in it a greater number of qualities. Thus j
Descartes can reply to the authors of Objections II, that |
though he confesses that he has not, in the second Meditation,I 
discovered whether or not the thinking thing is the same as
the body or something different from it, yet he does not admit):
PI Q ^that he haa no knowledge of the mind. ^  Who, he says, has {
ever had an acquaintance with anything, and yet known |
absolutely nothing about it? But, he continues, in proportion)
ijas we perceive more properties in anything, the better are we |
said to know it.
We discover what we are insofar as we are conscious 'j
of ourselves by an examination of our consciousness, enumera- j
ting the properties which we find there. Since this examina- j
tion is meant to further the conclusion that the mind is a ;
substance whose whole nature or essence is to think, it is I
necessary to enquire how this end is being furthered. This I
appears to be the explanation. By an examination of what we )
are ipLofar as we are conscious of ourselves, we come to j
; ' si
recognise in ourselves a number of properties, all of which |
have the characteristic of being thought properties. These j
are not the only properties of which we have ideas. When we j
■ Icome to examine the piece of wax we find that we have ideas j
of the properties of figure and of extension, in short, the j
properties/
properties of things which we call material or extended.
The properties which we observe in the mind, such as under­
standing, willing and imagining, are obviously quite different 
from properties such as magnitude, figure, and motion which 
we observe in material things. It is clear to us by the 
natural light that these two groups of properties have noth- 
[ ing whatever in common. One does not require to be a philo­
sopher to distinguish between modes of thought and modes of j 
extension. But can we thence proceed to distinguish the j
i>isubstances of which they are modes? j
jHere it is necessary to refer again to Descartes !.s j 
doctrine of the principal attributes. The principal attribute 
fully expresses the nature of a substance. But a mode cannot j 
be conceived without the substance of which it is a mode, and j
since the substance itself is conceived through the principal I1;tiattribute, no mode can be conceived apart from this principal j
attribute. But the principal attribute not only fully ex- jv
i\presses the nature of the substance of which it is an attri- |i;
bute, but is itself fully intelligible. Hence any mode |
reveals truly the nature of the substance of which it is a j 
mode, in the sense that it posits the substance as being that 
alone through which it can be understood. Though it is the Jj 
substance through which the modes are conceived, it is never­
theless from the side of the modes that we come to know what ! 
the nature of that substance is which the modes presuppose.
How all the discoverable modes of myself when I observe 
directly/
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directly what takes place in me, have the attribute of think­
ing in common, and all the modes of a body like a piece of 
wax have the attribute of extension in common. Since no mode 
discovered by the examination of what we are presupposes an 
extended substance through which it must be conceived, we are 
forced to conclude that we have distinct ideas of two sub­
stances, the nature of one of which is thought, of the other, 
extension.
The matter is put very well in the Response to Hobbes. 
"Since we have no immediate cognition of substance through 
itself, but only through its being the subject of certain 
activities (actuum), it is highly reasonable, and conforms to 
custom that we should call by different names those substances
which we recognise to be the subjects of activities (actuum)
clearly diverse, and afterwards to examine whether these 
different names refer to different things, or to one and the 
same thing. Now there are certain activities which we call 
corporeal such as magnitude, figure, motion, and all the rest 
which cannot be thought of apart from local extension: and 
the substance in which they are present, we call body: nor 
can we pretend that it is one substance which is the subject
•  ji;of figure, and another which is the subject of local motion, | 
etc., because all these activities come under the common 
notion of extension. Further, there are other activities 
which we call thought activities (cogitativos ), such as \
understanding, willing, imagining, feeling, etc., which all 
come/
come under the common notion of thought, or perception, or 
consciousness; and the substance in which they are present we 
call a thinking thing, or a mind, or by any name we like, as 
long as we do not confound it with corporeal substance, 
because thought activities have nothing in common with cor­
poreal activities, and thought which is the common notion
(ratio communis) of the former, differs wholly from extension
220which is the common notion of the latter."
To sum up, we come to know substances by knowing 
their modes. By enumerating the properties we can discover 
in a thinking thing, and contrasting them with those which we 
can discover in a body like a piece of wax, we can form the 
idea of mind as a substance whose whole essence is to think; 
a conclusion which clearly depends upon my right to determine 
what I am from the consciousness which I have of myself, 
since it is of a diversity of modes concretely presented in 
this consciousness that the direct examination is made from 
which I determine what I essentially am. It is this emphasis 
on the direct awareness of what we are which makes a formu­
lated doctrine of substance of secondary importance to 
Descartes, and why this doctrine which is almost ignored in 
the Meditations receives such wide expansion in the Principles 
Descartes desires to know what in particular he is, not what 
his nature is as a substance in general. His doctrine of 
substance depends on his doctrine of method, and not vice 
versa; and the method, being one which is directed to the 
investigation/
investigation of the particular, permits the formulation of 
general truths only secondarily and by reflexion.
§15. At the end of the second Meditation we are in pos­
session of the idea of a thinking substance. This idea is
the idea of something complete and standing in need of nothing
•' ' ; ' / ’ . -
beyond itself in order to its existence. Nothing belonging to 
the nature of body is contained in this idea. How is it, 
then, that we cannot immediately conclude that the mind is a 
pure spiritual substance?
During the course of the second Meditation, Descartes 
makes a reservation which not only caused difficulty to the 
Objectors, but which is puzzling also to the present-day
1
interpreter. The passage has already been quoted, but may be 
given again for convenience. "But it is true, perhaps, that j 
those very things (viz., bodies) which I suppose to be non­
existent, because they are unknown to me, are not in truth (
different from myself whom 1 know. This is a point X cannot ij
determine, and do not now enter into any dispute regarding it.
I can only judge of things that are known to me: I am con- ;
Iscious that I exist, and I who know that I exist enquire into 
what I am." Descartes thus admits that there is an ultimate j 
possibility that he is not different from bodies. We must 
not, he says, confuse the question of what the mind really is,
with the question, what we know of it.^^ In other words q
 ̂Iwhen I have formed a clear and distinct idea of a thinking I 
thing, the question still remains SDSxfc® whether or not I am a ; 
body. The Objectors believe that the question remains open | 
because it has been begged. The idea which Descartes has j
formed/ li
222formed of himself is not a true idea because it is inadequate. 
Arnauld believes that the fatal step in Descartes1 argument 
is his enquiring into what he is so far as he is conscious of 
himself. He says: nBut he (sc. Descartes) says that, in 
terms of the argument proposed in the method, the deduction 
has proceeded to the point only of excluding from the nature 
of his mind whatsoever is corporeal fnot according to the 
order of truth in the matter by only according to the order 
of his perception, since he perceived (sensus esset) that he 
clearly apprehended nothing which he knew to belong to his ' 
essence except that he was thinking thing.1 It is clear from 1 
this reply that the argument remains where it was, and that . j 
the question which he promises to solve remains untouched, 
namely: how it follows that, from the fact that he knows that j 
nothing else pertains to his essence, nothing further really 
does belong to it.”223 The charge is that Descartes1 reser- | 
vation that he may be a body is not quite honest. Arnauld 
says that he cannot find where in Meditation II this possi­
bility is finally disproved.224 He goes on to say that where j 
the proof is made in the sixth Meditation the adequacy of the 
idea of the mind formed in the second Meditation is taken for j 
granted.223 The promise made in the Preface to the Medita­
tions is not fulfilled. Descartes1 reservation that he may
I,
be something of which he is not conscious cannot thus be taken
j :t
as being in good faith. By enquiring what he is injsofar as ,j
! : Ihe perceives himself to be a mind, he makes abstraction from 
what may possibly be his nature, and by enquiring into a part J
145.
of his being, namely, himself as far as he is conscious of 
himself, he forms an inadequate idea of his own nature.
The criticism of Arnauld is one of the acutest 
which could be urged against the second Meditation; and of 
all his Objectors, Descartes treats Arnauld with the greatest 
respect. This criticism, indeed, seems to be very well 
founded. Towards the end of the second Meditation, Descartes 
says nBut, finally, what shall I say of the mind itself, that 
is, of myself? for as yet I do not admit that I am anything j 
but mind.” This statement clearly refers to the reservation j
made earlier in the Meditation, yet up to the end of this j
|
Meditation Descartes continues in the course of examining j
what he is only insofar as he is conscious of himself. The 
third, fourth, and fifth Meditations treat of other matters.
The point which appears paradoxical is that in the fourth j
Meditation Descartes especially reminds us that the difficulty 
raised by the reservation in the second Meditation has not yet 
been solved. nBut now I not only know that I exist, insofar 
as I am a thinking being, but there is likewise presented to 
my mind a certain idea of corporeal nature; hence I am in 
doubt as to whether the thinking nature which is in me, or 
rather which X myself am, is different from that corporeal
1122*7nature, or whether both are merely one and the same thing.
This doubt continues unresolved, and yet the real distinction j
i
is concluded in the sixth Meditation just as though the idea \ 




more to complete it. The reason for Arnauld’s bewilderment is 
clear. Descartes keeps emphasising the importance of the 
reservation which he has made, yet he remains equally firm in 
the belief that by the end of the second Meditation he has 
formed a complete idea of what mind is, an idea legitimately 
come by and not formed by intellectual abstraction. For Arnauld, 
these are two entirely incompatible positions. The difficulty 
is, indeed, profound; and it is one which has to be solved if 
the Meditations are to be admitted to be completely intelligible. 
One thing is quite clear, that Descartes is fully conscious of 
the difficulty, but that he sees no reason whatever to change I
the proofs of the Meditations. He holds to the opinion that 
the Meditations are a complete and coherent body of proofs.
The response to Arnauld provides the best clue to the 
solution of the difficulty. Descartes says that nthe real 
distinction cannot be inferred from the fact that one thing is 
conceived apart from another by the abstracting action of an 
intellect conceiving a thing inadequately, but only from the 
fact that each of them is understood apart from the other in a 
complete fashion, or as a complete thing.”228 It can be seen j
from this that Descartes does not believe that the idea which 
he has formed of the mind has been obtained by abstraction. On 
the other hand M. Arnauld is wrong in assuming that an adequate 
idea is required in order to the real distinction. Adequate 
knowledge is the kind of knowledge which God has of things. ,j
Thus even if a man had an adequate knowledge of anything, he
could/
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could not know it unless God gave him a private revelation of 
the fact. Finite minds merely require to know that their 
knowledge is adequate for that thing, that is, they require to 
know that their idea of a thing is not falsifying its nature, 
not that they know everything about it which is to be known.
We require to know no more than that we have an idea which we 
have not rendered inadequate by means of an intellectual 
abstraction. Human reason is capable of forming sufficiently 
adequate ideas of things. Though we are finite intellects, we 
can obtain true ideas about things. In order to have suffici­
ently adequate knowledge of a thing, we must have sufficient 
knowledge of it to let us know that it is a complete thing.
But the idea which we have of the mind at the end of the second 
Meditation, which is used in drawing the real distinction in 
the sixth Meditation, is that of a complete thing. The mind is 
thus completely conceived by our enquiring into what we are 
insofar as we are conscious of ourselves.
But yet the reservation holds that our nature may 
depend on something, namely body, which is, at the time that 
the reservation is made, not yet fully known to us. It is 
clear that there cannot be a unanimity between Descartes and 
Arnauld about the nature of this reservation. Arnauld’s inter­
pretation of it is clear: if there is any possibility that I am 
a body then I must demonstrate that I am not a body before I 
can be certain that I have a complete idea of myself. Descartes 
he thinks, has committed a bad flaw in reasoning in proving that 
he/
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he is not a body by means of the complete idea which he has of 
himself (or the idea which he has of himself as a complete 
thing). It is clear that this objection strikes at the very 
root of Descartes’ attempt to draw the real distinction between 
mind and body. How in principle, it implies, can one proceed 
to distinguish things by means of the ideas one has of them, 
when the very fact that one is setting out to distinguish these 
things implies that in the real they may be a single nature, 
and that consequently we can only form distinct ideas of them 
by assuming what has to be proved. How, in short, can we know 
things as they really are if ideas are anterior to things?
This, however, is what Descartes is attempting. Since the 
steps by which he discovers what is contained in the idea of 
himself conform to a definite plan of reasoning, and since he 
cannot be suspected of distrusting his Method, his reservation 
that he may be a body cannot be attributed to a doubt whether 
his chain of proof is complete. The grounds of this reservation 
must therefore be sought otl^erwheres than where Arnauld seeks 
them.
§16. The problem to be solved, if the reservation, made by 
Descartes about his nature, is to be intelligible is: how is it 
possible for me to have a clear and distinct and methodically 
formed idea of myself as a mind only, and at the same time to 
admit that it is possible that my nature may be corporeal? 
Descartes has rejected the criticism of Arnauld that the possi­
bility lies in his having formed an inadequate, or abstract, or 
incomplete idea of himself, in other words, in his having made 
an imperfect examination of his nature.
In the response to Arnauld, Descartes explains why he 
was unable to conclude the real distinction of mind and body at 
the end of the second Meditation, that is, to conclude that 
there was nothing corporeal in the nature of mind, and no 
thought in the nature of body. Consequently, had I not been 
seeking a certitude greater than the vulgar, I should have been 
contented with showing, in the second Meditation, that mind is 
understood as a thing that subsists although clearly nothing be 
attributed to it which pertains to body; and conversely that 
body is understood as a thing that subsists, though nothing be 
attributed to it which pertains to mind. And I should have 
added nothing more for demonstrating that mind is really dis­
tinguished from body: because vulgarly we judge that all things 
stand in their true order, in the same order in which they stand 
to our perception. But since among those hyperbolical doubts 
which I proposed in the first Meditation there was one that went 
so far that I could not be certain even of this (namely that 
things/
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things in their true nature were such as we perceive them),
while I supposed myself ignorant of the author of my origin,
all that I have written about God and truth in the third,
fourth, and fifth Meditations serve to the conclusion of the
real distinction of mind from body, a conclusion which I then
229complete in the sixth Meditation."
It has been noted that the reservation under discus­
sion was reaffirmed in the fourth Meditation. But the only 
reason why the real distinction is not made at the end of the 
second Meditation, is the hyperbolical doubt, as is clear from 
the passage just quoted. It is therefore to be concluded that 
Descartes considered that it is the hyperbolical doubt, and not, 
as Arnauld thinks, his method of investigating his nature, which 
must be held to account for this reservation. Though both Ar­
nauld and Descartes admit the reservation, it is for entirely 
different and incompatible reasons.
It will therefore be profitable to dwell briefly on
the nature of Descartes’i doubt. It is to be noted that Descartes
230distinguishes between essence and existence. The existence 
of God alone is contained in his essence. While, for this reas­
on, it is self-evident that God exists, it is a matter requir­
ing proof that any created thing exists of whose essence we 
have knowledge, Given the knowledge or the essence or nature 
of anything, there always remains a possibility of doubting 
whether that thing exists. But there is a further possi­
bility of doubt. We know the essences or natures of things 
through the ideas we have of them. Just as there is a possi­
bility/
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possibility of a discrepancy between essence and existence, so 
there is a possibility of discrepancy between idea and essence. 
It is the latter possibility which gives rise to the hyperboli­
cal doubt: whether things in their true nature are such as we 
perceive them. Though the hyperbolical doubt is the more ulti­
mate doubt it must be solved first.
The nature and solution of the doubt as it appears 
in the Meditations may be stated as follows. The pre-hyperboli- 
cal doubt arises out of the evidence of the senses. The facts 
of dream, illusion, and errors of sense perception force us to 
doubt whether things exist such as we sense them. Since physics, 
astronomy, and medicine seem to deal with bodies that we sense, 
we must conclude that these sciences are doubtful. But what of 
the sciences which do not deal with existent bodies? - tTArith­
metic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class,
which regard merely the simplest and most general objects, and
231scarcely enquire whether or not these are really existent?”
The fact that the existence of the things with which they deal
is not all-important for the latter sciences, does not make them
any the less open to doubt. Indeed, the highest doubt attaches
232precisely to these latter, since by the hypothesis of the
evil genius we can doubt whether the essences of things are such
as we conceive them to be. A science like algebra which deals
peculiarly with essences, is thus par excellence the object of
the hyperbolical doubt.
Furthermore, the pre-hyperbolical and the hyperbolical 
doubts are closely interconnected. Physics, astronomy, and
medicine/
medicine are doubtful sciences because they seem to deal with 
what are ordinarily and precritically called bodies, i.e., 
bodies as the objects of sense perception. They are doubtful 
because of the confusedness of our senses in perceiving such 
bodies. But in the first Meditation we do not yet know how 
bodies are to be truly conceived. This we discover by the 
examination of the piece of wax. But if physics, astronomy, 
and medicine are the doubtful sciences of objects confusedly 
perceived, are they the doubtful sciences of bodies when we 
clearly and distinctly conceive these as figured, moveable 
extension? It is clear that the doubt derived from the senses, 
which first infected these sciences, now has its basis removed. 
But the pre-hyperbolical doubt is not on that account resolved, 
for at this very point a new reason for doubt comes into opera­
tion. Just when these sciences cease to be the objects of the 
pre-hyperbolical doubt they become the objects of the hyper­
bolical doubt, for in the second Meditation, nature is seen to 
be the object not of the senses but of the intellect. As 
figured, moveable extension it is the object of mathematics. 
Physics, astronomy, and medicine are thus mathematical in 
nature, and are doubtful because of the doubt which applies to 
mathematics: the hyperbolical doubt, whether the natures of 
jthings is such as we clearly and distinctly conceive them to be. 
Thus the first necessity for placing physics on a firm founda­
tion is to solve the doubt regarding the truths of mathematics. 
For firmly establishing these sciences it is useless for us to 
know/
know that material objects exist, until we know that they are 
such as we conceive them. That is why the hyperbolical doubt 
is resolved before the existence of material things is proved.
But the reason for the reservation which forms the 
matter of dispute between Descartes and Arnauld was found to be 
the hyperbolical doubt, which arises from the possibility of a 
discrepancy between our ideas and the natures or essences of 
things. The difficulty of being certain that mind is not cor­
poreal, therefore, does not depend from the doubt of the exis­
tence of bodies, but from the doubt whether our ideas are 
veridical.
Let us suppose that the essence of things does not 
correspond to the clear and distinct ideas which I have of them. 
Then no matter how perfect may be the reasoning by which I pro­
ceed in forming a clear and distinct conception, I shall have 
advanced very little towards the certainty that the essence of 
the thing conceived is such as I conceive it to be. Therefore, 
when I have formed a clear and distinct conception of the mind,
I must still retain an ultimate doubt whether the nature or 
essence of the mind is such as I conceive it to be; and while I 
retain this doubt I cannot be sure that corporeity is not in- j
volved in the essence of the mind. It is chiefly in this i
.iultimate doubt that the explanation must be found for Descartes'<] 
reservation that he may be a body, in spite of his confidence in
j
his method of forming a clear and distinct idea of the mind.
This, however, is not the full extent of the explana- i
tion./ |
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explanation. The doubt whether or not our ideas truly represent
to us the natures of things is solved in the fourth Meditation.
But the doubt whether or not I am a body is not solved until the
sixth Meditation, where the real distinction is concluded.
"Finally, when I said that perhaps it was the fact that that
which I had not yet come to know (namely, my body) was not
different from me myself whom I knew (namely, from my mind), I
do not know, I do not dispute the matter etc.; you object: if
you do not know, if you do not dispute it, why do you assume
that you are none of these things? But it is false that I
assumed anything of which I was ignorant; for plainly and on
the contrary, because I was ignorant whether or not body was the
same as mind, I assumed nothing about it, but considered the
mind alone, and afterwards, in the sixth Meditation, I did not
that 233
assume but demonstrated/it was really distinct from the body."
Only the last Meditation finally solves the difficulty. 
Thus something more is required for the solution than the 
assurance that the natures of things correspond to our clear 
and distinct ideas of them. The natures which I conceive as 
distinct are distinct in virtue of the things of which they are 
the natures, and it is therefore on the real distinction of 
these things that the solution of the difficulty finally waits. 
But the real distinction does not require the proof of the 
actual existence of these things but only the assurance that 
they are of such a nature that, if they exist, they can exist 




God’s guarantee for two things: that my clear and distinct 
ideas are ideas of the true natures or essences of things, 
because God is no deceiver: and that things whose natures are 
distinguished in idea can exist in separation, because God is 
omnipotent and is able to do whatever we can clearly and dis­
tinctly conceive.
The reason why Descartes makes the reservation that he 
may be a body is thus explained. It remains to be seen, how­
ever, whether the reason he gives for examining his nature only
/ tinsofar as he is conscious of himself is justified. This 
reason he states as follows: l!It is, however, perfectly certain 
that the knowledge of my existence, thus precisely taken, is not 
dependent on things, the existence of which is as yet unknown 
to me: and consequently it is not dependent on any of the things 
I can feign in imagination.
Descartes cannot doubt that he exists, even though he 
doubts of the existence of corporeal things, which he perceives 
through confused images. He has a clear and distinct knowledge 
that he exists not merely when he doubts of material things, 
but even because he doubts of them. There is nevertheless an 
ultimate possibility that his nature may be that of the things 
of which he doubts the existence. He wishes to find out more 
precisely what he is, and the question which now arises is: how 
far, in defining what he is, must he take into consideration the 
nature of those things whose existence he doubts because he 
perceives them confusedly. But the manner of reasoning pre­
scribed/
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prescribed by the Method is to proceed from one clear and dis­
tinct idea to another. A confused idea cannot be employed in 
reasoning. Consequently, though it is possible that I may be 
one of those things which I confusedly perceive, it is never­
theless clear that I cannot possibly arrive at the truth of the 
matter by introducing these confused perceptions into my reason­
ing. My only clear and distinct perception at this stage is 
that I am a thinking thing. My further reasoning can take only 
this knowledge Into consideration. If I am to discover by a 
chain of accurate reasoning whether or not I am a body it is 
only by ignoring at this stage the confused images of body 
which I have. In so doing I do not prejudge the issue 
whether or not I am a body, but I take the only course which 
can bring the matter to an accurate and unprejudiced conclusion.
Thus Descartes can reply to Arnauld: "Nor can what M. 
Arnauld adds be urged against me: that it is not wonderful if, 
in concluding that I exist from the fact that I think, the idea 
which I thus form should represent me solely as a thinking 
thing. For similarly, when I examine the nature of body, I 
find nothing whatever in it which savours of thought. And no 
better argument for the distinction between two things can be 
urged than that in whichever we investigate we clearly find 
nothing which is not diverse from the other."235 The concep­
tion of a corporeal thing has, when the opportunity arrived, 
been examined as carefully as that of a thinking thing, con­
firming the conclusion reached by the examination of myself as 
thinking,/
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thinking, and thus justifying the procedure under discussion.
Gassendi urges the same difficulty as Arnauld, that if 
Descartes is ignorant whether or not he is a body, why does he 
assume that he is not, in examining his nature only insofar as 
he thinks.2*^ To this Descartes replies that it is false that 
he has assumed something of which he is ignorant; for on the 
contrary, not knowing whether body was the same as mind or not, 
he made no assumptions about the matter, but treating of the 
mind alone and assuming nothing, he demonstrated the real dis­
tinction of body and mind in the sixth Meditation.23*̂ It is 
interesting to note that Descartes charges his opponent with 
having made an assumption. He himself is reasoning in an un­
prejudiced fashion, but merely because he admits the possibility 
that he may be a body, his opponent wishes him to assume that 
he is. But it is contrary to all good reasoning to leave the 
ground of certain knowledge in order to entertain the phantoms 
of imagination.
Granting that Descartes’/ general method of reasoning 
from what is clearly and distinctly known is correct, it is im­
possible not to admit that he is justified in proceeding with 
the argument of the Meditations from the idea which he has of 
himself as a thinking thing. It is demanded by the method 
"that we shall treat of things only in relation to our under­
standing’ s awareness of them."238 However compounded any !
nature may be, we shall never discover what it is except by 
isolating and examining in it that of which we are clearly and 
distinctly/ [
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distinctly aware. It would be to propose a false "question" 
for analysis to assume as a condition necessary for its solution 
that the body thinks..
Descartes1̂ certainty that the idea-which he has formed 
of himself is not formed by abstraction is further explained, 
in an illuminating fashion, by a letter to a Doctor of the 
Sorbonne. "Regarding the principle according to which I believe 
that the idea which I have of a thing has not been rendered 
Inadequate by an abstraction of the intellect, I have concluded 
it only from my proper thought. For being assured that I 
cannot have any knowledge of what is outside of me except 
through the medium of the ideas of it which I have in me, I am 
careful about immediately referring ray judgments to things, and 
attribute nothing positive to things which I have not first 
perceived in their ideas; but I also believe that everything 
which is in these ideas is necessarily in the things. Thus in 
order to know if my idea has not been rendered incomplete or 
inadequate by some abstraction of the mind, I only consider if 
I have derived it, not from some subject which is more complete, 
but from some other idea more complete and more perfect than I 
may have in me; and if I have not derived it thence by an 
abstraction of the intellect, that is to say, in turning away 
my thought from a part of what is contained in the complete 
idea, for better applying it and rendering me more attentive to 
the other part."239 "It appears to me to be perfectly clear 
that the idea I have of a substance which thinks is complete 
and/
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and that I have no other idea in my mind which precedes it.n2^9 
This text well illustrates the connection of the 
Cartesian doctrine of ideas with the argument of the Meditations*! 
We know only our ideas directly. Consequently, when we have i 
doubted not only whether material things exist, but whether the j 
essences of things are such as we conceive them to be, we can 
only reason with certainty about ourideas. The application of• I
the Method to metaphysical matters determines that it shall be 
the nature of the nIw which is to be examined. What regulates |
our thinking during this examination cannot possibly be the j
things which our ideas may or may not represent. My idea can j
only be judged inadequate with reference to some more complete 
idea from which it is clearly seen to depend as an incomplete 
fragment. In order that I may judge whether or not the idea 
which I am forming of myself is inadequate, I must compare it 
with some other idea which I may have of myself, and to which 
I have reason to assign more truth than to that which I am 
forming. But since my method of procedure in the second Medi­
tation is precisely to form ideas than which I have hitherto j
had none clearer, it is Impossible that such an idea be found. 
Consequently any belief that the idea of myself which I am 
forming in the second Meditation is inadequate, can be,based 
only upon the false assumption which presupposes that that very 
idea has been found which it is the aim of the methodical 
reasoning of the second Meditation to find. The course of the 
argument, therefore, can confidently proceed, unhindered by the 
fear/
fear that the ideas formed can be rendered inadequate by com­
parison with any ideas which are clearer, or a fortiori, any 
ideas, like that of body, which have not yet reached precision.
The charge of having assumed what he wished to prove 
has been from Descartes’5 own time to the present, one of those 
most frequently levelled against him. It occurs in all the 
Objections except the first; it is made by Regius and by some 
of Descartes!< correspondents, and was in subsequent times a 
matter of continual controversy.
There is a kind of grossness in the very questions, 
whether or not Descartes was in good faith, and whether or not 
his thinking is imperfect. These questions really belong to 
the heat of controversy of his own times, and it is only in 
order the better to understand those times that the question 
ought to be debated. There is no need to pursue the matter at 
any greater length here, though it will be of use to draw 
attention to two texts which show clearly that Descartes felt 
himself to be governed by logic, and logic only, in his demon­
stration of the real distinction of soul and body.
In the Response to the sixth set of Objections, Descartes 
tells his interlocutors the history of his thought on this head. 
He tells them that he pursued his thinking according to his 
method, and, going where he was driven by the argument, he was 
forced to the conclusion that the mind was really distinct from 
the body, and better known than it. This conclusion was so 
novel that he had difficulty in believing his own proofs, feel-
feeling himself like the astronomers who are forced to judge, 
against the evidence of their senses, that the sun is larger 
than the earth. He required much reflection on his own con­
clusions fully to convince himself. If his proof surprised his
241readers, it surprised him equally.
This is a convincing example of Descartes subjection 
to his own logic. It is a consequence of this that he should j
be outraged by assertions to the contrary, and it is probably j
this feeling of outraged intellectual honesty alone which can
I
account for the vigour of his reply to Bourdin, when the latter j 
says that he should not take for granted the spiritual nature 
of the mind. "He falsely pretends here that I assume what I 
ought to have proved. And to such falsehoods, which are so 
freely framed, and cannot be substantiated by the smallest j f
evidence, nothing further need be said than that they are un- j;
i;
true.”2 -2 "I deny that I in any way posited that the mind is |j
incorporeal, but, finally, demonstrated it in the sixth Medi- j
tation.1,243 Evidently, Descartes regarded the imputation as a j ,
baseless slander.
If it is true that Descartes'{ conclusions followed
_ J  j ,  ;
strictly from his logic, it must nevertheless be admitted that !
j:the opposition of his critics is at least understandable.
Consider what analysis demanded: "The second rule of the logic 
of M. Descartes is to divide, or make a kind of anatomical dis­
section of the difficulty which he proposes to examine. First 
he looks at it generally, then, distinguishing each part, he 
disentangles/ j
disentangles one from the other, in order to contemplate each 
in particular, and to know its nature and its properties. He 
wished, for example, to know himself; hut the difficulty which 
he encountered obliged him to distinguish in himself the mind 
and the body of which he was composed, and to consider them |
separately.1,244 When it is recollected that such a procedure 
in metaphysics was previously unheard of, it is not surprising 
that the preliminary anatomical dissection appeared to make 
distinctions without foundation. An opponent was bound to 
reply: "You wish to discover what you are, and yet you regard |
the division of yourself into soul and body as a mere prelimin- j!
ary, when in fact that is the heart of the whole question." J j
Such an opponent ignores the fact that a mathematician is bound j ; 
to have a kind of prescience of the course his solution must >; 
take, or he would never be able to commence upon it. Indeed, 1
the higher his genius, the more speedily will he fasten upon j
the distinctions which at the end of the proof will be seen to 
have been most relevant to it. !
iDescartes1 proof conforms perfectly to his logic. It j
i
was only in a later century that the question was asked whether 
the mathematical procedure was able to give the truth in such 
questions. Idealism suggested quite another way of approach to 
speculative problems, and from its point of view the Cartesian 
metaphysic is superficial. It would be absurd, however, to read J 
history backwards in a fashion which would conceal how genuine 
was the attempt of Descartes to discover what he was.
§17. Descartes1 system of metaphysics can be conceived as a 
body of affirmations made about a certain subject matter. It is 
truth about things. These things may be material or spiritual 
things, or other truths, but they are equally things about 
which the system makes certain affirmations. It will be of use 
here to look at the Metaphysic of Descartes from the point of 
view of this distinction.
The Regulae and the Discourse on Method prescribe cer­
tain rules which all scientific knowledge must obey. Above all, 
every science must consist in clear and distinct truths, con- !
nected in the correct order. But in metaphysics this leads to j
a tremendous difficulty. The preparation for this science is
{
doubt. But this doubt affects our clear and distinct ideas: we
j i
cannot be certain whether or not they are true. Thus the hyper­
bolical doubt leaves us in this difficult position: it forces f 
us to doubt whether metaphysics as a science is possible, and ■ 
yet it is only by the aid of metaphysics itself that this dif­
ficulty can be solved. This is the problem of the cercle \
cartesien stated in its most general terms.
The difficulty of the cercle cartesien has already been 
dwelt upon. The doubt whether metaphysics as a science is 
possible is only solved in the fourth Meditation. It follows, 
therefore, from the nature of the doubt which is the indispen- N 
sable introduction to metaphysics, that, from the point of view 1 
of absolutely certain truth, the first four Meditations must be M 
regarded as having only provisional truth. It is not the Cogito 
alone/ j
alone whose truth is provisional, but every proposition pre­
ceding the proof of the certain truth of our clear and distinct 
ideas. This proof itself is provisional pending its own con­
clusion.
That there is some sort of circle here is evident.
But the true defence of Descartes’C reasoning is not to deny 
that this circle exists. The true defence lies in showing that 
this circularity is so fundamental to the Metaphysic, that it 
must have been intended by Descartes, and that so far from its 
being a deviation from his intention to philosophise in order, 
it expresses an inevitable consequence of the Method as applied 
in metaphysics. There is good reason for attaching consider­
able weight to some remarks of the R.P. Nicholas Poisson.
"I do not believe that M. Descartes has ever broken the least 
of these rules (namely, those of Aristotle according to which 
’there is a logical circle which so far from being vicious, is 
a demonstrative argument’); so that whatever circle is found 
in his reasoning can best be called a particular species or 
fashion of demonstrating things, and not a fault or vice."243
Unless Descartes intended the proof of God’s existence 
to have retrospective effect, it would be hard to explain his 
own words: nIn the fourth (sc. Meditation), it is shown that 
all which we clearly and distinctly perceive is true; and at 
the same time, is explained wherein consists the nature of error; 
points that require to be known as well for confirming the pre­
ceding truths (tarn ad praecedentia firmanda), as for understan­
ding/
understanding those to follow.”246
|
That characteristic of the Metaphysic discussed above 
gives the Meditations a curious appearance of hanging in the 
air, as it were. When we look at the matter from another point ! 
of view, and ask what the things are about which these affir­
mations are made of whose truth we must remain so long uncer­
tain, we find once more that we are hanging in a kind of meta- 
phys i cal suspens e.
The Metaphysic is to investigate the nature of material j i  
and spiritual things. But the doubt forces us to question !
whether material things exist. It also compels us to question l|
whether the ideas which we have of the essences both of material |j
and spiritual things truly represent their, natures. Of what, j :  
then, can we be certain? ”We are'not more certain of anything,” ' 
says Arnauld ”than of the knowledge which we have of that which [ j  
passes in our soul, when we take our stand there. For example, j j  
it is very certain to me that I conceive bodies when I believe 
myself to conceive bodies though it may be uncertain whether ! 
the bodies which I conceive either truly exist, or are such as 
I conceive them.”2417 ”Now, with respect to ideas,” says 
Descartes ”if these are considered only in themselves, and are 
not referred to any object beyond them, they cannot, properly 
speaking, be false; for, whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, i
it is not less true that I imagine one than the other ... for 1
assuredly, if we but considered the ideas themselves as certain - 
modes of our thought without referring them to anything beyond | 
they/ |
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they would hardly afford any occasion of error.”248 The con­
clusion to be drawn is plain: our doubt extends to the existence 
of the objects of our ideas, but it does not extend to our 
ideas injscjfar as they are related to us. j
s '■It; is, furthermore, a Cartesian doctrine that we know 
only our ideas. The sciences, says Arnauld, are formed only by 
the reflexions which men make upon their own perceptions, as 
when a geometer, having conceived a triangle as a figure 
bounded by three straight lines, finds by examining this per- j
ception that it must have three angles together equal to two j
right angles.2̂ 9 knowledge derives from the examination j
0  i - ■ l r  ’
more geometrico of the objective essenbe of; our ideas. As a 
consequence of the doubt, therefore, the immediate objects of ;
science are ideas, and ideas only. Arnauld, who has a genius ;
for making explicit what is implied in the metaphysics of i
■I
Descartes, puts the matter very well. ”lf I think of the sun, Ij
the objective reality of the sun which is present to my mind is j
the immediate object of that perception; and the sun, possible j
or existent, which is outside my mind, is, so to speak, its 
mediate object. And thus one sees ... it to be most true, that 
not only with regard to material things, but generally with 
respect to all things,^50 it is ourjdeas which we see
251
immediately, and which are the immediate object of our thought.
il
We are now in a position fully to appreciate the extent ;
of the cercle cartesien. The first books of the Meditations j-
consist of provisional truths about ideas objectively consid- j .
ered./ i
considered. The method consists in forming ideas about ideas.
We seem completely cut off from reality as well as from truth. 
This way of reasoning may well seem to be curiously
iartificial. When in the second Meditation we form conclusions, j
by the examination of the piece of wax, about the nature of :
bodies, we are making affirmations which we cannot be certain 
to be true, about that which we do not yet know to exist. Nor 
does the matter stand very differently with our examination of 
what we ourselves are. It is true that I am certain that I 
exist, even though I do not yet know whether bodies exist,* and 
in examining my nature I am aware that I am examining the |
nature of something that exists. But it is true, nevertheless, I
j
that my actual being is only the mediate object of my thought.
The dispute between Descartes, Arnauld and Gassendi is impos- ,
si-bXe-^o appreciate?/unless we see quite clearly that Descartes
i s ‘ j
preserves the distinction between what we are injscffar as we are j
/ : I
conscious of ourselves, that is, have an idea of ourselves, and Ii
what we may actually be. The objective essence of the idea ji
which he has of himself is that of a purely spiritual being, ;
and therefore, in enquiring what he is iijsdfar as he is con-l I
scious of himself, Descartes considers his procedure as legi­
timate as that of the geometers. But the same difficulty j
remains as in the instance of material things: how are we to |
know whether things, existent or possible, are such as we con- j
ceive them to be?
i.
The apparently inverted procedure of Descartes is j,
therefore,/ i
therefore, not to be urged against him as illogical. It is, 
indeed, the mark of a very high degree of logic to have con­
structed a.. system of metaphysics which has so thoroughly 
initiated its model, mathematics, that it seems to have no 
immediate contact with the actually existent. It behoves 
metaphysics, however, to prove that it is a science of the 
really existent, and this Descartes is most anxious to do.
Let us consider the means at his disposal. That Is 
easily done. He has to prove that his ideas correspond with 
the reality which he suspects to lie beyond his thought. The 
proof cannot be made from the side of the external reality 
since it is doubtful whether that exists. It must therefore 
be made from the side of our ideas. But it cannot be made from 
our ideas taken as true, since that would be to beg the question. 
The proof must therefore be made from the side of our ideas 
taken as pictures not known to correspond with anything external 
to them.
It is unnecessary to discuss at any length what Descartei 
means by the word "idea," since that is a task which has already 
been excellently performed by others.252 It is sufficient to 
remark that Descartes defines "thought" as follows: "in the 
wori/ thought, I comprehend everything which is in us in such a 
fashion that we are immediately conscious of it. Thus all the ! 
operations of the will, the understanding, of imagination, and j 
of sense are thoughts."255 And then, "By the word, idea, I ;
understand that form of each of our thoughts, through the im- ; 
mediate/ ;j
immediate perception of which we have knowledge of that same
thought. ”254 Nothing can he more certain than that we have
ideas, and as long as we simply contemplate our ideas without
affirming that they represent any reality external to them we
255are in no danger of error. It is in this doctrine that the
reason lies why Descartes commences his proof that we have 
knowledge of the real, from ideas as entities not taken as 
truly representing anything actual hut only as seeming to do so. 
Since we have douhted whether knowledge is true, the demonstra­
tion of the existence of a reality external to our ideas can 
only he made, for the first time, from the fact of a relation­
ship, other than that of knowledge, between our ideas and the 
supposed external world. This demonstration has to he made 
from the side of the real content of our thought, and takes the 
form of giving a sufficient reason for this content hy means of 
the principle of causality. If our ideas are such that in order 
to explain their nature we must assume a cause of them other 
than ourselves, then we can he certain that we are not alone in 
the world hut that there is a reality which is external to us.
It is on this supposition that the first proof of God’s 
existence rests. It may be remarked incidentally that the 
reason why Descartes prefers this proof to the ontological is j
i
now clear: the ontological proof presupposes that we know we j
shave a true idea, one which truly represents the essence of God; j 
and of that we are not yet certain here. \
It must he explained, therefore, how Descartes passes 
from/ I
from ideas, taken in the sense explained, to an external 
reality, without presupposing the truth of these ideas. In 
order to do so, it is necessary to consider what Descartes 
understands by the objective reality of an idea. Descartes says 
that some of his thoughts, those properly called ideas, exist 
in him as pictures or images, such as those by which he holds 
before his mind a man, a chimera, the sky, an angel, or God.256 
These ideas are pictures, but they are not of such a kind as to 
assure us that they are true pictures. Furthermore, even were 
we certain that they were true pictures it would still be the 
picture which we contemplated and not the reality apparently 
represented as it exists formally or actually. We know only 
our ideas; they are never formal signs through which another 
thing is seen. This having been explained it is easier to 
understand the passages in the third Meditation concerned with 
the nature of our ideas. f
nIf ideas are taken insofar only as they are certain 
modes of consciousness, I do not remark any difference or in­
equality among them, and all seem, in the same manner, to pro­
ceed from myself; but, considering them as images, of which one 
represents one thing, and another a different, it is evident 
that a great diversity obtains among them. For, without a 
doubt, those that represent substances are something more, and 
contain in themselves, so to speak, more objective reality, 
that is participate by representation in a higher degree of 
being or perfection, than those that represent only modes or 
accidents;/ I
accidents: and again, the idea by which I conceive a God 
sovereign, eternal, infinite, immutable, all-knowing, all- 
powerful, and the creator of all things that are out of him­
self, - this, I say, has certainly more objective reality than 
those ideas by which finite substances are represented.”257
Though we know only our ideas, and though we are aware 
of the existence of nothing beside ourselves, it is nevertheles 
true that our ideas of themselves claim to represent other 
things. This is their objective essence,1 and it must conse­
quently be taken to be a property of ideas themselves taken as 
I images or pictures.2^2 It is true that the nature of any idea
i
; f,is such as of itself to demand no other formal reality than 
that which it borrows from our consciousness.”259 Nevertheless 
and this is the very core and heart of Descartes’ doctrine of 
objective essences, it is a mode of existence of the object 
represented.260 In this fact lies the possibility of bridging 
the gap between our ideas, and things outside ourselves.
This doctrine of the objective essencesof ideas is so 
extraordinary that it would be well to pause a little longer 
upon it. Though I know only my ideas, and though I am certain 
of the existence only of myself, yet I can be certain by marks 
proper to my ideas, that those things which I do not know to 
exist, nevertheless exist, though in an imperfect fashion, in my 
ideas. I am certain that my ideas are a way of existence of 
things of whose existence beyond my ideas I am still in doubt, 
fst. Thomasx shows how, from the undoubted fact that we have true 
knowledge,/
knowledge, we must conclude tliat knowledge is a manner of exis­
tence of the object known, in the mind of the knower. For 
Descartes, the fact of knowledge is still in doubt, yet he is 
certain that from the side of the thinking subject alone evi­
dence can be derived that his ideas are modes of the existence 
of things other than any particular idea in question. 
Ultimately, these things cannot merely be other ideas.
A few passages may be cited to drive home the nature of 
this typically Cartesian doctrine.
”By the objective reality of an idea I understand the
entity or being of the thing represented by the idea, ir^qfar
/ /as that entity is in the idea; and in like fashion one can 
speak of an objective perfection, or an objective artifice.
For everything which we conceive as being in the objects of the 
ideas, is objectively or by representation in the ideas them­
selves. ”262
”l say that a thing is objectively in my mind when I 
conceive it. When I conceive the sun, a square, a sound: the 
sun, the square, this sound are objectively in my mind, whether 
they be, or whether they be not, outside of my mind.”263
”When it is said that our ideas and our perceptions 
represent to us the things which we conceive, and are their 
images, this is in quite a different sense from that in which 
I say that pictures represent their originals, and are their 
images, or that words spoken or written are the images of our 
thoughts. For with respect to ideas, it is a v/ay of saying 
that/
that the things which we conceive are objectively in our mind j
and in our thought. But this mode of being objectively in the j
mind is so peculiar to the mind and to thought, that, being that
which constitutes its peculiar nature, we should search in vain J
26 4 jfor anything similar in everything which is not mind or thought.,fS
j'’What is termed being objectively in the mind is not j 
only to be the object which is the limit (la terme) of my j
thought, but it is to be in my mind intelligibly, as objects 
are accustomed to be present there: and the idea of the sun is_ j 
the sun irj/scjfar as it is in my mind, not formally as it exists 
in the sky, but objectively, that is to say, in the manner in 
which objects are in our thought, which is a mode of existing 
considerably more imperfect, than that by which the sun really 
exists, but which can nevertheless not be said to be nothing, j 
and to have no need of a cause.”265
Our ideas, then, though pictures or images, are pictures 
in a fashion peculiar to themselves.266 They are something more 
than mirrors or indications of external reality. They actually 
are a mode of existence of that external reality. Their
]
objective essence is to be that reality, in the manner in which j
that reality is accustomed to be present to our minds, though j
this mode of existence is imperfect. This is an ultimate meta- j
1physical fact inexplicable in terms of other things. Further­
more, being unaware of the existence of any reality beyond our 
thought, we know all this from the inspection of the ideas 
themselves. The consequence of this doctrine is that it is 
possible/
possible to avoid examining ideas from the point of view of 
truth, and to examine them from the point of view of their being 
existent things of a peculiar kind, for whose cause we may 
require a sufficient reason.
This is the doctrine of ideas involved in the proofs of 
God’s existence contained in the third Meditation. From the i
point of view of DescartesX method of demonstration, its most j
1important feature is that the proof of the existence of external!
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reality can be attempted without making assumptions forbidden byj
the hyperbolical doubt. To illustrate this, a few remarks on 
the proofs of the third Meditation become necessary. After 
some very important remarks about the nature of our ideas, 
Descartes makes a classification of ideas into innate, adven­
titious, and factitious, a classification referring to the j
origin of his ideas, and based on his former prejudices. He 
then asks what grounds he had for thinking that those which 
appeared to come from external objects were like these objects. 
These grounds, namely, that he was so taught by nature, and 
that the ideas appeared in him independently of his will, he 
finds reason to reject. Being compelled to reject the proof of 
the existence of things other than himself by means of ideas 
taken merely as images, he enunciates the doctrine of the 
objective essence as a consequence of which we are able to 
consider ideas not as things related as mere pictures to a 
reality which they seem to mirror, but as being a way in which 
that reality exists. It enables us to consider ideas as effects, 
not/
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not as images pretending to be true; as has already been 
insisted on.
A doctrine of cause and effect is then outlined. The 
natural light reveals to us that there must be at least as much 
reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. 
Further, not only can something not be produced by nothing, but 
the more perfect cannot be produced by the less perfect.
| Whatever comes into existence can only be produced by that|
; which contains in itself, formally or eminently, whatever is 
contained in the thing produced. To these necessities the 
objective reality of ideas is as much subject as physical 
things like stones or heat. This, it may be remarked in pass­
ing, is the central assumption of this part of the proof.
Since our ideas reveal to us that they are effects, we must 
enquire into the efficient cause in which they are contained 
formally or eminently. As a result of this enquiry we conclude 
that the reality objectively existing in our ideas requires the 
formal or actual, as opposed to the objective, existence of the 
thing represented by our idea, as its efficient cause.
It remains to enquire what this cause is, formally or 
actually. If my ideas are such that my own nature cannot be 
considered a sufficient reason for their objective essences, 
then I must conclude that I am not alone in the world and that 
this cause is other than myself. Among my ideas I find one 
that represents a God, others that represent corporeal and in­
animate things: others, angels: others animals: and finally 
some/
some representing men like myself. With respect to ideas 
representing living and spiritual beings other than God, I am 
compelled to conclude that I myself am able to be their effi­
cient and actual cause since they are not such that they may 
not have been derived from the idea which I have of myself, and 
it is impossible to deny that I myself am the cause of the 
latter idea. With respect to the ideas of corporeal and in­
animate things, a similar conclusion must be reached, since, 
though I am conscious that I am a thinking thing it is possible 
that the qualities of extension, figure, situation and motion 
may be contained in me eminently. The examination of these 
ideas, therefore, fails to assure me that I am not alone in the 
world. But such is not the conclusion to which I must come 
when I examine the idea of God. This idea is that of a sub­
stance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, 
all-powerful, by which I myself, and all other things, should 
they exist were created. Is it possible that I am actually or 
formally what is contained objectively in the idea of God?
But this is impossible since I am aware that I am an imperfect 
and finite creature, because I doubt. And since the idea of ■ 
God is that of a being perfect and infinite, then, since the 
more perfect cannot have the less perfect as its cause, and 
since what is objectively in my idea requires an actually 
existing cause in which it is formally or eminently contained,
I must conclude that there actually exists a God in whom there 
are contained all the perfections present objectively or by 
representation/
representation in my idea of him.
Such, in brief, is the celebrated first proof of God’s 
existence. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to examine 
the other proofs of the third Meditation since they add nothing 
relevant, for the present, to the first proof, serving only to 
confirm it. The ingenuity of this proof is wonderful, and the 
critique of it would have to be based on the possibility of 
making such a use as this of the doctrine of cause and effect, 
j Since the objective essence of an idea appears to be of an 
! order so different from that of its efficient cause, it is 
difficult to conceive of a causal relation between them. 
Descartes appears to avoid this difficulty by considering the 
objective essence to be a way in which the object represented 
exists in the mind, in a fashion, presumably, as proper to it­
self as to the mind, thus establishing the possibility of a 
causal connection. But such a critique is not called for here, 
where the main end is to ascertain D e s c a r t e s ’ own thought.
The proof illustrates once more the rigid logic of Descartes’< 
thinking. Compelled to take his doubt with the utmost serious­
ness, Descartes is faced with the necessity of philosophising 
in an inverted fashion. He has to escape from the circle 
inevitable from the nature of the doubt, without doing violence 
to the demands of the doubt. By a theory which conceives 
philosophising to be the order in which our will is compelled 
to make affirmations as though they were true, rather than an 
order of absolutely certain truth, he tries to make his first 
metaphysical/
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metaphysical propositions legitimate. But there is a second 
circle to he avoided, with respect to the objects about which 
these propositions are affirmed. Since the doubt has rendered 
suspect not only the existence of external objects but the 
truth of the ideas by which we appear to perceive any objects 
at all, it follows that that about which we philosophise can,
at first and immediately, be only our ideas regarded with no
aasumptijons as to their truth or error. All proofs must be 
made from the nature of our ideas thus taken, if no assumptions 
as to the nature of truth are to be made. If we are to 
establish the relation of our ideas to an external reality, 
this relation cannot at first be that of truth. Hence the 
peculiar genius of the first proof of God’s existence, that it
is made by considering the natures of ideas taken, not as
truths, but as the effects of causes which must, from the very 
nature of the ideas of which they are causes, be considered to 
be of a certain order of existence. We are compelled to make 
divers affirmations about these causes because we clearly and 
distinctly conceive certain characteristics of them. When 
these affirmations have been made, we find that we have 
affirmed the existence of a Being of such a nature that, having 
created us, He could not deceive us in matters where we proceed 
by clear and distinct conceptions. The proof thus justifies 
both itself and all other proofs, and we seem to escape from 
the threatened circle without a petitio principii.
§18. In the preceding pages, the distinction has been drawn 
between metaphysical truths which are certain and evident pro­
positions about their peculiar subject matter; and metaphysical 
things, or the objects of which these propositions are the rule 
of truth. The immediate objects of metaphysfcs are ideas, 
since we know only our ideas. The problem of truth, therefore, 
involves two distinct questions for Descartes. The first is, 
whether metaphysical propositions are true; the second, whether 
the ideas which are the immediate objects of our thought are 
veridical. When the existence of God has been proved we can be 
certain both that metaphysical propositions are the rule of 
truth in the things which they concern; and that we are acquir­
ing true knowledge when clear and distinct ideas are the objects 
of our thought.
It is the latter consequence of the proof of God’s 
existence which is of the greater importance in tracing the j
steps leading towards the drawing of the real distinction :
between body and mind. The peculiarity of Descartes’( doctrine 
of ideas is that though we are not directly aware of the exis-  ̂
tence of anything except our ideas, and though the immediate 
objects of our thought are ideas, these are nevertheless con­
ceived as representative beings. By their very nature they j
claim to be something other than themselves insofar as that 
other is present in the intellect, that is, is known. There is ; i  
thus a contradiction in conceiving of an ilea which is not the .j 
y e a  of something. But this is the contradiction which the
hyperbolical/ J
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hyperbolical doubt threatens. The solution of this doubt, 
therefore, enables us to conclude that our ideas are true of 
independent natures or essences, and that everything which is 
contained in the clear and distinct idea of a thing can be 
affirmed with truth of that t h i n g . I n  examining our clear 
and distinct ideas we can be certain that we are eo ipso 
examining the nature or essence of something other than our 
ideas.
It remains true, however, that we have an immediate 
knowledge only of our ideas. The proof of God’s existence 
makes a difference to the trust which we place in our ideas, 
not to the fact that we are said to know objects mediately by 
means of our ideas. We regard our ideas first as doubtful, 
then as true: but it remains our ideas of which we have im­
mediate knowledge, and not their objects, as the latter exist 
formally. We never have direct knowledge of objects.
Arnauld’s comments on the Cartesian doctrine are ins­
tructive :
’Thus,' because to be an animal is contained in the idea 
of man, I can affirm of man that he is an animal; because to 
have all its diameters equal is contained in the idea of a 
circle, I can affirm of every circle that all its diameters 
are equal; because to have all its angles equal to two right 
angles is contained in the idea of a triangle, I must affirm it 
of every triangle.
’This principle cannot be contested without destroying 
all/ -)
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all evidence in human knowledge, and establishing a ridiculous 
Pyrrhonism. For we cannot judge of things except by means of
the ideas we have of them, for we have no other means of con-
! ;
ceiving them except insdfar as they are in our mind, where they 
are present only by means of their ideas. But if the judgments 
which we form in considering these ideas do not regard things 
themselves but only our thoughts; that is to say if from this 
that I see clearly that to have three angles equal to two 
right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle, I have not 
the right to conclude that, in truth, every triangle has three 
angles equal to two right, but only that I think so, it can be 
seen that we have no knowledge of things but only of our 
thoughts; and consequently that we know nothing of the things 
which we persuade ourselves that we know with the greatest 
certainty; but that we know only that we think them to be of 
such a kind, a thing which manifestly would destroy all the 
sciences.
It is certain, then, that the judgments we form in 
considering clear and distinct ideas give us true knowledge of 
the objects of these ideas, that is, give us knowledge of 
things other than our ideas. We know that we know the essences 
of things by means of our clear and distinct ideas. It does 
not follow from this, however, that the things represented by 
these ideas real2x~exist• In tlie Cartesian philosophy we know 
what material things are before we know that they are or exist.
Descartes gives no definition of the terms, essence or
nature, which are synonymous in his writings.269 It is, how­
ever,/
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| however, clear that for him an essence or nature is something 
; which is not merely a modification of the mind, for then we 
should know only our thoughts; but something which we know to 
belong to the thing which is the object of our thoughts even 
1 though we are as yet uncertain of the existence of that thing. 
In the glossary appended to his Cours Entier Regis gives the 
following definition: ”Essence: By this term is called every­
thing without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived.11 
The essence of a thing is, therefore, necessary to it both as 
it exists for the mind, and as it exists in itself.
Thus, though we do not yet know that material things 
exist, it is true that any nature or essence, known by means 
of a clear and distinct idea, always presents itself as the 
nature or essence of something, that is, it contains in itself 
a possibility of existence. To have a clear and distinct idea, 
therefore, implies the possibility of the existence of some­
thing which in itself is not a mode of mind. nExistence is 
contained in the idea or concept of everything, because we can 
conceive nothing except under the form (sub ratione, sous la 
forme) of a thing that exists; but with this difference, that, 
in the concept of a limited thing, only possible or contingent 
existence is contained, and in the concept of a being supremely
it 2 70perfect, perfect and necessary existence is comprised.
i|'’Existence, at least possible, is contained in the idea of 
whatever we conceive clearly and distinctly.”2*^
If Descartes does not elaborate a doctrine or defini­
tion of essence, it is because he was not interested in the 
doctrine/
doctrine as such. We conclude directly from the fact of the 
truth of our clear and distinct ideas to the existence, actual 
or possible, of their objects. For this, an explicitly formu­
lated doctrine: de essentia, is superfluous, since the possi­
bility of the existence, of the object of a clear and distinct 
idea is something which is recognised directly. For Descartes 
the doctrine of essence cannot be an ontological question, 
since the existence of the external world is still in doubt.
The distinction of essence and existence in his metaphysic has 
its roots otherwhere^ than in the existent because of the 
priority of thought to things. The distinction, indeed, appears
to be psychological in origin, and to arise out of the doubt. j
!When we emerge from the hyperbolical doubt, it is apparent to 
the natural light that, when philosophising in order, we_can 
know the natures of things, while still doubting their exis­
tence . It is a distinction come upon by thought in its 
passage from itself to the existent; a fact of introspection.
We have here another example of Descartes’j preoccupa­
tion with the live movement of thought itself. His procedure 
is one of direct investigation with the postulation of prin­
ciples. What he desires to know is particular natures or j
essences, not the doctrine of essence in general. That is why, j 
from the point of view of a Thomist, Descartes may be called a 
metaphysician who does not love the truth, indeed, no meta­
physician at all.
M. Maritain makes the latter charge against Descartes272j 
precisely/
precisely the latter was more interested in the particular 
than the general, in things than in truths. For Descartes a 
doctrine such as that of essence is of secondary and derivative 
importance. It can never he one of the grand questions of 
metaphysics. ĵ Hence M. Maritain’s criticisms. But on the other 
hand it could he conc3.uded that, since it follows from the 
universal applicability of the Method that Descartes can know 
the things which are the proper objects of metaphysics in a 
manner fundamentally the same as that by which the objects of 
physics are known, he would pursue metaphysics with a new zest, 
precisely because he had assimilated the standpoints of meta­
physics and physics
. | That, probably, would be true enough, if the question
went no further than assessing Descartes’$ interests . /A Thomist* 
would be disposed to reply, and with complete justice from his 
point of view, that it was an unholy zest, because it had its 
origin in the materialisation of metaphysics. Furthermore, it 
is certainly true that Descartes did not appreciate what was 
truly valuable in̂ Thomisirii He represented it as mechanical in 
order that his own philosophy might appear the more spiritual.
He regards the older system as a system of affirmations derived 
from a logic which was false because it did not have direct 
intuition as its starting point, but general propositions 
which, because general, had no direct contact with the real. 
Truth for the sake of truth and not for the sake of things, he 
believed, could only be words for the sake of words. He never 
appreciated/
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appreciated the real necessities determining the Thomistic 
philosophy.
Prom his own point of view, however, the problem of 
truth is of more importance than the problem of being, and it 
is with truth rather than with being that his metaphysics is 
concerned. He has lost the Thomistic. equilibrium between being 
and truth. He does not desire to evolve a metaphysic based on 
the fact of their perfect suitability to each other, but to 
investigate how far thought, which is present to the mind of 
man prior to existence, is true. Furthermore, the problem for 
Descartes is the relation of thought to beings in particular 
rather than to being in general. Thus his problem is deter­
mined with respect to truths in particular rather than to truth 
in general. The problem of the doubt is how the particular 
sciences of physics, mathematics, and metaphysics are possible. 
Never in the preceding centuries had the problem of the possi­
bility of metaphysics itself appeared in so acute a form. 
Metaphysics had become reflexive, and it is this for which the 
cercle cartesien stands. Metaphysics must first safeguard 
itself, and then safeguard the other truths which are the 
objects of its speculations. Shut off from the grand questions 
of Being in general, it becomes introspective, and begins to 
substitute criticism for ontology.
The philosophy of Descartes suggests why the Critical 
philosophy is that of the age of positive science. The 
Cartesian philosophy lost sight of Being through its absorption 
in/
in beings. Even the metaphysic, whose special object was the 
mind, examined the self by a method which it had in common with 
physics, and can therefore be said to have ontological pre­
occupations only in the sense that physics can be called onto­
logical. It is a special science. But metaphysics had a 
double rdle to play. Since beings in particular are the 
objects of the special sciences, it becomes necessary to safe-
s
guard the special departments of truth relating to particular 
classes of objects. Metaphysics becomes, not only the special 
science which has minds as its objects, but the general science 
I which has truth as its object. It contains in itself the 
attitudes both of criticism and of positive science; and it 
contains them as distinct elements because, having lost sight 
of truth through its positive interest in beings, it had to 
make a special effort to re-interest itself in truth, the truth 
in which it interested itself being now that claimed by the 
special sciences of which it was itself one. That was the way 
in which modern philosophy became introspective: precisely in 
assimilating the positive attitude. Thought was becoming self- 
conscious because it was becoming other-conscious.
Descartesb interest in metaphysics was thus an interest 
entirely different from that of Scholasticism. Because this 
change in interest goes with a new attitude to the existent, 
the question arises: physicist or metaphysician? Just because 
he was a physicist Descartes had an interest in metaphysics 




was that of Kant: the love not only of truth but of the truth 
about truth. Descartes was the first to believe that the very 
character and. existence of metaphysics depended on recognising 
a man’s right wholly to devote himself to a special science 
like physics. His person was one which was subsequently to 
become two; and it would be to read history backwards if we 
assumed to be separate what was only in fission.
But nothing of this prevents our conceding that, 
though Descartes had this peculiarly intense form of the love 
of truth, this love was perhaps deluded and false. A pattern 
of the modern world, he doubted the truth of truth, while yet 
conceiving the natural reason to be the only solace and comfort 
of our purely human state. Is human nature capable of sustain­
ing so much? Or does the modern grief come from nothing other 
than the hyperbolical confidence of the modern in his own stoic 
power to endure?
However, there is no need to linger here, and we can 
proceed with following the Meditations after merely mentioning 
that the concrete interpretation of the Cogito is of consider­
able significance for the interpretation of the history of 
philosophy.
Descartes, then, does not examine the nature of the 
concept of essence, because he is not interested in the question 
of what being in general is. In the last two Meditations his 
problem no longer is whether true knowledge is possible, but 
what the things are of which we are able to have this true 
knowledge./
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knowledge. Metaphysics as a science is possible because it is 
a nexus of clear and distinct propositions, and such proposi­
tions must be true. That problem being disposed of, it is 
necessary to ask what in particular those objects are about 
which we can discover truths.
From the fourth Meditation it is evident that a clear 
and distinct idea is the proper object of science. ”Nor have 
I merely learned to-day what I must do to escape error, but 
what I must do to arrive at the knowledge of truth; for I^ill 
assuredly reach truth if I only fix my attention sufficiently 
on all the things I conceive perfectly, and separate these 
from others which I conceive more confusedly and obscurely: 
to which for the future I shall give diligent heed.”2*7̂  When, | 
therefore, the fifth Meditation opens with the determination 
ttto discover whether anything can be known with certainty
o r r cregarding material objects,” it is clear that this question . 
must be decided by our asking whether we have clear and distinct!
ideas of material things. This is a more pressing problem than j
p
their existence. ”But before considering whether such objects p 
as I conceive exist without me, I must examine their ideas in^ ;
sofar as these are to be found in my consciousness, and discover 
which of them are distinct, and which confused.”2,76 The Medi­
tation concludes with the affirmation that we can have a perfect 
knowledge of corporeal nature as the object of pure mathematics 
(which does not consider whether it exists or not) because we 
have a clear and distinct idea of bodies.27*7 
It/
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j It is probably true that Descartes’; distinction between
essence and existence arises largely from his conception of the 
nature of mathematical truths "which regard merely the simplest 
and most general objects, and scarcely enquire whether or not
o  170these are really existent;" and, since the emphasis here 
(Medit.I) lies on the nature of our ideas, it is a distinction 
made from the side of the subject. By the end of the fifth 
Meditation, physics has been reduced to the contemplation of 
mathematical ideas, that is, it has become a science which 
studies the natures or essences of material things, which con­
tain only a possibility of existence, through the medium of
OI7 Qclear and distinct ideas. To existence, the mathematical
physicist is indifferent; and from this indifference or detach­
ment of the thinker, and not from the fact of existence, 
depends the Cartesian distinction of essence and existence.
The Cartesian physics can be quite properly described as a 
physics of "as if." The whole trend of Descartes’S mind is to
A -  - 'make essences or natures, which contain only possibility of 
existence, of more importance than the actually existent, 'in 
his system, truth is not the correspondence of ideas with the 
existent but with the possible. Thus physics is not immediate­
ly the science of actually existing material things, and the 
last Meditation is not designed especially for it. If the 
Cartesian physics, unlike the Scholastic, required the proof of 
the existence of its objects, it was only because existence 
did not seem so necessary to Descartes as to the Schoolmen.
It/
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It would not be easy to establish finally and precisely 
I what the terms "essence" or "nature" signified for Descartes. 
That they are synonymous is significant. In the meantime, a 
hypothesis may be hazarded. It was shown above that though we 
do not yet know whether the material world exists, we are never­
theless aware that that about which we think by means of clear 
and distinct ideas of corporeal things is something other than 
our ideas. But this is the same as saying that we know our­
selves to have a true knowledge of the essences or natures of 
material things. Now this would be impossible if these natures 
or essences had not some kind of being in their own right; for 
otherwise our knowledge would be as uncertain as the existence 
of the things of which these are the essences. Nevertheless it
;is certain, regardless of our doubt of the existence of these 
things. |
Now by what means does Descartes secure this measure of j 
independence for essences? It seems quite likely that in makingj
iIessences the proper terminus of thought instead of the actually | 
existent, he has materialised the concept of essence. Separat- j 
ing the essence from the existent, he conceives the former as 
having a real, and curiously equivocal being, proper to itself. 
The psychological source of his doctrine of essence, gives the 
essences or natures of things an ontological status of their
Iown halfway between the extremes of full existence and mere '
ileality. The essences of corporeal objects are, in fact, real 
individuals. It is this half-real world of which thought is 
true: / j
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true: and if there is any external world more real than this 
we can be assured of the fact of its existence only indirectly.
But let us remember that the matter in hand is the 
fashion in which the real distinction is concluded in the 
metaphysics.
For the Cartesians, the immediate object of science 
is the objective essence from the examination of which, says 
Arnauld, derives all our knowledge. The objective essence is 
a real being which, though ideal in its mode of existence, has 
yet as its eminent or formal cause something other than the 
merely ideal. The nature of this cause can be fully known 
before we can assert that it exists such as it is represented 
in idea: but even before we know that it exists it determines 
what our idea of it shall be. Therefore, provided that we 
know that God exists, and that we have clear and distinct ideas 
of created things, we are able to have a true knowledge of 
created things and of the relations obtaining between them, 
whether or not we know them to exist. To determine whether or 
not mind and body are really distinct, therefore, it is not 
necessary first to establish that bodies actually exist.
In the Principles, the real distinction is defined as
follows:
ttThe real distinction properly subsists between two or 
more substances, and we perceive that these substances are 
really and mutually distinct from each other, from this ©.lone 
that we can clearly and distinctly conceive the one without the
other./
other. For from the knowledge we have of God we are certain 
that he can effect whatever we distinctly conceive: so that, 
for example, from this alone that we now have an idea of 
extended or corporeal substance, though we do not yet know with 
certainty that any such substance truly exists, yet we are
certain that it can exist; and if it exists every part of it
determined by our thought, is really distinct from the other 
parts of the same substance. Also from this alone that every­
one understands himself to be a thinking substance, and can 
exclude from himself every other substance, thinking as well 
as extended, it is certain that everyone thus considered is
really distinct from every other thinking substance, and from
PROevery corporeal substance.”
This passage is perhaps the most instructive of all 
tests for determining what Descartes understands by the term 
"real distinction.” The real distinction subsists between
i
substances, and knowledge only of the possible and not the j
actual existence of, at least, extended substances, is required
in order to this distinction. The real distinction is not the |
less real, because the existence of the things distinguished is 
hypothetical. It is, nevertheless, necessary to know that 
their existence is possible, for it is by being assured that 
our thinking is about natures or essences - which imply the 
possibility of existence - that we know that our knowledge has 
any validity. ”The Cartesians” says Regis ”have never pretended 
to demonstrate the real distinction of things purely from the
difference/
difference between the ideas they have of them: the difference 
between ideas is rightly enough to enable us to know the dif­
ference between things ... , but not to enable us to know their 
real distinction. For knowing this real distinction, we require 
to know, not only the difference of the ideas, but that the 
different things can exist separately from each other.n281
The real distinction is thus objectively determined 
without being determined by the actually existent, that is to 
say that it is determined not by our ideas as such but by that 
of which we have ideas. It is only substances, however, in the 
definition of which is contained the possibility of independent 
existence. Substance is that which can exist per se without 
the aid of any other substance. No one can tell that one 283
substance is not another unless he has distinct ideas of them; 
but the possibility of the real distinction is contained in the
proper nature of substances.
That this is true is further brought out by the citation
from the Principles, from which it is clear that the real dis­
tinction subsists between any two substances, even substances 
of the same kind. Thus there is a real distinction between two 
thinking substances, and between two corporeal substances, as 
well as between a thinking and a corporeal substance. The fact 
that my ideas of thinking and of corporeal substance have 
nothing in common would be to no purpose did it not serve to 
assure me that these were the ideas of things which in their 
proper nature contained each the possibility of an existence
£er/
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per se. There is no difference between the idea I have of a 
round stone of a certain size, and that which I have of another 
of similar specifications, yet I am able really to distinguish 
one from the other by virtue, not primarily of the differences 
of the ideas, but by virtue of the substantiality of the stones 
revealed by the ideas. Similarly, my ideas of thinking and of 
extended substances must reveal to mis that they are indeed the 
ideas of two substances; the fact that these two ideas have 
nothing in common being merely the best means to that end.
They are, through contrary ideas, clearly and distinctly con­
ceived as diverse substances, that is, as things that God can 
make to exist separately; and therefore they are really 
distinct.
The real distinction, therefore, secures the real 
multiplicity of substances in the possible. The real distinc­
tion of body ard mind, the deduction of which in the last 
Meditation will be traced below, must consequently be regarded 
as a particular instance of what God can effect throughout 
reality, the real distinction subsisting between any two sub­
stances. This general result is not apparent from the Medita­
tions, in the last of which I merely distinguish my mind from 
my body, not my mind from other minds, nor my body from other 
bodies. Descartes appears to be indifferent about explaining 
how this passage from the particular to the general is to be 
made.
The proof of the existence of bodies in the last
Meditation,/ ^
Meditation, and the connection of this proof with that of the 
real distinction presents many problems which cannot be said to 
have been settled.^? There is a way of approach to the matter 
however, which has not been sufficiently explored, and that is 
to take quite literally Descartesh words that it is the order 
of proof which is of most importance to him, and then to 
examine the sixth Meditation simply for its own sake, so as to 
grasp the order of its reasonings. It will then be seen that 
the real distinction of body and mind precedes the proof of the 
existence of bodies, and is required for the latter. The fol­
lowing analysis is an abstract of the proofs of the first half 
of this Meditation. It may be said beforehand that the problem 
here is to prove the existence of material objects as the 
objects of pure thought, that is, as the objects of speculative 
geometry through the sense side of our nature.
I. The Meditation opens by distinguishing imagination from 
intellection, instancing that it is possible to conceive, but 
not to imagine, a chili^gon (A.T.VII. 71. 10-73. 4).
II.It is then concluded that imagination does not belong to the 
essence of our minds (A.T.VII. 13. 5-8); and must therefore 
depend on something different from the mind (A.T.VII. 73. 9-10). 
Ill .We can suggest "with probability," and as the most likely 
hypothesis which our minds are capable of reaching, that it 
depends on bodies. But we cannot yet be certain. This step 
must be carefully borne in mind.
IV. The consequence of this conclusion is, that I have failed
197.
to prove the existence of bodies from the distinct idea of 
corporeal nature which I have in m y  imagination. (This step and 
the one before: A.T.VII. 73. 20-28).
V. Since I c-annot prove, from the side of imagination, which Is 
capable of being distinct when geometrical figures are its 
objects, that bodies exist, I am compelled to try to prove it 
from the confused ideas of sense perception (A.T.VII. 74. 1-10).
! Note: At the end of the fifth Meditation I find that I
I am able to have a perfect knowledge of nature considered as the 
object of pure mathematics: and I also know that a world of 
objects corresponding to this knowledge may really exist by the 
power of God. But I do not know whether it does exist, nor can 
these sciences inform me of that. If the proof of the existence 
of external objects cannot be made by considering our clear and 
distinct knowledge, then we are forced to the lower side of our 
nature to discover this proof.
VI. Descartes commences the proof from sense-perception by 
recalling to mind his early prejudices, to see whether, in the 
light of what he has learned since the doubt, he cannot find 
truth among them,; since his doubt does not prevent his accept­
ing as true afterwards what at first he doubted (A.T.VII. 74. 
11-16).286 He then makes a review of his early beliefs and his 
doubt of them (A.T.VII. 74. 17-77. 27).
VII. This doubt led him to form a clear and distinct idea of 
himself, of body, and of an all-powerful God. Though he does 
not yet know that body exists, yet, from his dear and distinct 
Idea/
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idea of its nature, and of God, he is certain that if it did 
exist it could exist distinct from mind. Mind and body are 
therefore really distinct. (A.T.VII. 78. 4-20).
VIII. The next paragraph^is one of the most difficult in the 
Meditations, and^requires more detailed examination. The modes 
and faculties of thought and of extension are, in virtue of the 
conclusion of (VII), now for the first time known to belong to 
substances really distinct and completely different. Hitherto 
we have merely believed that they belonged to different sub­
stances without being aware that by the power of God conceptual
distinctions were valid for existence.
Having concluded the real distinction of body and mind, 
Descartes argues: ”l find in myself diverse faculties of think­
ing which have each their special mode,” for instance, those of 
imagining and perceiving, which I cannot conceive without con­
ceiving myself, that is, an intelligent substance in which they 
reside. I remark likewise certain other faculties such as the 
wpower of changing place, of assuming diverse figures, and the 
like” which, differing in kind from the faculties of thought 
are conceived through, and must belong to, a substance different 
from myself, namely extended substance. (A.T.VII. 78. 21-79. 6).
Here the argument takes a slight jump, reaching the 
same conclusion as that just come by, from different grounds. 
”There Is in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that 
is, of receiving and taking knowledge of the ideas of sensible 
things: but this would be useless to me, if tnere did. not also
exist/
exist in me, or in some other thing, another active faculty 
capable of forming and producing those ideas. But this active 
faculty cannot be in me (in as far as I am but a thinking thing)
seeing that it does not presuppose thought ... . This faculty
must therefore exist in some substance different from me”
(A.T.VII. 79. 6-15. IX. 63).
At this point it becomes clear of what tremendous 
importance f or the proof of the existence of bodies it is that 
the proof of the real distinction of body and mind should 
already be an accomplished fact. I can now conclude that the 
faculties of imagination and extension belong to substances 
which are distinct actually, and not merely in idea. The fear 
that thinking may be a property of bodies is finally quelled 
only by the real distinction. By virtue of this distinction 
only, can I conclude that the active faculty forming the ideas 
of sensible things in me, must exist in some substance different 
from me, since it does not presuppose thought. For if I dis­
tinguish myself in thought from that, whatever it may be, which 
is conceived as having this active faculty, I may be sure that 
I am really distinct from it, and that this active faculty does 
not belong to me.
The argument continues (A.T.VII. 79. 15-80. 10): ”This 
faculty must therefore exist in some substance different from i
me, in which all the objective reality of the ideas, that are j 
produced by this faculty, is contained, formally or eminently.” 




mind to which, this faculty cannot belong, we have knowledge of 
no other substances. For the first time we can lay aside the 
scruple of the third Meditation that we ourselves might be the 
eminent cause of our ideas of body.^®^ But we have concluded 
(above, step III) that, as far as human hypothesis can determine 
it must be a body which has the power to produce our images: and 
since God is no deceiver, we must believe that a hypothesis, 
than which no more probable can be found, is trust-worthy, and 
that the power of producing these images belongs to really 
existent bodies, which, though confusedly and obscurely per­
ceived by the senses, have all the properties which are dis­
covered by speculative geometry. The proof from imagination 
which seemed to fail is now seen to have played an essential 
part in securing this result, far by it was concluded that 
bodies were the most probably cause of images: and the rest of 
the proof did no more than supply a sufficient reason, namely, 
God’s veracity, for accepting this hypothesis as true. To 
understand that Descartes’̂ aim is to impute truth to the con­
clusion that bodies exist forced on us by the nature of 
imagination, is to grasp the inner connection of the reasonings 
of the last Meditation.
201.
§19. The pages of the Meditations, following the proof of 
the real existence of bodies, are concerned with the union of 
mind and body, and the reliability of the judgments of sense 
perception. The length at which the subject is treated is 
worthy of remark, the last Meditation giving the Impression of 
being unduly prolonged. It Is as though Descartes had shifted 
his attention from metaphysics in the strict sense, and had lost 
himself in the observation of certain experiences for their own 
sake.
This final preoccupation with the deliveries of the 
senses cannot serve the ends of physics, which dispenses with 
the data of the senses. The conclusion of the Meditations, 
therefore, does not have physics especially in view. It appears, 
rather, to lay the foundations of the science most intimately 
concerned with man in his earthly state.
The end of all Descartes’, researches is the good of man. 
But what is man? A whole made up of mind and body, who has a 
sensual nature, and acts rightly or wrongly on the evidence of 
the senses. He enjoys his natural beatitude only Injso/far as heI !
has a body. To be able to determine the nature of the union of 
body and mind is, therefore, to be able to determine that on 
which man’s happiness depends. But in order that this knowledge; 
should be of us e to us in enabling us to live the best life we 
must know what this union is, not in the abstract, but in the 
concrete, since happiness depends upon particular acts. Know­
ledge which will lead to happiness must therefore be knowledge 
of/
of the conditions of particular acts. It is the foundations 
precisely of a science of this kind which appear to be laid in 
the last Meditation which shows that there is a close union 
between the mind and the body which has determinate results.
The metaphysic, therefore, establishes the presuppositions of 
the science of man’s happiness on this earth, that is, it shows 
a preoccupation with moral science. It makes possible the 
attainment of a natural beatitude by the study, by empirical 
means, of the connections between mind and body.
This becomes clearer when it is asked what the account 
is which Descartes gives of the union of mind and body. Here 
the conversation with Burman is of great interest. Descartes 
has stated that body and soul are substantially united’. But 
how can this be, asks Burman, when they are clearly diverse in 
nature? To this Descartes replies, ttThis is very difficult to
pooexplain; but here experience is enough.” What is the meaning 
of this statement that experience is to be preferred to explana­
tion?
Clerselier has written a very interesting letter to de 
la Forge,289 in which he claims faithfully to explain Descartesh 
account of the union of body and mind, and which may be followed 
because it unites much of what is scattered in the writings of 
Descartes himself . Clerselier says that though our mind does 
not know the manner of its union with the body, it can, however, 
not disown it. He says that, should we ask how it is that our 
mind which is incorporeal can move the body, M. Descartes has 
most/
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most judiciously added that there is no argument or comparison 
drawn from other things which enables us to understand this, 
but that, nevertheless, we cannot doubt of it, since very 
certain and evident experience convinces us of it daily. We 
must take careful note that this is one of the things which are 
known through themselves, and which we obscure each time that 
we try to explain them through things other than themselves.
The mind, he says, can know and wonder at the effects of its 
union with the body, and the reciprocal power they have over 
each other, but it can give no reason for this union or for its 
effects. Since there is no agreement or affinity between their 
properties, that is to say, between the movements of the body 
and the thoughts of the mind, the union between them can only 
be explained by the will of Him who has joined and united them: 
and experience alone can tell us what that union is.
The position taken up is clear. While we have before
us the distinct ideas of body and mind, we cannot have a clear
and distinct idea of their union, since that would be self­
contradictory.2"  We can only be aware of the union. It is 
sensible, not conceivable.291 In Cartesian terminology, we can 
give its nefficient,n not its "formal” cause. It is clear that
this is tantamount to saying that the nature of the union of
i mind and body is not a question for metaphysics; a conclusion
referred to, and criticised by Spinoza, in his He Smendatlone,
292as not giving us absolute or ultimate knowledge.
Descartes’; thought is, however, contained in the words
of/
of his reply to Burman: experience suffices. What we can be 
certain of is the fact of certain phenomena, namely the sensa­
tions and feelings whose presence can only be explained by the 
hypothesis of the union of mind and body. These phenomena 
admit of scientific investigation of the type followed in the 
‘Tassions of the Soul.” We can give a particular account of the 
effects of the union, we can show just how these effects will 
vary In this or that man, in this or that situation; and this, 
a scientific and not a metaphysical account, Is the only 
explanation which we can have of the union of mind and body. 
Experiment entirely displaces speculation.
The proof of the union of mind and body in the sixth 
Meditation consists only in drawing attention to a matter of 
fact which is not explicable by formal causes. It is nothing 
else than the abdication of metaphysics, since it is an admis­
sion that a problem posed by metaphysics cannot be answered by 
it. in the pages of the last Meditation following upon the 
proof of the real existence of the material world, metaphysics 
makes way for, and prepares the advent of, another science by 
drawing attention to occurrences inexplicable by Its own methods. 
It withdraws in favour of the treatise on the passions without 
the proper control of which felicity is impossible.
Can Descartes be said on this account to have been no 
metaphysician? Quite the contrary. Interested above else In 
the knowledge of man, Descartesk great urge is to know what he 
is and how he is to act. The science of what man essentially
205.
is, is metaphysics; the science of how he is to act is morals, 
and they are inseparably bound together in a common passion 
for the human state. Man cannot seek the good which is 
proper to him unless he knows what that nature is for which 
he must seek a proper good. The metaphysic, whose first 
principle is the thinking self, precisely because it leads to 
the science of man’s proper good, draws attention to its own 
significance for Descartes’ deep interest in himself.
With this, the analysis of Meditations is concluded, 
and it is hoped that they, and not the interpretation of them, 
have been in the foreground. But history should be more than 
a study of systems; it should be a study of men. Are the 
Meditations intelligible if their writer be ignored? To close 
this study with an attempt to answer that, would not be out of 
place, especially since Descartes himself was deeply conscious 
of the moral effects of metaphysics, which as the clearest and 
distinctest of the sciences, contribute so much to that perfec­
tion of the mind in the exercise of which true liberty 
consists.
§20. It was remarked earlier, that an interesting feature 
of Descartes ’J attempt to prove that the mind is a spiritual 
substance really distinct from the body is, that while his |
j : |||procedure is to examine his own nature insofar as he is con- ;j
scious of it, yet he believes that the solution he has reached 
is perfectly general. In the second Meditation, he asksi 
what am I; and In the last he concludes j ttIt is certain that
I, that is, my mind by which I am what I am, is entirely and j
truly distinct from my body and may exist without it. Yet 
the titles both of the second and of the sixth Meditations are
rl;
quite general: n0f the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it ^
is more easily known than the body;*’ ”0f the Existence of j
Material Things, and of the Real Distinction between the Mind |
and Body of Man.w In examining his own nature, Descartes !|
: claims to be thinking for all humanity. In claiming objec- |
tivity for his metaphysic he imposes his own person upon the |
; Iwhole world. |
By what right does Descartes make this claim? In the j
Discourse he avows that it is not his design to teach the
method which every man ought to follow for the proper conduct j
of his reason, but only to show how he has tried to conduct j
his own.293 However, we are assured of what we are by j
methodical reasoning, so that the Discourse, in not making Is
the acceptance of the method obligatory by no means supports
the pretensions of the Meditations. This difficulty is not to




4ipon his writing the Discourse. His doctrine of substance is 
framed in conformity with a demand to arrive at a knowledge 
of particular substances. Furthermore, we form an idea of any 
substance by an examination of its modes. We discover what we 
are by attending to that which passes in us, that is, to the 
stream of our private mental life. Whence, then, the claim of
our findings to generality?
The difficulty is not diminished by the Cartesian 
doctrine of the real distinction. Not only are minds really 
distinguished from bodies but also from each other. Since 
they are entirely distinct, how can we know that they have 
anything in common? How, indeed, can we know that they exist? 
No proof of the existence of other minds occurs in the Medi­
tations, though in the first Descartes has doubted whether 
anything exist except~he, himself. The third Meditation states 
that we have ideas of other men,2^  a proposition quite per­
missible to Descartes since the doubt does not strip the mind 
of its ideas. But since it compels us to doubt whether what 
they represent really exists, they can at that stage assure 
us only of our own existence. Even when God’s existence is 
proved, the objects of any ideas except that which I have of 
myself can only have an imputed existence. What, then, 
happens to Descartes’ claims for the generality of his meta­
physical conclusions when those for whom he claims them to be 
general are never actually proved by him, in his definitive 
metaphysical work, to be other than his own ideas?
To/
To these questions no definite answers are formulated 
in Descartes ’/metaphysics. What was to become explicit in 
later philosophy was still buried in his own character, and 
it is there that we must seek a solution.
It is a notable fact that Descartes made demands upon 
other persons which he would never have made upon himself.
It was repugnant to Descartes1 spirit, says M. Ch.Adam, to 
enter into a thought which was not his o w n . 295 gut in spite
of his repugnance to other men’s thought, Descartes desired
L ; , J . .  . 4  ! ! . <  , r - s *  i 
that all men should accept his own. He claims that his is
the true metaphysic, because it follows the true method,* and 
yet, as was shown earlier, he says that the analytic method 
demands the surrender of one’s own opinions if its demon­
strations are to be appreciated.296 He invented no device 
for disarming criticism more strong than this conception of 
the analytic method, since it put all criticism eo ipso in 
the wrong. Disagreement was diagnostic of prejudice, and 
prejudice of falsehood. From the resort to the authority of 
the twelve or fifteen theologians, already mentioned, the 
strength of Descartes1' desire that the metaphysic be accepted 
can be judged.
But when we enquire further into the nature of the 
man that made these demands, two characteristics appear quite 
clearly: his fear of delusion, which was sufficiently strong 
to be personified as an omnipotent evil genius; and a distrust 
of his own talents. He is, he says, a man accustomed to think 
lowly/
209.
lowly of himself on account of the mediocrity of his talents,29*̂ 
and to suspect the judgments in his favour of those that know 
him best.298 He was, indeed, a man who himself stood in con­
siderable need of reassurance. And yet he wished to impose 
his metaphysic upon the whole world: a metaphysic made neces­
sary by doubts which he himself compares to the aberrations 
of the insane.
But there seems to be an explanation for these diffi­
culties which reconciles the need to be assured with the desire 
to persuade. It is that Descartesclaim for the objectivity 
of his metaphysics arises from his own character and not from 
the nature of the objects of that science; and that his proud 
assurance and his modesty are but the obverse and the reverse 
of a single fault. Not questioning his essential similarity 
to all men, since reason is the same in all,299 he can on the 
grounds of this very modesty assert that what one mind dis­
covers to be true must be true for all minds. If he who is 
no different from us thinks himself a pure spirit then we 
others must be compelled to hold that opinion of ourselves.
If the fear that we are ’’liable to delusion in what relates 
to ourselves”300 leads Descartes to philosophise upon what he 
is, it is also a good reason for his imposing the results of 
his philosophising upon others. But since his separation of 
thought from being makes it impossible that, in fact, the 
certainty of the metaphysics can be founded on the existent, 
his certainty is, and can be, no more than the degree of self 
persuasion/
persuasion to which he has attained, the very nature of the 
metaphysic requiring that its certainty should he something 
enclosed within thought itself. His need to persuade others 
is a need of his own nature, not of theirs. In short, he 
requires the acquiescence of others in his conclusions to 
assure himself against his own timidity and self-distrust. 
Totally engrossed in himself, he did not wish to persuade 
others for their own sakes, because they did not have enough 
reality for him. He wished to persuade them from the horror 
of delusion into which a difference of opinion had the power 
to throw him. Utterly self-centred, he was a man constitu­
tionally incapable of paying attention to the demands of 
other souls. Their existence and their beliefs were of im­
portance only in relation to his own. That was his tragedy, 
to feel that his mental health depended from those of whom he
was disdainful.30^
It was Descartes ’ genius to accept nothing as he foupd
-it. His resolution to doubt of all things was the formulation
of a fundamental impulse. He was a man, let us affirm, capable
of doubting to the verge of madness. Pew men have ever lived
whose natures were so exquisitely adapted to the horrible
sufferings of uncertainty. What was the source of this
malady? - for as a malady Eudoxus himself describes it.302
The disease of doubt was probably brought to a head by the
mystical crisis of November, 1619. The vivid visions of that
fateful night came upon Descartes in his search for his true
vocation./
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vocation. Quod vitae sectabor iter? Along what road shall I 
make life’s journey? To a philosopher, that question has 
regard not so much to externals, but to the kind of man he 
wishes to be. Really to doubt my vocation is to be seized 
with a spiritual vertigo in which I lose entire grip upon 
myself as a creature both of time and of eternity. To Descartes 
in this plight came the revelation that he alone was the man 
to complete the corpus of the sciences, he alone of all the 
world. Yet when the divine thunder echoed in his ears, and 
his room was filled with flakes of fire, he was smitten with 
terror at his own sins. The utmost fear and the utmost 
elation consumed him. In one night, he felt the worst and 
the greatest of men, and these two moments fused into his very 
being, each, however, retaining its own identity. That they 
retained their identity is important, since it distinguishes 
the experience of Descartes from the perfect conversion of the 
saints. The coal on his lips did not burn deep enough. He 
was great and small, assured and afraid, confident of his 
mission yet fearful of his corruption, at once and in extremes. 
He emerged from that night with a fission in his nature, which 
was to determine the whole course of his life. Henceforth he 
was to go forward trusting only himself, yet seeing nothing 
beyond himself in which his inner contradictions could be
reconciled.
The doubt of Descartes has thus three aspects. There 
is his disposition, present from childhood, to take nothing 
for/
for granted. That is the first kind of doubt; and it appears 
to have gathered and accumulated until it came to a head in 
the crisis where, doubting his vocation, Descartes doubted 
what he himself was, for upon that hinged the whole question. 
Descartes, we can be certain, was one of those who are called 
upon to make the horrible discovery that they do not know what 
the reality is . For this state of soul there is only one 
solution, and that solution he did not take. Still clinging 
to himself and to humanity, he deferred the solution to the 
sciences, at the commencement of which we again find the doubt, 
in a third form, as a methodical discipline, precisely formu­
lated. First a disposition, it was then a crisis, and finally 
a method which admits us to the sciences by whose means, 
Descartes thought, he could determine what he himself and all 
other things were. That crisis, commencing in Descartes’ quest 
for himself, died down with the search unended, indeed, only 
begun upon, since all that happened was that it had become 
clear to him that the answer was to be found in science as 
pursued by the natural light. Having doubted of all being in 
the pitiless night of the spirit, Descartes was still to 
wander upon the stage of the world, on a search, to contemplate 
the failure of which inspired some return of the terror which
had come upon him in that night of dreams.
Quod vitae sectabor iter? The vivid realisation that
that involves knowing what we are, and how life is best lived 
for creatures such as we, is the key to the understanding of
Descartestf/
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Descartes’5 life. Descartes believed that he had found the 
answer to this question in the revelation of his universal 
science, the highest branch of which is the science of morals 
which teaches us how to proceed with assurance in this life.
And though this answer clearly implies the spending of life 
in the search for living, Descartes had the confidence to wish 
to teach the world what we are and how we must live. Since 
these are two indissolubly connected questions, and since 
Descartes seeks their respective solutions in the sciences of 
metaphysics and morals, we can understand why Descartesj meta­
physics leads directly to his moral science, and why these two 
sciences, understood only when taken together, are the true 
reflection of his spirit. We can understand, also, that his 
dying with his Moral unwritten marks the failure of the 
resolution of the night of crisis to find in the sciences a
way of life.
In that decisive night of visions Descartes did not 
discover what he was, nor along what road he should make life’s 
journey. He discovered no more than the means which, it 
seemed to him, would be sufficient to demonstrate these things. 
In choosing the way of science to reach the solution of these 
problems, he deferred the solution305 which it was open to him 
to grasp immediately by faith, by conceiving that it was to be 
found at the conclusion of a science, for which he desired, in 
order to be assured, that complete and absolute certainty which 
belong only to faith. To know by science as we know by faith,
and/
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and what we know by faith, was the aim of Descartes’ endeavours.
Since that night revealed to Descartes only the means 
for discovering his nature, and the right way of living, it 
follows that the sciences of metaphysics and morals are the 
work of a man who is not using these sciences as a means of 
giving rational expression to something already known with an 
infallible certainty other than that of science. The old 
dependence of metaphysics from theology was gone, the depen- 
dance in which metaphysics could, in a spirit of spacious and 
luminous calm, give rational development to what God had 
revealed. Now it had the feverishness of search. It took 
upon its sole self the task of bringing the soul of man 
whither its questing would cease in the satisfaction of its 
deepest needs. It led the mind in a state of suspense towards 
conclusions which it could not see itself, the analytic method 
assuming by implication the functions of a doctrine of spirit­
ual medicine. Yet the Moral, which was to tell Descartes how 
to proceed with assurance in this life, was never completed, 
and since the questions of what we are and how we must act are 
inseparable, it would seem right to conclude that the results 
of the metaphysic, more certain as they are than those of 
mathematics, were the conclusions of a man who did not know his 
mind. In this lies the paradox of Descartes’ insistence that, 
in metaphysics, the reader who would wish to follow must not 
question the guide or the guidance. It is the call of the 
blind to the blind; of one who seeks company in the dark; of 
one/
215.
one who, seeing no light in himself is yet persuaded that he 
alone of mortals holds the clue by which we are able to guide 
our steps to the sun.
Here, indeed, lies the true interest of the Meditations 
They are an attempt at a rational solution of a mystical crisis 
Medieval philosophy was a rational account of a mystical 
solution. That the Cogito posits me as a thing of which I 
know nothing than that I doubt, of whose existence I neverthe­
less am certain, and whose nature I forthwith seek to discover, 
is a rational transposition of that intense moment when 
Descartes, never more aware of himself, was lost in a night of 
black indecision concerning what he was, and how he should go 
forward in this life. The Meditations, leading naturally to 
the Moral are the actual and fruitless struggle of a great 
mind to know itself. They are the vain attempt of a spirit 
which could have been set at rest only by faith, to reach the 
calm which faith offers by a rational certainty which, in 
attempting to copy a model in fact rejected, inflates itself 
to something extravagant and hyperbolical. Reasoning not so 
much to discover the nature of things as to convince himself, 
Descartes’s joy in the contemplation of God at the end of the 
third Meditation, is not joy in the contemplation of God for 
His own sake, but joy in his felicity at having seemed to find 
that which secures reason; for it is to reason alone, and not 
to faith, to which belongs the medicine to heal our doubts.
That is the true Descartes: the man who doubted what
he was,- yet trusted only in himself.304 Intolerable contra­
diction - is it wonderful if Descartes thought he might be mad?
wBut it may be said, perhaps, that although the senses 
occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as 
are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close 
observation, there are yet many other of their informations, 
of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt; as 
for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, 
clothed in a winter dressing-gown, that I hold in my hands 
this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. 
But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, 
and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of 
insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark, 
bilious vapours as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that 
they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty; or 
clothed in gold and purple when destitute of any covering; or 
that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that 
they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than 
they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so 
extravagant."305
Here, then, is Descartes, knowing himself to be insane 
if he doubts what he feels drawn to doubt. Fleeing from admit­
ting this by the hypothesis of a dream, he attempts to secure 
himself by metaphysical arguments which are modelled on mathe­
matical reasoning chiefly because of the necessity to be com­
pletely persuaded felt by a mind in such dire straits.
But/
But what do we then find? That wê  can doubt even 
whether our clear and distinct ideas are true. From a bad 
plight we are fallen into a worse. We cannot but assent to 
our clear and distinct ideas. Yet may we assent to that to 
which we must assent? If to persist in the doubt whether or 
not we have bodies is to be no better than the man who thinks 
himself a gourd, then to what profound derangement can this 
second and deeper doubt be compared? If the former doubt 
could be imparted to the readers of the Discourse, the latter 
had to be concealed from them lest its practical consequences 
for more feeble spirits should disastrous. By the hyper­
bolical doubt the human mind is threatened with a conflict so 
deep that it is utterly helpless, since thought itself appears 
to be corrupted to the very core. The solution of this doubt 
is the fight of the mind for its very existence, a struggle in 
which the prospect of a possible failure must have afflicted 
Descartes with the very horror of despair. In this dark night 
of the intellect, his mind, fearful of its own utter corrup­
tion, took the leap of faith, and saved itself from destruction 
by a confidence in itself which came from the contemplation of
God’s veracity.
This confidence in the mind, however, remains for
Descartes an act of external imputation. In the night of his 
visions Descartes pledged himself to the purely human sciences; 
and to the end he required no more of God than His external 
concurrence in this task. It is here that we may seek the
explanation/
explanation of the earnestness of his attempt to defend his 
method against the accusations that in metaphysics it involved 
assumptions. If his reasoning is false nothing remains to him, 
for he has determined to seek the assurance given by faith in
reason alone. If his is not the true metaphysic, what is
there to assure him that he is not like one of those poor 
crazed beggars who believe that they are monarchs clad in
purple and gold? At all costs, he must determine what he is,
and what he is not, constructing to this end a metaphysic 
which persuades him that he is a pure spirit, whose will is 
like God’s.
This, then, is the metaphysic of Descartes. Arising 
from a hyperbolical doubt which is the very black pit of 
intellectual despair, it seeks a hyperbolical certainty, so 
absolute that it is not proper to discursive reason. Arising 
from the need of the mind not so much to know the real as to 
persuade itself, it is a system logical and precise which, by 
its mere coherency, tries to delude the mind into that agree­
ment with itself, and what Is, which can be found only in a 
direct communion with the Existent which is more and other 
than that of metaphysics. Starting in a vision, it ends in 
something unsubstantial, a soliloquy spoken by an actor 
wandering masked upon the theatre of the world, persuaded by 
his own eloquence that he is indeed that man whom he says 
himself to be.306
Let us leave Descartes seated before the fire, warmed,
wrapped/ I
wrapped up in his own thoughts and sensations, feeling his 
creatureliness as a kind of comfortable presence. Musing upon 
the world’s uncertainties and illusions, he takes notice of a 
vivid doubt of all things. As he meditates the doubt grows in 
reality. He can doubt of all things. He can doubt of whatever 
he once believed. Yes, he can even doubt if he has a body.
But surely he must be mad to doubt it’. Deep in thought, the 
blood in his head, he wraps his dressing-gown more closely 
round himself, and stretches out his hands to the fire, his 
sense of warmth and bodily comfort increasing. But what if 
this body be not his I what if it be an illusion’, what if 
nothing around him exist! He feels the blood throbbing in his 
temples. What if he be actually a madman, insane as those who 
think their bodies are of glass or their heads of clay? But 
he dare not seriously entertain such thoughts. That would be 
real madness. He will calm his brain by pretending he is 
dreaming. Yet so curious are his thoughts that he can almost 
persuade himself that he is really in a dream, here, before 
the fire, with the paper in his hands.
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1. A.T. III. 276.3; III. 296.14; III. 297.1; III. 359.7; eto.
2. M. Henri Gouhier gives a good, account of this meeting. (La 
Pensie Religieuse de Descartes. 1924. p. 56 ff.)
3. A.T. VI. 30.17 - 31.1.
4. "Quaestiones de Deo et mente hum ana jam ante paucis attigi 
in Dissertations de Methodo...., non quidem ut ipsas ibi 
accurate tractarem, sed tantum ut delibarem." A.T. VII. 7.1-5.
5. A.T. I. 570.23.
6. A.T. VI. 4.7-20.
7. A.T. I. 349.29 - 350.23; I. 353.2-20; I. 560.7-561.6.
8. "Je crois done qu’en faisant imprimer ma Metaphysique, il 
sera bon d'y mettre ce commencement, afin qu'on voie que ce 
que j’avais ecrit dans le discours de ma Methode n'est que
la mime chose que j'explique plus au long.” A.T. III. 296.30- 
297.4.
"Ibi in Methodo continetur epitome harum Meditationum, quae 
per eas exponi debet." A.T. V. 153.
9. "Or, jTai travailli de tout mon possible pour comprendre dans 
ce Traite tout ce qui s!en peut dire." A.T. IX. 6.
10. Cf. A.T. VII. 10.6-23.
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11. Saiaset pointed out long ago that the Principles are life­
less compared with the Meditations. "Mais en meme temps 
que je vois Descartes substituer aux intuitions de la con­
science des concepts abstraits et geometriques, il me semble 
aussi qufil tend manifestement a effacer dans tous les etres 
ce principe d'activite qui constitue leur essence et leur 
vie." ("Precurseurs de Descartes." 2nd ed. 1862. p. 168)
12. Thus Descartes writes to Mersenne not to disturb him need­
lessly during the time which he has resolved to employ in 
writing his philosophy in an order in which it could be 
easily taught. A.T. III. 276.3-9. "Dans les Principia, 
ouvrage didactique, destine a repandre sa philosophic dans 
les ecoles, il fait revetir a ses idees la forme qui con- 
venait a 1*enseignement: il les distribue en articles,
dont chacun porte un numero, et qui ressemblent a autant
de propositions ou de theses, dont la rapide esquisse laisse 
encore place a un developpement oral." (M. Ch. Adam. A.T.
X. 530.)
13. "La premiere partie... contient quasi les memes choses que 
les Meditations... sinon qufelle est entierement d'autre 
stile, et que ce qui est mis en l’un tout au long, est plus 
abrege en l'autre, et vice versa." A.T. III. 276. 9-14.
1A. Objections III and IV.
15. Pr. I. LI-LXV.
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16. The first part of the Principles contain "les Principes de 
la connaissance, qui est ce qu’on peut nommer la premiere 
Philosophie ou bien la Metaphysique: c'est pourquoi, afin 
de la bien entendre, il est a propos de lire auparavant 
les Meditations que j’ai ecrites sur le meme sujet." A.T.
IX. 16. 13-18. Thus Descartes can say in the course of
the Principles; "Nee opus est ista pluribus verbis hoc
in loco persequi, quoniam in Meditationibus Metaphysieis 
jam utcunque tractata sunt." Pr. I. XXX.
17. A.T. X. 427.27 - 428.2.
18. A.T. X. 425. 10-12.
19. A.T. X. 505.11 - 506.16.
20. 0. Hamelin. "La Systeme de Descartes," 2nd Ed. p. 99 ff.
21. A.T. X. 518.
22. A.T. X. 525.
23. A.T. IX (2e). 13.30. - 14.9.
24. A.T. VI. 18.16 - 19.5. cf. "Assuefacit autem Mathesis in-
genium veritati agnoscendae, quia in Mathesi reperiuntur 
recta ratiocinia, quae nullibi invenias alibi. Etproinde 
ille qui semel assuefecerit ingenium suum ratiociniis 
mathematicis habebit etiam illud optum ad investigandas 
alias veritates, cum sit ratiocinatio ubique una et eadem."
A.T. V. 177.
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25. A.T. III. 284. 27-29.
26. A.T. V. 177.
27. A.T. II. 378.9.
28. A.T. VIII. 4. 24-25.
29. A.T. VII. 16. 5-9.
50. References In E. Gilson. Index Soolastico-Gartesien. 1913
art. 361.
31. A.T. I. 351.1; 1. 560.16.
32. To avoid the risk of giving a one-sided view of Descartes1
character it would be well to recall what M. Maxime Leroy
says of the Descartes suggested by his friendships. He 
speaks of rt... ces amities heretiques, libertines, bizarres, 
qui, par leur duree, leur profondeur, revelent, sinon des 
identites psychologiques, du moins des similitudes morales 
(Descartes, le philosophe en masque. 1929. p. 10*) M*
Leroy makes much of Descartes1 relations with the possibly 
atheistic priest, Pioot. The reasons for Descartes1 im­
patience may become clearer later on.
33. A.T. I. 144. 12-14.
34. A.T. III. 436. 20-437.2.
35. a .T. III. 175. 9-12.
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36. A.T. X. 500. 9-15.
37. A.T. X. 501. 1-6.
38. A.T. III. 237. 9-13.
39. A.T. X. 497. 10-14.
40. A.T. VI. 2.20 ^ 3.2.
41. A.T. IX. 14. 23-31.
42. A.T. III. 297.31 - 298.2. III.233. 24-26.
43. in his "Descartes." 1886.
44. if we are to acoept the conclusions of M. H. Gouhier in his
"La Pensee Religieuse de Descartes," 1924. The conclusion 
of M. Leroy (op. cit.) is possibly more profound: that the
character of Descartes is so subtle that the question: tact­
ician or not, is a gross simplification. But on either 
view the matter goes deeper than Liard suggested.
45. v. Hamelin. op. cit. ch. VII, p. 93-98.
46. The originality of DescartesT proof of God's existence from
an idea is well shown by the difficulty and indignation 
occasioned thereby. Here is an example.
"Vous croiriez, peut-etre, que ce qui a persuade M.
Descartes de 1'Existence de Dieu, soit la beaute, la grand­




rapport mutual des principales parties du Monde, en soite 
Q.ue les Creatures luy ayent servi oomme de degrez pour par— 
venit a la connoissanoe du Createur, selon les paroles de 
l'Apotre, Invisibilia Dei per ea quae faota sunt intelleota 
oonspiciuntur? Tout oela selon Descartes etoit peu de 
chose, nous avions besoin de cette Demonstration qu'il 
nous a enfin tire de la profondeur de ses Meditations, 
la voici... (Here follows a summary of the first proof) 
Voila, par consequent Dieu qui existe, et dont l1existence 
est selon Descartes prouvee demonstrativement: de sorte 
que si quelqu'un ne se souvient pas qu’il ait pense a 
Dieu des le ventre de sa mere, tant pis pour luy, les 
Cartesiens s'en souviennent tres-bien." (Eclaircissement 
sur le Livre de M. de la Ville. ap. Bayle, "Recueil de 
quelques pieces curieuses..,tT 1684. p. 85-86.)
47. ”on dit souvent que Descartes est avant tout un physicien 
et un savant: cela est vrai quant a ses predilections,
vrai aussi quant a ses plus authentiques titres de gloire 
et a sa plus geniale activite. Mais Descartes n'est pas 
un savant "positif" comme on en voit de nos jours; il reste 
subs tant iellement un metaphysicien - et c’est pourquoi il a 
fait tant de mal a la metaphysique, qui ne peut souffrit 
que des siens. Descartes est un metaphysicien infidele a 
la metaphysique, et qui se detourne volontairement vers 
les plaines, vers le vaste pays plat qu'arrose le fleuve 
Mathematique; un metaphysicien qui n'aime pas la verite 
metaphysique/
47 (contd).
metaphysique.Tl (j. Maritain. "Le Songe de Descartes" 1932. 
p. 131-132.)
48. "La Metaphysique ne sert pas seulement a l'ame pour se con- 
noltre elle-meme, elle luy est encore neoessaire pour con-
noltre les choses qui sont hors d’elle: toutes les Sciences
naturelles dependent de la Metaphysique; la Mathematique,
la Physique et la Morale sont fondees sur ses principes."
(P.S. Regis. Cours Entier de Philosophie. 1691. La Meta­
physique. Avert is sement.)
49. in subsequent philosophy the reservation of the R. P. Nich­
olas Poisson becomes of ever-increasing importance: "Car 
bien que tous les esprits soient egaux, neantmoins les 
temperamens qui contribuent a ses fonctions sont assez 
differents." (Remarques sur la Methode de Mr. Descartes. 
1671. p. 34. of. Descartes A.T. VI. 62. 15-20). In fact,
I we are within sight of Fichte and Hegel.
50. A.T. V. 176. cited in a note below.
51. For the divorce of philosophy and theology in the seven­
teenth century see the following typical text: "Enfin,
ce qu'il faut considerer est que nous sommes Philosophes 
Chresfciens par deux qualitez differentes; o'est pourquoy nous 
perfectionner entant que nous sommes Philosophes, et entant 
que nous sommes Chrestiens par deux sortes de doctrine." 




parties.,, en tables et par discours. 1654. la Morale 
p . 304.)
52. A.T. VI. 8. 16-17.
53. "Remargues sur la Methods..." p. 21-22.
54. v. Gilson. Commentaire Historigue. p. 133-134. "ad p. 8 
1. 11."
55. The most important passages are:
"Objection: Sed annon etiam in Theologia omnia ita se
seguentur et connexa sunt?
Response: Imo prooul dubio; sed nos earum veritatum nexum
ita consegui et intelligere non possumus, guia a revelatione 
dependent. Et certe Theologia nostris ratiociniis, guae in 
Mathesi et aliis veritatibus adhibemus, subjicienda non est, 
cum nos earn capere non possimus; et guanto earn servamus 
simpliciorem, eo meliorem habemus. Et si sciret auctor 
aliguem ex sua Philosophia ratiocinia deducturum in Theol­
ogia, et in eum modum sua Philosophia abusurum, eum operae 
suae poeniteret. possumus guidem et debemus demonstrare 
Theologicas veritates non repugnare philosophicis, sed non 
debemus eas ullo modo examinare. Et per hoc monachi oo- 
casionem dederunt omnibus sectis et haeresibus, per suam 
Theologiam Scholasticara scilicet, guae ante omnia extermin- 
anda esset. Et guorsum opus tanto molimine, cum videfemus 




hoc certe nos monere deberet, longe satius ease tam sim- 
plicem habere Theologiam ac illi, guam earn multis contro- 
versiis vexare, et ita corrumpere, et occasionem dare jurgiis, 
rixis, bellis, et slmllibus." (Conversation with Burman.
A.T. V. p. 176.)
Je reverais notre theologie, et pretendais, autant
gu’aucun autre, a gagner le ciel; mais ayant appris, comme
chose tres assuree, gue le chemin n ’en est pas moins ouvert
aux plus ignorants gu’aux plus doctes, et gue les verites 
/ / /revelees, gui y conduisent, sont audessus de notre-intellig- 
ence, je n ’eusse ose les somnettre a la faiblesse de mes 
raisonnements, et je pensais gue, pour entreprendre de les 
examiner et y reussir, il etait besoin d1 avoir guelgue ex­
traordinaire assistance du ciel, et d’etre plus gu’homme.” 
(A.T. VI. 8. 8-17.)
"En guoi il (sc. Comenius) me semble ne pas remarguer 
gu’il y a grande difference entre les Verites Aoguises et 
les Revelees, en ce gue, la connaissance de celles-ci ne 
dependant gue de la Gr&ce (laguelle Dieu ne denie a personne, 
encore gu’elle ne soit pas efficace en tous), les plus idiots 
et les plus simples y peuvent aussi bien reussir gue les 
plus subtils; au lieu gue, sans avoir plus d ’esprit gue le 
commun, on ne doit pas esperer de rien faire d ’extraordin­
aire touchant les Sciences humaines." A.T. II. 347. 21-30.




Descartes says that he is more persuaded by clear and dis­
tinct reasoning than by faith. (A.T. III. 580. 18-28); but 
he describes this as an infirmity.
57. v. j. Maritain. T,Le Songe de Descartes." p. 92 ff.
58. Be it mentioned that the opinion of the R. pfcre j. B. de 
la Grange of the Oratory was that "Descartes a trop bonne 
opinion de sa raison, et de sa Philosophie pour la con- 
damner, en cas qu'elle enseigne quelque chose de contraire
s 'Ia la Theologie. (les Principes de la Philosophie contre 
les noveaux Philosophes, Descartes, Rohault, Regius, 
Gassendi, le P. Maignan etc. 1675.p.5)
59. rrx,a vie de M. Descartes" I. 115. Of the practical orienta­
tion of Descartes1 early training A. Espinas says: "Le 
college de la Fleche, par son esprit pratique, refl^chi, 
inspirait a ses eleves un gout vif pour la methods en 
toutes choses, mais surtout dans la pratique: cela n’est 
pas niable" (Descartes et la Morale. 1925. bk. I. p. 27. 
see the whole of ch. II).
The passage following is the opening of the Dioptrics A.T.
VI. 81. 3-7.
60* A.T. IX (2e). 13. 22-23. The capital texts are Descartes’ 
correspondence with Elizabeth in 1645, especially the 
letters of the 4th Aug., 18th Aug., 1st Sept., 15th Sept., 
6th Oct.
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61. For the phrase "vivere beate" v. A.T. IV. 263. 17 - 264. 13.
62. "La Philosophie est 1’Etude de la sagesse. On appelle icy 
Sagesse, la plus parfaite connoissance que les hommes 
puissent avoir des choses, qui sont ou neoessaires ou 
utiles a la conduite de la vie, a la conservation de la
sante et a 1* invention des arts. Et o’est dans le soin
d ’aquerir cette connoissance, que consiste ce que les 
G-reos et les Romaines ont appelle Philosopher.” (Jacques 
du Roure. La Philosophie divisee... Discours generaux
sur la Philosophie, 1654, p. 1-2. This is obviously an 
echo from the Preface to the Principles.)
63. A.T. IX (2e).14. 29-31.
64. A.T. IV. 267. 20-26.
65. Preface to V. de Swarte’s "Descartes, directeur spirituel,"
1904.
66. A number of reflections suggest themselves.
I. Here is one of the occasions when the conceptual 
system of Descartes falls short of that of St. Thomas as a 
vehicle of spiritual truth. The discrepancy has its origin 
as far back as their metaphysical doctrines of substance.
For St. Thomas the soul is the substantial iorm of the body. 
Considered in itself it is only in potency. Its virtue and 
intelligence must be brought from potency to act. But what­
ever/
66 (contd).
whatever ia in potency is to its act as the incomplete is 
to the complete; potency existing only in respect of the 
act. The human soul being only in potency thus exists in 
view of some other thing, and cannot be its own last end. 
But beatitude is the last end of the soul, and therefore 
it cannot be that in which beatitude consists is something 
contained in the soul itself. "Beatitudo est aliquid 
animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid 
extra animam." (Sum. Theol. la. Ilae. 2. 7. ad Resp.)
Ultimately, a "beatitude naturelle" is a contradic­
tion in terms. It is true that according to St. Thomas we 
can enjoy in this life an incomplete beatitude, and that 
we can attain this beatitude through the study of the spec­
ulative sciences. But this incomplete beatitude is essen­
tially derivative and is only enjoyed through, and as a 
foretaste of, that complete beatitude which, both in it­
self, and in its essence as something possessed by us, is 
supernatural. Furthermore, this incomplete beatitude con­
sists in the actual apprehension of science, that is, it 
is possessed by man insofar as he is a purely rational be­
ing. It is enjoyed by him through that in which he is near­
est the pure spirits. But paradoxically, for Descartes, who, 
in really distinguishing the mind from the body, makes us 
like the pure spirits, our natural beatitude is enjoyed by 
us not as purely rational, but insofar as our reason turns 
towards the body. For him, the beatitude which depends on
232.
66 (contd).
us is nothing but the accomplishment and fulfilment of our 
desires regulated according to reason; in short, a bodily 
enjoyment. Reason has become the servant of desire. Of 
the passions Descartes says, "c’est d’elles seules que 
depend tout le bien et le mal de cette vie" (Des Passions. 
Art. COXII). "Notre bien et notre mal" says de la Forge 
"dependent principalement des Emotions de 1’Ame" (Traite/ 
de 1* esprit de l’homme, ed. rev. 1725, p. 417).
I Descartes, in distinguishing the soul from the body
has separated it from God. Furthermore, the attempt to 
make ourselves self-sufficient by seeking nothing which does 
not depend from our own thoughts, subjects us to the things 
we despise. The R.P. de la Grange makes a criticism which 
strikes to the very roots of the Cartesian philosophy when 
he says that we are not so far removed from our bodies that 
we should despise material ills (Les Principes de la Phil­
osophie, 1675, p. 29).
"La philosophie que je oultive n ’est pas si barbare 
ni si farouche qu'elle rejette 1’usage des passions, au 
contraire c ’est en lui seul que je mets toute la douceur et 
la felicite de cette vie" (A.T. V. 135. 5-8) . But if our 
felicity depends from our passions, and our passions from 
our bodies, which in turn are affected by other bodies then 
it no longer depends from us, but from the constitution of 
material things. There is thus an inner contradiction in 




from our bodies, it comes to share in their apparitional 
nature when, by a development of the Cartesian distrust 
of the faculties, philosophy reduced the objects of exper­
ience to phenomena. Ever since then we have been uncertain 
whether or not we are happy. "Les grandes joies sont or- 
dinairement mornes et serieuses," Descartes writes to 
Elizabeth (A.T. IV. 305. 21-22). One suspects, at times, 
that his hatred of the Calvinists arose from sheer fellow- 
feeling.
II. An important consequence of the Cartesian conception 
of wisdom is that it makes philosophy necessary to moral 
virtue. "Toutes les personnes de bon sens demeurent 
d'accord que c’est par la Philosophie gue l’on peut agir 
suivant 1 ’honnetete... " (Jacgues du Roure. "La Philosophie 
divisee..," Discours generaux p. 11). We must be philoso­
phers to act well and go forward with assurance in this 
life, it is by faith, however, that our salvation is 
secured; but since perfect faith can be found in idiots and 
rustics, incapable of being philosophers, it follows that 
salvation lies open egually to those who act in the best 
possible way, and those who do not. There is thus a sep­
aration of faith and action. The condition of salvation 
becomes a mere subjective attitude. Hot only can we act 
well without the grace of faith, but faith, when bestowed, 
does not affect our works. "Pelagius a dit gu’on pouvait 




la Grace, ce qui a ete condamne de l’Eglise; et moi, je 
dis qu’on peut connaitre par la raison naturelle que Dieu 
existe, mais je ne dis pas pour cela que cette connaissance 
naturelle merits de soi, et sans la Grace, la Gloire surnat- 
urelle que nous at tendons dans le Ciel. Car, au contraire, 
il est evident que, cette Gloire etant surnaturelle, il 
faut des forces plus que naturelles pour la meriter" (A.T.
III. 544. 8-17).
If Descartes can deny the efficacy of works alone, 
it is only by affirming their indifference. Works done with­
out the light of grace need not contain, he thinks, any 
element of obstruction to life eternal.
"Si une chose est convenable a la raison et aux
natures intellectuelles, on l’appelle bien Moral ou honnete," 
says du Roure (op. cit. "La Morale" p. 293-294. of. Des­
cartes’ letter to Elizabeth of the fourth of August, 1645).
It is in the same spirit that the R.P. Nicholas Poisson, 
priest of the Oratory, can say, "Toutes les fautes de nostre 
conduitte ne viennent done pas de 1’esprit, mais de la 
mauvaise methods." (Commentaire sur la Methods de Mr. 
Descartes, 1671. p. 17). "Remarques en passant," he adds 
"que M. Descartes regarde l’homme dans sa propre nature, et 
Qu’il ne pretend pas toucher aux effets du peche, n ’y pre- 
judicies a la neeessite de la grace." How can it be stated 
more plainly that grace does not affect our natural conduct?




because he was too deeply absorbed in that Philosophy 
by the aid of which he could perform the actions which 
would make him happy in this life, but which were not 
necessary to his salvation. Yet what is this but a kind 
of degenerate Pelagianism?
When one comes to enquire what Descartes took man 
to be "in his proper nature" one questions the value of 
P. Poisson’s passing remark. Terrified by the evil genius, 
Descartes can only feel certain that man’s intellectual 
nature is not essentially corrupt by ensconcing himself, 
by God’s aid, within a rationalism, which establishes that 
our passions are the source of our natural beatitude, and 
that they are not a consequence of the Fall, but are the 
natural outcome of the union of mind and body. Our pas­
sions are nearly all good, he says, forestalling Rousseau 
(A.T. IV. 538. 8; XI. 485. 25). Where are the effects of 
sin requiring grace, of which P. Poisson speaks, when man’s 
passions are good, and his mind is clouded only by prejudice?
The impression must not be gained, however, that 
Descartes was a theologian actively debating these matters.
We are here merely deriving consequences from his philosophy 
which follow from the very fact that this philosophy was 
wholly secularised. Indeed, the fact that Descartes did 
not see these results is exactly the proof of their reality. 
What is true, however, is that his philosophy is precisely 
the counterpart of Lutheran theology. It is interesting to




difficulties and solutions run parallel with those of the 
Reformation, in religion. Just as luther believes that our 
concupiscence is invincible, so does Descartes, by the hypo­
thesis of the evil genius, express the utter fallibility of 
man’s rational nature; and just as for the former our justifi­
cation is exterior to us, so for the latter does God bring it 
about that, without any change in our rational nature, we can 
nevertheless seek the truth with confidence, in both, we 
attain to assurance without an intrinsic regeneration. To be 
saved, spiritually or intellectually, we need do no more than 
rely on God. It is in the Reformed theology, too, that we find 
an exact counterpart of the cercle cartesien upon which we shall 
later come to insist. The determination to philosophise even 
while still doubting the very truths of metaphysics - what is 
this hut the determination to persist in the actions of a 
nature which we fear to be fundamentally corrupted? the pecca 
fortiter et orede firmius of the intellect? And what is all 
subsequent Idealism but a perpetuation of this attitude?
HI* The subjection of the mind to the body is one of
the most noteworthy results of the Cartesian philosophy. Des 
cartes derives the remedy for controlling the passions from a 
treatise, the Passions of the Soul, in which man is considered 
in his relation to his tody. The material world acts upon our 
todies in a certain fashion producing ascertainable effects 




made us masters and possessors of nature, we shall he able to 
regulate its effect upon ourselves, controlling our passions 
by our perfect knowledge. Thus de la Forge speaks of "the 
means with which Philosophy furnishes us for regulating every 
passion." (Traits' de l1 esprit de 1’homme, 1725, p. 412). Here 
is another instance of the fashion in which the Cartesian phil­
osophy subjects morality to reason.
The treatises on the Passions and on Man must thus 
be considered to throw considerable light on the theological 
implications of Cartesianism. The regulation of the Passions 
requires not grace but knowledge. To live well we require not 
repentance but science. It is the doctor of medicine, not the 
priest, who now has care of souls, (of. A.T. VI, 61, 15-20). 
Anger must be avoided only because it interferes with rational 
judgment and corrupts the blood. (P.S. Regis, Cours Entier, La 
Morale, I, n, 2). it is clear that according to Cartesianism 
a philosopher has a greater opportunity of living well than an 
ignorant man, since he can attend better to his temporal wants, 
bodily and mental.
M. Maritain remarks: "Descartes est egalement oon-
vaincu de la possibilite morale ou nous sommes de parvenir par 
la seule raison a une sagesse pratique et a une perfection de 
vie completes dans l'ordre des vertus naturelles - aux<iuelles 
Pourra s'ajouter ensuite la superstructure des vertus chreti- 




pouvions sans le secours le la grace acquerir une pleine 
perfection Ians le lomaine le la moralite naturelle."
(Le Songe le Descartes, 1932, p. 141).
There seems every reason to believe that Descartes 
thought that, since natural beatitule lepenls on unassistel 
human reason, both the ignorant man anl the philosopher, 
secure in the faith, coull proceel with their proper voca­
tions without fear for their souls. If we look after the 
moral, the spiritual will take care of itself. (On the 
subject of Descartes' "social materialism" see M. Maxime 
Leroy's "Descartes Social," 1931). My natural beatitule 
comes to lepenl entirely from my station anl its luties.
It is wholly leterminel by the organisation of civil society, 
since from that lepenls the amount of philosophy I possess, 
our society being what it is, says Descartes, from the le- 
gree to which philosophy is infusel through its members. 
(Pref. to Pr.). This trenl of the Cartesian philosophy
comes clearly to the fore in the moral philosophy of P. S.
/
Regia (see esp. Cours Entier, La Morale, II, II, 3). Regis, 
who, of course, can claim no originality, listinguishes 
between "natural" anl "civil" beatitule, anl cf them he says, 
inter alia: "La Beatitule naturelle et la Beatitule civile
ne loivent pas estre eonsilerees comme un Etat exempt le 
tout mal, mais comme un Etat Ians lequel on peut jouir le 




du corps, la condition du pais, et l f§tat de la paix ou 
de la guerre dans lequel on se trouve, le peuvent permettre 
a l'homme qui fait de sa raison le meilleur usage qu'il en 
peut faire." (loc. cit.). Since our sovereign good depends 
on the state in which we live, and since the maintenance of 
the best state depends upon the observation of the laws - 
civil society being more perfect than the state of nature 
(op. cit. II: II: 4) - our highest good lies in obedience 
to the civil law. TTI1 est visible qu*on n'a pu trouver aucun 
moyen plus propre pour etablir la paix que la societe civile, 
dont 1*autorite et la puissance absolue rendent 1*invasion 
du bien d!autruy si dangereuse a ceux qui la voudirent entre- 
prendre, que chacun aime mieux se tenir dans l'ordre des loix
que de les violer." (loc. cit.). Virtue is conformity to
thethe natural and/ civil law (op. cit. II: II: 2).
Nothing could show more clearly than the developments 
of the doctrine of earthly beatitude, how rationalism has led 
to the enslavement of men by the state. "Dans la societe 
civile la raison exerce son empire, la sur&te publique est 
etablie, et les richesses abondent" (op. cit. II: II: 4). 
Reason, which was to make us independent of all external cir­
cumstances ends by subjecting man as never before to a civil 
law which secures that those riches will abound which a wise 
man does not need for his happiness.




philosophy, to secure the subjection of man to a type of 
state which has as its end nothing but the attainment of 
material goods which, even on the principles of that phil­
osophy, much more on those of Christianity, can make no 
fundamental contribution to the human good, it has been 
suggested that Descartes’ preoccupation with reason implies 
a doctrine of justification which has as its complementary 
error a corrupt Pelagianism which falls below conceiving 
our human activities as themselves sufficient for securing 
salvation, by considering them only as a means to earthly 
welfare. In subsequent political philosophy, it is the 
state which comes to be regarded as the embodiment of that 
reason by which earthly felicity is to be attained. The 
will of the state expressed in its laws has ever since 
directed the consciences of men with a despotism pernici­
ous, not because it enjoins political obedience, which 
is necessary to man's welfare, but because it has totally 
usurped the whole of his spiritual activity,making of the 
national state an ultimate end, which it can never properly 
be because its aims are of the earth only.
IV. De la Forge affords a good example of the Cartes­
ian tendencies in morals. He contributes nothing fresh to 
the moral philosophy of Descartes, but may be profitably 
resorted to because it is often valuable to confirm the 




restatement by his followers. Himself a doctor of medicine, 
de la Forge draws his moral precepts from his physiology in 
a chapter whose heading is a clear echo of Stoicism:
"Remedes Generaux contre les Fougues des Passions, et les 
Adversitez de la Fortune" (de 1'Esprit de 1 'Homme, 1725.
Chap. Dernier, p. 412).
In this chapter the Stoic self-sufficiency is quite 
apparent.
p.417*. Only attempt things within your own power. After 
that, and then only, are we absolutely in the hands of Provi­
dence.
p.419t "Un autre de plus puissans moyens que nous ayons a 
opposer au dereglement de nos Passions, est la Generoaite, 
par laquelle un Homme s'estimant au plus haut qu'il puisse 
legitimement s'estimer, et reglant sur ce pied toutes les 
actions de sa vie, n'oublie rien de ce qu'il doit faire, et 
ne fait rien qui soit indigne de lui." (of. Ch. Adam. "Vie 
de Descartes," pp. 505-509; and "Des Passions," art. CLIII.). 
p.418*. "II faut nous munir de deux remedes qui nous servir- 
ont de preservatifs contre toutes sortes d'evenemens. La
g pI est, de nous conduire en telle sorte que nous ayons 
sujet d'etre satisfaits de nous-memes." "La 2me est (p. 419) 
de oonsiderer toutes les choses qui se font dans le monde, 
et qui ne dependent point de nous, comme des actions qui se 




And hence one is led to remark that the Stoic 
detachment does, in fact, lead to theatricality. We bleed 
in our baths, declaiming. It is strange that Descartes who 
determined to go masked like a comedian upon the stage of 
the world (A.T. X, 213, 4-7) should nevertheless so have 
loved the play that he wished, by the art of medicine, to 
prolong human life on earth to indefinite lengths. He 
wished to give to human beings the power to live almost for­
ever as players at a remove from the real. Nothing teaches 
more clearly than Stoicism that to despise the contingent 
is to be bound to it by a link which is the more pernicious 
because it is unseen. Descartes1 philosophy is not com­
patible with that which overcomes the contingent by making 
it its own, and seeks in the misfortunes of life not an 
occasion of indifference but an opportunity of great benefits.
V. It is no wonder that the question of natural beati­
tude waa one on which the Cartesian philosophy aroused the 
suspicion of the Church, by which it was put on the Index 
in 1663. The agreement between the Jesuits and the Oratory, 
in the latter of which a split was threatening, is thus of 
far more than the local significance attributed to it by 
Bayle (Preface to the work cited below). The agreement con­
tains the following passage:
"On ne doit pas traiter en Philosophie la question 




s1 engager a parler de l fetat de la nature pure et de celuy 
de l finnocence et du pechl originel qui sont des matieres 
de Theologie. L Ton doit traiter la question des actions 
et des vertus humaines en Philosophie, comme a fait Aristote 
par rapport a leurs fins prochaines et a leurs circonstanoes, 
et non en Theologien par rapport a la fin derniere." (Con­
cordat entre les Jesuites et les Peres de l’Oratoire, p.
Bayle, "Reoueil de quelques pieces curieuses n 1684, p.10).
VI. The modern world, being built upon the foundations 
laid by Descartes, rests upon the rejection of grace in 
human affairs. The Stoic conception of the human will, 
accepted by Descartes, recrudesces in the Kantian philosophy 
which expresses perfectly the pride of man in his ability 
to secure his own virtue through his own will. The second 
Critique marks a Pelagian renaissance. The Idealist phil­
osophy - and let us not forget its connection with the modern 
conception of the national state - thus rests upon the re­
jection of the theological conception of manfs nature. The 
acceptance of the modern world as expressed in politics as 
well as in philosophy; and the acceptance of Christianity, 
are thus mutually exclusive alternatives. "For if natural 
capacity, by help of free will, is in itself sufficient both 
for discovering how one ought to live, and also for leading 
a holy life, then Christ died in vain,1 and therefore also 
’the offence of the cross is ceased.1rt (Augustine, Anti- 
Pelagian Writings, "On Nature and Orace," ch. 47).
244.
67. II (28), 14, 28-31.
68. Revue de Metaphysigue et de Morale. 1896. This is an
important article and the texts are very well assembled 
and dealt with. See also M. Maxime Leroy’s ”Descartes 
Social, *' 1931.
69. A.T. VII, 62, 8-9.
70. A.T. VI, 10, 9-11.
71. See Boutroux’s article in the Cambridge Modern History, 
vol. IV (1906), p. 784.
72. A.T. VII, 57, 27-58.3.
73. Cf. de la Forge, "Traite de I ’Esprit de l’Homme," ch. XXVil
where the author speaks of metaphysics particularly in
its relation to the sovereign good. It is the means for 
avoiding error.
74. A.T. IV, 305, 11-14.
75. A.T. VII, 53, 1-2.
76. A.T, IV, 291, 20-292,12.
77. A.T. IV, 291, 16-19.
78. The utilitarian conception of the love of God may be said 
to have one of its roots in the philosophy of Descartes.
Thus/
78 (contd) .
Thus de la Forge says: TfLe dernier et le plus effioaoe de
tous les remedes contre les Passions, est 1 1Amour de Dieu." 
(Traite/ de lfesprit de l’Homme, 1725, 42o) . It is as though 
he were prescribing a remedy in his capacity of a doctor of 
medicine. He refers his opinion to a letter from Descartes 
to Chanut, where the love of God is called "la plus ravissante 
et la plus utile passion que nous puissons avoir." (1st Feb., 
1647). One is reminded of Rousseau: "Je veux vivre en homme
de bien et en bon chretien, parce que je veux mourir en paix, 
et que d ’ailleurs ce sentiment ne glne en rien la suite de 
ma vie, et qu’il me fait concevoir une esp^rance qui m ’est 
douce, quand je ne serai plus.... Illusion, peut-fetre; mais 
si j’en avais une plus consolante, je 1 ’adopterais." (Mem- 
oires de Madame d ’Epinay, II, 394-395).
79. M. Maxime Leroy suggests that Descartes’was "une morale nee 
de la physiologie, utile a la conduite de la vie, une morale 
tendant a la rehabilitation des passions; dirons-nous une 
morale naturaliste." ("Descartes Social," p. 21).
BO. The remarks of the R. Pere J. B. de la Grange on the rules
of conduct, formulated by Descartes in the Discourse, are very 
penetrating. (Les Principes de la Philosophie, pp. 26-30).
In pointing out the Stoic element in the rules of Descartes1 
provisional moral, he shows the point of real connection of 




the essential weakness of both. He makes the possibly 
significant remark that the Stoics desired to live this life 
with assurance because they had no hope of another. Who, in­
deed, can fail to note the melancholy, altogether Roman, in 
Descartes1 letters to Elizabeth concerning the highest good?
It is the melancholy proper to the deathbed of a man dying 
in the belief that he can reproach himself with nothing, it 
is the sadness of a life lived only to a happy retrospect.
A noble sadness; a word summing up all the greatness and all 
the weakness of the pagan character.
A further point of interest suggested by the criti­
cisms of the R. Pere, arises from his remarks on the second 
rule of the provisional moral. The resolution to be absol­
utely firm in decisions once taken, even when they are not 
well founded, leaves, he says, no room for remorse and re­
pentance, that is, for the action of grace. Here is one of 
the respects in which the philosophy of Descartes is a fore- 
I runner of that of Spinoza, and of much that is subsequent.
Fojs^Pantheism, remorse and repentance are necessarily defects,
' since our moral errors are realities, not negations, and be- 
I long to the nature of things.
With the criticism of P. de la G-range we may contrast 
the following remark of another priest of the Oratory; "H'est- 
ce pas en effet un sujet de contentement, lors qu?on fait 
reflexion sur sa bonne conduite, et que bien-loin de se re-




qu’on n ’eust pas d’autres lumieres que oelles qu’on avoit 
lors qu’on l!a entrepris, on ne s'y prendroit pas autrement?" 
(P. Nicholas Poisson, "Remarques sur la Methode de Mr. Des­
cartes,11 pp. 113-114, Observations on the second maxim of the 
provisional moral). To repent is not to act "en homme sage," 
that is, to act according to the Cartesian moral: "le dernier 
degre de la Sagesse." (of. Descartes to Elizabeth: "... oar il 
n ’y a rien que le desir (sc. of things not in our power) et 
le regret ou le repentir, qui nous puissent empeoher d ’etre 
contents: mais si nous faisons toujours tout oe que nous 
dicte notre raison, nous n ’aurons jamais aucun sujet de nous 
repentir." A.T. IV, 266, 1-6).
j
See also de la Forge: "If faut craindre davantage la 
perte de sa raison, lors qu'elle vient par notre faute, que 
la perte de sa vie: Car sans l'usage de la raison nous ne 
pouvons pas etre heureuse. Et la seule Philosophic naturelle 
sans les maximes de la Foy, fait esperer a notre Arne un etat
V  Vplus heureux apres la Mort, que celui ou elle est a present....
Comme il n ’y a que les remors et les repentirs qui 
puissent troubler notre satisfaction, pour nous faire justice 
a nous-memes, et nous en exempter, nous devons faire en sorte
A ^que nous puissons toujours et avec verite nous rendre oe 
fidele temoinage, que nous n ’avons rien omis de ce qui etoit 
le meilleur et le plus raisonnable, Jii manque de resolution 




of. A.T. IV, 266) .
See the whole of this chapter (ch. XXVI, p. 390 ff*)i 
which treats of natural beatitude. The following sentence 
is interesting because it leaves no shadow of doubt upon the 
origins of the moral rules under discussion. Remarking that 
only our will is our own, and that it is the means to natural 
beatitude, de la Forge says: ”11 est aise; par ce moyen,
oomme dit Mr. Descartes, d'accorder Zenon avec Epicure touch- 
ant le Souverain bien de cette vie; parce que c'est en effet 
dans le bon usage de la liberte que consistent toutes les 
vertus, dans lesquelles Zenon etablissoit la Beatitude” (op. 
eit., p. 393, cf. A.T. IV, 275 ff.). The moral theories of 
Descartes fell on ready ears.
It was remarked that this dislike of repentance was 
something which linked Descartes with Spinoza. It is further 
to be observed that the Cartesian emphasis on the power of 
the will, to the exclusion of repentance, does not contradict 
the determinism of Spinoza. At root, the Spinozist and Stoic 
| doctrines of the will are in agreement. The Stoics cannot
j escape from the spiritual necessity by which the excessivej
contempt of external things is ultimately a complete submission
\! j to them, our wills being as much determined by what we do not 
; seek as by what we 3eek. The Cartesian doctrine of the free- 
j dom of the will is one of the points of similarity, not of 




The regulation of the passions by reason is the aim of the 
Ethic, and it is precisely in this regulation that Descartes 
places natural beatitude. Thus, when he says that "free 
will... renders us in some fashion like God in making us 
^masters of ourselves" (A.T. XI. 445. 19-SS), we can inter­
pret this not as vindicating human freedom, hut, on the 
contrary, as assimilating our wills so closely to that of 
God's, that they tend to become his, and that is Pantheism. 
Thus the freedom and independence of the human will are de­
stroyed and not exalted by the Cartesian deification of the 
will.
The consequence of Descartes* making our happiness 
depend on our passions is in fact to make it depend on that 
which does not constitute our essence, which is rationality. 
It is to make it depend upon our animality, that is, on 
what we are considered as mind and body substantially unit­
ed (for this phrase see references in Gilson, index, p.
304 art. "Union”). But since will is the chief character­
istic of a thinking thing, it is impossible to see how, for 
Descartes, our happiness can any longer be said to be with­
in our own power. We come to regard men not as individuals 
in relation to a personal God, but as parts of nature, so 
that "to act in conformity with nature" becomes the highest 
wisdom for the modern as for the ancient world.
81. A.T. VII. 4S9. 5-8.
250,
82. nen la recherche de la verite... consiste mon principal 
hien en cette vie." A.T. V. 430. 24-26.
83. "Descartes Savant," 1921. p. 36.
84. v. Grilson. Oommentaire Historique. p. 176-7.
85. A.T. IV. 113. 18-21.
86. "la Q,uatrieme Meditation tout entiere, est un tissu d ’em- 
prunts faits a la theologie de Saint Thomas et a celle de 
1 ’Oratoire. il n ’est pas exagere de dire qu’elle ne con- 
tient rien d ’original, si ce n ’est l’ordre selon lequel ces
materiaux sont disposes." E. G-ilson. "La Lihert^ chez Des­
cartes et la Theologie" 1913. p. 441.
87. Notae in Prog. A.T. Till. 364. 22-27.
88. A.T. IX (2e) . 19. 23. M. G-ilson remarks that Descartes’ is
a doctrine where the truth of ideas is a function of their 
order. (Oommentaire Historique. p. 23L)
89. A.T. VII. 9.28 - 10.2 cf. VII. 379. 15-22.
90. Regulae XI.
91. A.T. III. 267. 1-6.
92. A.T. VII. 155. 11-20.
93. A.T. VI. 18.31 - 19.2.
94. A.T. VII. 155.24 - 156.5.
251.
95. ”... clarum fiet iis qui satis attendent, et diu meoum
meditabuntur.” A.T. Vll. 135. 30-31.
96. ”l !analyse... consiste plus dans le jugement et dans
l^dress de I 1 esprit que dans des regies particulieres." 
(Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 4. Ch. II.)
97. A.T. VII. 159. 9-13.
98. A.T. VII. 130. 23-29.
99. The degree of intellectual submission implied by this is
made more precise by the following text. ”M§me touchant 
les verites de la foi, nous devons aperoevoir quelque 
raison qui nous persuade qu'elles ont ete/ revelees de 
Dieu, avant que de nous determiner a les croire; et encore 
que les ignorants fassent bien de suivre le jugement des 
plus eapables, touchant les choses difficiles a connaltre 
il faut neanmoins que ce soit leur perception qui leur en- 
seigne qu’ils sont ignorants, et que ceux dont ils veulent 
suivre les jugements ne le sont peut-etre pas tant, autre- 
ment ils feraient mal de les suivre, et ils agiraient 
plutot en automates, ou en betes, qu’en homines.” (A.T. IX. 
208. 19-30.)
It is interesting to note that Descartes believes 
that one must trust in one’s own discoveries as though 
they had a kind of external authority. He says that though 




once in one13 life, because they give us the knowledge of 
God and the soul, one should not meditate on them excessive­
ly. It is better to remember to have grasped these principles, 
than continually to agitate the matter. (A.T. III. 695.
4-15). The proof of the trustworthiness of memory in Med­
itation V gives the metaphysical ground for this, since 
it is there shown that I should not doubt of a truth pro­
viding I remember that I once possessed a clear and distinct 
comprehension of it. We must believe our own doctrines 
even when we are not presently aware of their rational 
grounds which it is not profitable always to recall. Des­
cartes thus thought it advisable, not only for other people, 
but even for himself, to take his metaphysical conclusions 
on trust. We require not only the power of intellectual 
invention but also of intellectual faith, "for to perceive 
clearly is one thing, to know with certainty another; for 
we now know many things with certainty not only by the 
faith which comes from God, but also because we have per­
ceived them clearly before, though at present we do not 
clearly perceive them." (A.T. VII. 519. 18-23.)
Incidentally, one wonders at the anxiety of Descartes 
to impose on men, by the authority of theologians, the 
truths concerning God and the soul, rationally demonstrated*
If they are imposed by authority they cease, properly speak­









theologians is sufficient to persuade belief in these* 
truths taken as mere conclusions of reason, surely it should 
be sufficient to persuade belief in them as truths of faith. 
It is the atheists at whom the rational demonstrations are 
said to be aimed, and an atheist is not likely to trust the 
authority of a theologian however eminent.
A.T. III. 102.11 - 103.16.
"Monsieur Descartes a temoigne assez de modestie dans 
toutes les action de sa vie, pour nous obliger de oroire 
qu'il n !y a rien d ’affecte dans celle-cy ou il se met au 
nombre des esprits medioores." (R.P. Nicholas Poisson. 
Remarques sur la Methods de Descartes p. 17-18 ad. Dis­
cours I. A.T. VI. 2. 20-21. Cf. Claubergius, Defensio 
Cartesiana, De modestia Oartesii in modo loquendi; Opera 
Omnia Philosophies, Pars Secunda, 1691. p. 948).
I. It may well be asked whether these two attitudes are, 
in Descartes, compatible. Descartes speaks of his meta­
physics as an edifice built to God's glory. He has con­
structed "not out of nothing, but out of the most durable 
material, not nothing, but a stable and well-built church 
to the glory of God" (A.T. VII. 542. 10-13). Of the sin­
cerity of this aim, in the ordinary sense of the word, 
there can be no doubt. But sincerity is not enough. Who 




dedicated his metaphysics, he dedicated them with a sense 
of his strength and not of his weakness.
In a matter of such delicacy one hesitates to pass 
an opinion. Yet philosophical exegesis seems to call for & 
judgment. It is impossible to understand Descartes* meta­
physics without evaluating his religious motives. When we 
make such an evaluation, it is impossible not to judge 
that Descartes, the apologist, was, unknown to himself, 
motivated by intellectual pride. His sincerity consists 
in his ignorance of his own presumption. If he regarded 
his metaphysic as a stable and well-built church, it could 
only be by substituting a corpus of rational truths for 
the mystical Body of Christ. Is this not, perhaps, the 
sanctification of reason by pride, but a pride so deep- 
rooted in Descartes that its expression is sincere by 
reason /f its very depth?
However, and at present, the point is that this ap­
peal to authority shows clearly how rigorous Descartes 
thought his proofs to be, and how thoroughly persuaded he 
was that it was necessary to his missionary ends to retain 
the analytic method of exposition.
II. That the analytic method is the best method of teach­
ing is not agreed to by the later Cartesians.







la verite, qu’on appelle analyse ou methode de resolution, 
et qu’on peut aussi appeler methode d ’invention; et 
I 1autre pour la faire entendre aux autres, quand on l ’a 
trouvee, qu’on appelle synthese ou methode de composition, 
et qu’on peut aussi appeler methode de doctrine.” (Port- 
Royal Logic Pt. 4 Ch. II.)
Regis says that his Logic contains "deux methodes, 
dont l'une s’appelle Analyse qui sert a nous instruire nous
\  \  Vmemes, et 1 ’autre Synthese, qui eat propre a instruire les 
autres." (Oours Entier. Preface.)
Descartes himself seems to have suffered a disil­
lusionment. He tells Burman that he has changed the order 
of proof in the Principles "quia alia est via et ordo in­
vent endi, alia docendi; in Principiis autem docet" (A.T.
V. 153). As usual, however, it is hard to discover Des­
cartes’ real motives. Did he wish to give his proofs a 
wider popularity, or had he come to believe that not even 
the "twelve or fifteen theologians" could understand them? 
Had he come to think less of his powers, or more?
A.T. VII. 156. 6-16.
Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 4. Ch. II.
"1’application de la methode d'analyse a la metaphysique
exclu.t la velleite de deduire quoi que ce soit a partir 
de principes que le doute interdit de postuler." (Leon


















Brunschvicg. Mathematique et M^taphysique chez Descartes. 
Rev. de Met. et de Morale. 1927. p. 315.)
"Descartes avant 1637." 1867. p. 226.
A.T. III. 396. 17.
A.T. VII. 226. 23-26.
A.T. VII. 124. 29 - 125. 5.
Of. Instances of Gassendi. In Medit. IV, dubit. 4, Inst.
2, quoted E. Gilson. Oommentaire Historique. p. 360. 
"Descartes" III. I.
A.T. VII. 146. 14-28.
A.T. VII. 35. 6-15.
A.T. VII. 36. 8-21.
A.T. VI. 33. 16-24.
A.T. VII. 36. 21-23. "de iis confuse solum loquor." A.T.
V. 151.
A.T. VII. 69. 18-20.
A.T. VII. 62. 2-4.
A.T. VII. 69. 16-18. Of. VII. 145. 27-146. 1- and VII. 416. 
24-28.
257.
120. A.T. VII. 58. 20-25.
121. A.T. VII. 62. 1-2.
122. "ne sommes-nous pas icl an centre d ’un conflit de la 
lumiere naturelle avec elle-meme, de 1*evidence avec 1*ev­
idence?" (J. Maritain "Le Songe de Descartes," p. 166)
123. A.T.'I. 165. 16-19; III. 567. 17-21; VII. 71. 18-20.
124. A.T. VII. 36. 24-25.
125. A.T. VII. 144.26-146.4 cf. Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 4. Oh. VI.
126. Principles I. VII; I. X.
127. A.T. VII. 65. 16-20.
128. A.T. VII. 65. 5-6.
129. A.T. VII. 65. 21 - 66. 1.
130. A.T. VII. 3. 9-21.
131. A.T. VII. 24. 7-13.
132. Oommentaire Historique. p. 299.
133. A.T. X. 527.
134. A.T. X. 505. 9-13.
135. See A.T. VII. 488 ff. and Notae p. 491 ff.
258.
136. npensee." A.T. IX. 10. 5. For the meaning of the term 
see the following passage:
"Cependant, je cralns encore de me definir mal, 
quand je dls que je suls une pensee, qui a la propriete de 
douter et d !avoir de la certitude; car quelle apparence y 
a-tTil que ma nature qui doit estre une chose fixe et per- 
manente, consiste dans la pensee, puis que je scay par 
experience que mes pensees sont dans un flux continuel, 
et que je ne pense, jamais a la meme chose deux momens de 
suite? mais quand je considere la difficulte de plus pres, 
je con^ois aisement qu’elle vient de ce que le mot de Pen­
see est equivoque, et que je m'en sers indifferement pour 
signifier la pensee qui constitue ma nature, et pour 
designer les differentes manieres d*estre de cette pens&e; 
ce qui est une erreur extreme; car il y a cette difference 
entre la pensee qui constitue ma nature, et les pensees,
qui n ’en sont que des manieres d ’estre, que la premier
est une pensee fixe et permanente, et que les autres sont 
des pensees changeantes et passageres. O ’est pourquoy, afln 
de donner une idee exacte de ma nature, je diray: Que je 
suis une pensee qui existe en elle-meme, et qui est le
sujet de toutes mes manieres de penser.,f (P-S. Regis.
Cours Entier. Metaph. I: I. ch. II. cf. the Secondes 
Reflexions I. and Resp. to du Hamel ,Paris,1692. p. 34-36). 
"Pensee," thus used, clearly connotes substantiality, (cf. 
A.T. V. 221. 10-25).
259.
137. A.T. IV. 444. 23-24. Descartes’ Italics.
138. "In primis nego eum juste queri, quasi dixissem me habere 
clarum et distinctum mei conceptum, priusquam sufficiente 
explicuissem qua ratione habeatur.” A.T. VII. 518.1-3.
cf. "Quod autem dixi, me nondum satis intelligere quis sit 
ille qui cogitat, non bona fide ut serio dictum accipis.” 
A.T. VII. 351. 12-14.
139. A.T. VI. 18. 27-29. cf. VI. 19.. 17-20.
140. A.T. VII. 140.18 - 141.2.
141. For the historical origins of this phrase v. E. Gilson 
Oommentaire Historique, p. 208-209.
142. A.T. VII. 33. 1-17. cf. Pr. I. XI.
143. cf. Pr. I. XI; A.T. III. 394. 14-31 etc.
144. The fact is interesting to note, that Descartes does not 
consider the position which the Gogito occupies in his 
metaphysics to be in itself a sufficient proof that the 
mind is more intelligible in its nature than bodies are.
The Scholastics believed that Being as such is intelligible,
and that everything is intelligible in exact proportion to
the amount of being it possesses. Minds have more being 
than bodies, consequently it is in the nature of minds to 
be better known than bodies. God is the supreme being,




Only GrodTs own intellect is capable of fully understanding 
his own Being. Though he is in his own nature the most 
intelligible of all beings, we know him only obscurely, 
though this obscurity, by reason of its object, is never­
theless a more perfect knowledge than that which we have 
of created things, however clear the latter knowledge may be.
Descartes accepts the Scholastic hierarchy. "I
have accurately observed that there is exceedingly little
known with certainty respecting corporeal objects, - that
we know much more of the human mind, and still more of God
himself.” (A.T. III. 52.24 - 53.3) But the doubt forbids
Descartes to concede that Being as such is intelligible.
That is the very thing which he has to prove. Hence arises
the curious inversion that the mind is demonstrated to be ■
better known than the body, as part of the proof that we
know the real. Since the hierarchy cannot be established
from the side of Being, it must be established from the \
side of our ideas, of whose correspondence we are as yet
uncertain. Thus the demonstration that I know myself better
than I know bodies does not take the form of showing that
I have more actual being than bodies, but that the ideas
I have of bodies assure me rather of my own existence than 
of that of bodies. In spite of this revolution in the
scholastic doctrine, Descartes preserves, with a curious 
integrity, the necessity of connecting existence and in­











tam distincte percipere? Nunquid me ipsum non tantum 
multo verius, multo certius, sed etiam multo distinctius 
evidentiusque, cognosco? Nam si iudico ceram existere, 
ex eo quod hanc videam, certe multo evidentius efficitur 
me ipsum etiam existere.” A.T. VII. 33. 3-8.
There is a resemblance of circularity in the Car­
tesian proof.
A.T. IV. 291. 11-16; IV. 295. 22 - 296. 3.
A.T. VII. 131. 3-16.
A.T. VII. 34. 5-9. cf. "les pensees metaphysiques qui ex- 
ercent 1 *entendement pur, servant a nous rendre la notion 
de l'ime famili&re." A.T. III. 692. 10-12.
A.T. VI. 32. 18-23.
v.n. 7.
A.T. IV. 444.4 - 445.8. cf. Port-Royal Logic Pt. 4. ch. VII 
The axioms "que l ’on donne ordinairement sont de si peu 
d'usage, qu’il est assez inutile de les savoir, car ce 
qu1ils appellant le premier principe de la connaissance:
II est impossible que la meme chose soit et ne soit pas, 
est tres-clair et tres - certain; mais je ne vois point 
de recontre ou il puisse jamais servir a nous donner aucune 
connaissance." See also P.S. Regis. Cours Entier. La 
Logique. Pt. 2. ch. III.
151. A.T. X. 522.
152. A.T. V. 146. cf. Resp.„ II. Post III.
153. A.T. IX,> (2e). 9. 18-22.
154. f,Le Systeme de Descartes.” Ch. V.
155. A.T. VII. 25. 25-31.
.156. A.T. X. 515 .
157. The ”de£initio vulgaris.” A.T. VII. 259. 14-15.
158. A.T. X. 516.
.159. A.T. X. 517.
.160. A.T. X. 521.
161. A.T. X. 522.
162. A.T. X. 523-524.
163. A.T. X. 525.
164. A.T. IX. 206. 17-23.
165. A.T. VII 413. 2-11. cf. Arnauld ”Des Vrayes et des Fausses
Idees,” 1683, Ch. I. Rule 4. ”La 4 (sc. regie) est de ne 
point demander de definitions des termes qui sont clairs 
d'eux memes, et que nous ne pourrions qu*obscurcir en les
voulant deflnir, par ce que nous ne pourrions les expliquer 
que par de moins clairs. Tels sont les mots de penser efc
263.
165. (contd.)
d ’estre dans cett© proposition: Je pense, done je suis.
De sorte que e'estoit une fort mechante objection que cell© 
qui fut faite a M. Descartes en ces termes dans les six- 
iemes objections.”
166. A.T. X. 525.
167. A.T. X. 526-527.
168. A.T. X. 527.
169. Pascal. Oeuvres, ed. Brunschvicg. vol. IX. p. 240 ff.
170. Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 1. Ch. 12.
171. Cf. Pr. I: X.
172. For the explicit application of this method to things
metaphysical as well as geometrical see the Port-Royal 
Logic Pt. I. Ch. XII and XIII. These chapters make it 
clear that Descartes’ successors had a very clear concep­
tion of the relevance of this branch of mathematical doc­
trine to metaphysics. The Port-Royal Logic displays a
complete indifference in giving examples of the use of this
method mentioning either mathematical or metaphysical ob­
jects and terms. The twelfth chapter of the first part 
proposes nominal definitions as a remedy against all con­
fused thinking, in whatever sphere.
173. Port-Royal Logic. Pt. I. Ch. XII.
264.
174. A.T. X. 516.
175. Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 4. Ch. II.
176. MDes Vrayes...11 Ch. II.
177. It is perhaps in this very theory of definition which we 
must seek the reason for the ambiguity which some scholars 
find in the terminology of Descartes.
Eucken (Geschichte der Philosophischen Terminologie, 
1879, p. 88, quoted by Koyre, l'ldee de Dieu chez Descartes 
1922. p. 8.) remarks that it is characteristic of Descartes1 
style to confound and use as synonyms terms separated by the 
acuteness of centuries. "Wir finden z. B. als gleichwertig: 
noticiae sive ideae, conceptus sive idea, idea sive cogitatio, 
res sive substantia, natura sive essentia, corpus sive mater­
ia, materialls sive corporeus, res corporales sive physicae, 
res ixnmateriales sive metaphysicae, intellectualis sive cog- 
itativus, formae sive species, formae sive attributa, mens 
sive anima, intellectus sive ratio, realitas sive perfectio, 
est sive existit, und vieles andere mehr. Kan die scholas- 
tische Spi t sfindigkei t scharfer bekampft werden als es durch 
dieses sive gesebieht?,f Koyre remarks, "Tous ces sive ne 
font pas la pensle de Descartes plus “claire et distincte” 
et on peut M e n  aouvent regretter qu'il n'ait pas conserve 





In fact, an indifference to strict terminology 
is an inevitable consequence of the Cartesian philosophy.
The correct method for seeking the truth is not, in the 
scholastic sense, a method of definition, but a method for t
the direct examination of the properties of thb real. It 
is things and not logical distinctions which must primar­
ily be regarded. The term is of use and of meaning only 
as indicating independent things. It is this prepossession 
with the real which explains Descartes’ disgust with the
i . l
scholastic distinguo> which it is clear, from the speech f
of Epistemon in the Recherche, that Descartes regards as a ij
red-herring across the path of thought. Preoccupation with |
terms means for him distraction from the real and true. ;
It is interesting to observe the tendency among ,
the later Cartesians to multiply and give precision to the 
terms of the philosophy of Descartes. His followers are |
much more technical than he himself. This tendency, how­
ever, was sterile and reactionary, and marks the decay of 
the pure doctrine of Descartes , making it resemble the 
tired scholasticism it was intended to replace. Here, as 
often, the true trend of Descartes’ thought must be sougjht 
for in Idealism, the terms of which are quite incapable of 
being defined in the strict scholastic fashion. For the 
Idealists, concepts take their meaning as they are developed, ■
j




then not by a brief definition. W© may trace the origin 
of the logical doctrine underlying this to the mathematic­
ians of the seventeenth century, who, refusing to consider 
it a scientific need to give preliminary definitions of 
terms such as "space" proceeded to develop the content of 
these conceptions by examining the realities which they re­
presented, so that the true meaning of the term was con­
tained in the whole system of propositions thus developed. 
Space, for instance, is defined by the whole system of 
geometry.
As removing knowledge from the domination of verbal 
subtleties this development has been of great value. Un­
fortunately, what was excellent in scholasticism was lost 
sight of, owing it its philosophy coming to be considered 
a tissue of purely verbal subtleties. Its "formulae" were 
always called "barren." It is only recently that the labours 
of scholars, such as M. Gilson and M. Maritain, have begun 
to make philosophers in general aware of the great spirit­
ual realities which underlie the philosophy of classical 
scholasticism, and the rich beauty of its precise and for­
mal conceptions.
(The work of Rudolf Eucken cited is suggested (v. 
pp. 79-94). Of the seventeenth century he says: "Es 
scheint bisweilen bemshs, als handle es sich m  dem Kampf 











konnten durch Reform der Sprache die realen Probleme 
gelost werden" (p. 87).
Of the philosophy of Descartes: "Die Distinction
tritt in zweite Linie, nicht von der Hussein Erscheinung, 
sondern vonden Grund3o?aften her muss sie begriffen warden." 
(p. 89)
He considers that the tendency to avoid distinctions 
was carried too far by Descartes, but that it was a nec­
essary consequence of his philosophy. "Der Fehler hangt 
aber auf’s engste mit der Eigenart seiner Philosophie 
zusammen, die Analyse nur bis zu einem gewissen Punkt zu 
verfolgen, diesen aber als unmittelbar gegeben hinzustellen." 
(p. 90)
A.T. VII. 25. 31- 26. 2.
Oeuvres. IX. p. 240-241.
A.T. VII. 25. 14 ff.
A.T. VII. 488-90 passim.
\
A.T. VII. 491.11-25. cf. VII. 509. 17-19; VII. 510. 3-5 and 
9-16; VII. 522. 9-11.
A.T. VII. 27. 24-29.





Veitch, in his well-known edition of Descartes, remarks:
"The method, when carried out in its integrity, is primar­
ily one of observation and reflective analysis, (cf. the 
meditando et advertendo of A.T. VII. 515. 20) And in 
order to the faithful application of it, we must scrutin­
ise carefully and fully every form of our conscious life, 
and every, even apparent, deliverance of our intelligence.” 
p. LXIX.
This became a commonplace among the Cartesians: "ie n ’ay
/ % \iamais etably la science a apprendre des mots, mais a
demontrer les choses." (J. du Roure. La Philosophic
divisee.. Avertissement).
It may not be out of place to observe that the doubt purges
our knowledge of assumptions, but it does not deprive the
real of its qualities. This may seem obvious, but in fact 
the metaphysic of Descartes has been badly misunderstood 
in this country through the ignoring of this truth. Pro­
fessor Latta identified the method of doubt with a process 
of abstraction applied to the real. "The essence of Des­
cartes’ method of doubt is the endeavour to attain certainty 
by stripping from experience (as it is given in common con­
sciousness) all specific qualities or determinations, on 
the ground that no contradiction in terms is involved in 




or other than it is. The result of the method is to give, 
as the residual ultimate certainty, nothing but the in­
strument by which the process of stripping has been carried 
out, viz. the thinking Ego, without any specific thought." 
("Leibniz" pp. 24-25. v. pp. 22-27 passim.) Hence arises 
Professor Kemp Smith’s interpretation of the Cartesian 
metaphysics. He speaks of the "Cartesian tendency to 
hypostasise abstract and empty conceptions into absolute 
realities." (Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, p. 133). 
"These conceptions, however, of extension and of conscious­
ness... are in reality the emptiest in content" (op. cit. 
p. 134).
The abstract conception of the self attributed to 
Descartes by these authors rests on a simple misinterpreta­
tion of the doubt. The doubt does not strip our mind of 
its "specific qualities or determinations," that is, of 
its thoughts. What it does is to forbid us to assume that 
our ideas are true. Our ideas, in so far as they are mere­
ly taken as modes of our thought are not affected by the 
doubt. Our mind, that is, is not stripped of its ideas 
insofar as these are considered only as related to itself. 
Our consciousness, as such, remains full and concrete.
Vi/hat, then, is the situation when we make ourselves 
the objects of our thought? It is this, that we may make 




has revealed to us how many prejudices we harbour, and 
we must be careful to escape prejudice in this matter.
But there is clearly a vast difference between freeing 
the intellect of its prejudices, and stripping its object 
of its qualities. It is our minds which are suspected to 
be without truth, not their objects which are without their 
concrete reality. When, therefore, the self is posited 
by the Cogito, it is we who know scarcely anything about 
the self, not the self about which there is nothing fur­
ther to be known.
On the contrary, Descartes [: attitude is essentially 
realistic and empirical. Descartes treats the self as the 
geometer treats space: as that about which there is noth­
ing to be assumed but a great deal to be discovered. Thus 
the examination of the self in the second Meditation is 
not the illegitimate impletion of a thing rendered empty 
by abstraction, but an explication of the content of a 
thing which has been examined for the very reason that it 
is believed to be concrete.
Cf. "Neque enim substantias immediate cognoscimus, 
ut alibi notaturn est, sed tan turn ex eo quod percipiamus 
quasdam formas sive attribute, quae cum alicui rei debeant 
inesse ut existant, rem illam cui insunt vocamus Substant- 
ium.
"Si vero postea eandem illam substantiam spoliare 




nostram de ipsa notitiam destrueremus; atque ita verba 
quidem aliqua de ipsa possemus proferre, sed non quorum 
significationem clare et distincte perciperemus." A.T. 
VII. 222. 5-14.
If existence by itself is not observed by us (Pr.
I. LII) then so far as we from reaching certainty by de­
spoiling substance of its modes, that that would be the 
surest method of destroying all possibility of knowledge.
188. A.T. VII. 130.30 - 131.18.
189. A.T. VII. 136.25-137.7. cf. VII. 133. 5-8.
190. A.T. VII. 78. 15-20.
191. A.T. VII. 13.. 5-19.
192. Pr. I. LI.
193. Pr. I. LII.
194. In Pr. I. XLIX. Descartes speaks of innumerable axioms
or general principles "quae quidem omnia recenseri facile 
non possunt, sed nec etiam ignorari, cum occurrit occaslo 
ut de iis cogitemus."
195. Thus Regis says (Cours Entier. Metaph. Avertissement):
"Et parce quTil n !y a rien de plus necessaire dans la re­
cherche de la verite que d'eviter les mots equivoques, et 
d'etablir/
272.
195. d*etablir certains propositions qui soient connuSs par 
elles-mSmes pour en deduire d ’autres qui sont raoins 
connuSs, nous ajouterons a quelques Chapitres de la prem­
iere Partie du premier Livre, des Reflexions, qui con- 
tiendront non seulement les definitions des mots dont nous 
nous serons servis, mais encore certains axiomes, ctest­
a-dire certaines veritez qui se seront presentees comme 
d telles-memes."
"Les Axiomes que nous proposerons ne soient fondez 
que sur 1 Existence, et sur la nature particuliere de 
ltesprit et du corps."
The definitions and axioms given are, for instance, 
as follows: That nothing has no properties (Reflex. I.
Ax. I); what the words substance and mode signify (Reflex.
II. defn. I); what is meant by words 1 'esprit, sensation, 
and idea (Ibid. defns. Ill, IV); that every mode presup­
poses a substance in which it exists (Ibid. Ax. I); that 
modes are attached in such a manner to their proper sub­
stance that they can never become the modes of another 
substance (Ibid. Ax. II); that everything which exists is 
a substance or a mode (Ibid. Ax. Ill) etc.
It may be remarked that the Cartesians believe 
that any definition or axiom reflexively derivable at one 
stage of an analytic proof, may be used explicitly at a 




Reflexions I in the proof by analysis of God*s existence. 
Such a use is considered to be quite different from the 
procedure of synthesis which, not starting with the exam­
ination of the particular, enunciates these truths as 
general principles at the commencement of its expositions.
196. The Cartesian doctrine is;nLes modes dependent des sub­
stances, non seulement pour exister, mais encore pour estre 
concus.” (P.S. Regis, Cours Entier. La Logique. Pt. IV. 
ch. II.)
197. A.T. III. 506. 8-13.
✓198. v. E. Gilson. Index scol.-cart. text 2, p.2.
199. Pr. I. LIII.
200. Pr. I. LIII.
201. Pr. I. LXII, I: LXIII.
202. Pr. I: LXIII.
203. See the important text: A.T. VII. 129.6 - 130.5.
204. Compare A.T. VII. 33.1 ad. fin. with Pr. I: XI.
205. How completely opposed the attitude of Descartes is to all 
wonder and allmysticism comes home strikingly if we recall 




on the nature of memory, while reading that letter in 
which Descartes says that he is dissecting the heads of 
different animals to explain in what consists imagination, 
memory, etc. A.T. I. 263.
It must be remembered that Descartes distinguishes 
between imagination as a physical and as a mental modific­
ation; so that what is here intended is not that Descartes 
meant to discover the nature of consciousness by physical 
researches, but that his attitude to the powers of the 
mind is the direct, matter-of-fact attitude of the phys­
iologist to the parts of a corpse.
206. A.T. VII. 225.26-226.7.
207. "Des vrayes et des fausses Idees," Ch. V. Postulate I.
208. Cf. Port-Royal Logic, Pt. 4. Ch. II.
209. Cours Entier. Metaph. I. I. XI.
210. It may also be remarked that the nature of the analytic
method explains the relation of the first book of the
Principles to the Meditations. The former comprises 
the "reflexions" made upon the latter. It contains 
axioms and definitions operative in the Meditations but 
not explicit there. Therefore, if the analytic method 











explain the Meditations in a manner which is precise and 
scientific. Attempts to explain the Meditations by means 
of the general truths stated in Principles I must not lose 
sight of the fact that the Meditations represent the ac­
tual order of the affirmation of all metaphysical truths 
and principles.
”Car puis-que tout le monde convient, que la substance 
n fest autre chose que le premier sujet de quelque 
propriete on accident, il faut de necessite* que ce qui 
possede en nous la faculte de penser, et qui est le 
premier sujet dans lequel toutes nos pensees en particul- 
ier sont revues, soit une substance; Ainsi quoi que nous 
ne fachions pas encore de quelle nature et de quelle con­
dition elle est, nous ne pouvons pourtant pas douter que 
nous n Tayons en nous une substance qui pense, qui est 
ce quTon appelle l fAme ou 1 TEsprit de 1*Homme.” (De la 
Forge. ffde 1*Esprit de l 1 Homme.” 1725. p. 6)
P. S. Regis. Cour Entier. Metaph. I. I. IV.
A.T. VIII. (2e ). 354. 18-27. cf. Pr. I. VIII; and A.T.
X. 518.
A.T. VII. 198. 12-19.
A.T. VII. 27. 18-23.
A.T. VII. 27. 24-29.
276.
217. A.T. VII, 28. 20-29. 20. "Nous ne pouvons M e n  con-
noitre ce que nous sorames, que par une serieuse attention
\
a ce qui se passe en nous." (Arnauld, "Des- vrayes et 
des fausses Idees." Ch. II).
218. Pr. I. XI.
219. A.T. VII, 129. 21-27.
220. A.T. VII, 176. 1-26. cf. "neque enim substantias immed­
iate cognoscimus" etc. A.T. VII. 222. 5-9.
221. A.T. VII. 386. 22-387. 5.
222. A.T. VII. 200. 20-24.
223. A.T. VII. 199. 1-12.
224. A.T. VII, 199. 12-14.
225. cf. A.T. VII, 7. 20-8.15.
226. A.T. VII. 33. 1-3.
227. A.T. VII. 59. 5-10.
This passage occurs in the fourth Meditation as an 
illustrative example of a proposition to which the will 
is free to refrain from assenting. Obviously, however, 
it has a further use, since its appearance would other­




as careful in expressing himself as Descartes was, 
would have risked confusion to his readers by using 
merely as an example, a proposition charged with a great 
metaphysical import. It is probably correct to say that 
the proposition is intended not so much as a mere example 
of a proposition to which the will can not yet assent, 
than as a reminder of the stage at which our metaphysical 
proofs had arrived at the end of the second Meditation.
228. A.T. VII. 220. 1-5.
229. A.T. VII. 226. 8-26.
230. A.T. VII. 66. 4-6; VII. 194. 12; Pr.I. XVI; etc.
231. A.T. VII. 20. 23-27.
232. Pr. I; XXX.
233. A.T. VII. 357. 7-17.
234. A.T. VII. 27. 29-28.2.
235. A.T. VII. 227. 11-19.
236. A.T. VII. 264. 20-265.13.
237. A.T. VII. 357. 7-20.















A.T. III. 475, 22-25.
A.T. VII. 439. 16 ff.
A.T. VII. 487. 13-18.
A.T. VII. 492. 17-19.
R. P. Nicholas Poisson. "Remarques sur la Methode....” 
pp. 54-55.
R. P. Nicholas Poisson. op, cit. p. 199. What is import­
ant is not his defence of the cercle, but his admission
that it is there.
A.T. VII. 15. 3-6.
"Des vrayes et des fausses Idees.n Ch. V. ax. 6.
A.T. VII, 37. 13-22.
flDes vrayes et des fausses Idees." Ch. VI.
i.e. with respect also to the mind. cf. P. S. Regis:
"Desirant scavoir ensuite si une chose qui pense est cor- 
porelle ou spirituelle, j*examine I1idee d'une chose qui 
pense." (Cours Entier. Logique, Pt. 4. Ch. II). It 
would be a radical misinterpretation of the metaphysic 




aware of my existence, I have an immediate knowledge of
the formal or eminent causes of ideas in the third Medi­
tation Descartes says: "Ex his autem meis ideis, praeter
illam quae me ipsum mihi exhibet, de qua hie nulla diffi- 
cultas esse potest....” A.T. VII. 42. 29-30. That is 
to say that I am represented to myself by an idea, and 
that there is no difficulty in seeing that I am able to 
be the formal or eminent cause of that which is in this 
idea objectively or by representation.
If this is to be properly grasped a few distinctions 
must be borne in mind.
My existence is known by a simple inspection of the 
mind, that is to say, no more is required to the certainty 
of my existence than that I should take note at any time 
that I have an idea. ”l am - I exist: this is certain; 
but how often? As often as I think." (A.T. VII. 27. 9-10 
cf. VII. 33. 3-17).
"je ne mets autre difference entre l!Sme et ses idees, 
que comme entre un morceau de cire et les diverses figures 
qu*il peut recevoir." (A.T. IV. 113. 22-24), says Descartes 
to P. Mesland. If this is true, then to have an idea is 
to be immediately aware of that of which it is a mode.
It is to be observed, however, that this immediate
my nature. I know myself objectively




awareness of what we are is not an express knowledge of what 
we are. An idea of a stone, an idea even of something purely 
chimerical, give me an immediate awareness of what I am since 
our thought is sui conscia. But did these ideas give me an 
express knowledge of what I am, then the science of metaphysics, 
in which we expressly aim at forming a clear and distinct idea 
of the mind would he superfluous. It is this express idea of 
ourselves as such through which we are present to ourselves 
objectively or by representation.
In the letter to P. Mesland Descartes refers only 
to the manner in which ideas are present to the mind as modes 
i.e. to the formal essence of ideas. But the modal relation of 
ide.as to the mind is a relation only of modification which, 
though it involves, in the instance of mind, the self-awareness of 
the thing modified, is not strictly speaking a relation of cog­
nition, since we know through the medium of ideas taken, not 
formally or as modes, but objectively or as referring to some­
thing else (Medit. III). That is v/hy ideas considered formally 
are neither true nor false. Though the idea even of a material 
thing persuades me that I am, thought being sui conscia, yet 
some other idea than this, formed reflexively, is required ex­
pressly to inform me that the former idea persuades me that I am. 
If all ideas show me that I am a thing which thinks them, yet 
what more precisely they concur in showing me to be is a thing 




The simple awareness that I have of myself is an 
idea or perception; but before I can arrive at a scientific 
knowledge of what I am, I must cease to regard this idea 
virtually, that is, as merely present, and make it the special 
object of reflection. I have begun to think metaphysically 
when I have commenced expressly to consider the idea of my­
self. By metaphysical thinking I form a clear and distinct 
idea of myself which has me as its special object.
There is, however, a potent source of confusion 
in this idea, and peculiarly in this idea. The idea of my­
self stands in a twofold relation to me. Formally taken, 
it is merely a mode of myself, and makes me aware of what 
I am in the fashion of the idea of an extended thing. It 
makes me aware of myself simply because thought is sui 
conscia. But the metaphysical idea of myself has also the 
peculiar characteristic of representing me. Of no other 
idea can it be said that it is related to me both modally 
and by representation, the ideas of God and of material 
things being related to me modally, and by representation 
to things other than myself.
Thus, while it may be said that the idea of myself 
implies an immediate awareness of myself, it is not by vir­
tue of this awareness that the idea expressly informs me of 
what I am, but only by virtue of its objective essence in 
respect of which I am the mediate object of that idea.
282*
251. "Des vrayes et des fausses Idees." Ch. VI. cf. P. S, 
Regis. Cours Entier. Metaph. Bk. I. Pt. I. Ch. III. 
Reflex, ax. I.
252. v. E. Gilson. "Commentaire Historique." pp. 318-323. 
J. Maritain, "Trois Reformateurs." (revised edition), 
n. 50.
253. Resp. II. defn. I, cf. Pr. I. IX.
254. Resp. II. defn. II.
255. A.T. VII. 37.-13-17; Pr. I. XIII; etc.
256. A.T. VII. 37. 3-12; VII. 42. 11-13.
257. A.T. VII. 40. 7-20.
258. "images or pictures." How these words must be under­
stood will appear more clearly later.
259. A.T. VII. 41. 17-20.
260. A.T. VII. 41. 27.
261. A.T. VII. 41. 30-42.11.
262. Resp. II. defn. III. "me autem loqui de idea, quae 
nunquam est extra intellectum, et ratione cuius esse 
objective non aliud significat quam esse in intellectu
w







Arnauld. "Des vrayes et des fausses Idees." Ch. V, 
defn. 5.
Op. cit. Ch. V. defn. 8.
Op. cit. Ch. V. defn. 10.
For the contrast of 1 formal1 and Objective* see
further the following very clear texts: "Par 1*estre
formel des idees j’entens la propriete qu’elles ont 
dfestre des modifications de lfarae, et que par leur 
estre objectif j!entens la propriete qu*elles ont de 
representer leurs objets." "Par 1*estre formel des 
iddes M. Descartes et les Cartesiens entendent, non la 
vertu de representer les objets, mais la propriete'" de 
modifier lfame." P.S. Regis. "Reponse aux Reflexions 
Critiques de M. du Hamel. 1692. Ch. VI.
The meaning of the word "represent" presents consider­
able difficulties.
"II est constant quion ne peut expliquer la res- 
semblance desid^es par la ressemblance des tableaux, 
parce que dans le fond les tableaux ressemblent, et les 
idees ne ressemblent pas; d'ou il s*ensuit que le mot 
de representation est fort equivoque, quand on l*attribue 
aux idees et aux tableaux. Quand on l!attribue aux tab­
leaux, il signifie representer en ressemblant; et quand 
on l»attribue aux idees, il signifie seulement faire 
connoitre/
connoitre sans rassembler." (P. s .  Regis. "Reponse aux 
Reflexions Critiques de M. du Hamel." Ch. VIII)..
"Us (sc. les Cartesiens) nfont entendu par le mot 
de representer, autre chose que faire connoitre.... 
n ’estant plus obligez de chercher aucune ressemblance 
entre les idees et les objets, et s»appliquant unique- 
ment a examiner comment il se peut faire que les id^es, 
qui n font rien de semblable aux objets, fassent pour- 
tant connoitre les objets; ce qui fait toute la diffi- 
culte. U s  ont done remarque que les idees sont des 
connoissances, et que la nature des connoissances est 
de faire connoitre, sans qu’il soit possible de remonter 
plus haut, pour dernontrer comment la lumiere fait voir., 
parce que dans le fond les idees et la lumiere font con­
noitre et voir par elles-mesmes, et par leur propre 
nature. C*est pourquoy les tableaux different des idees 
en ce que les idees font connoitre simplement en faisant 
connoitre, et que les tableaux font connoitre en repres- 
entant par des lineamens et par des couleurs semblables 
aux couleurs et aux lineamens de leur original."
(P. S, R^gis. loc. cit.).
The difficulty of du Hamel is classical: ".... il
faudroit auparavant connoitre les objets, et il est cer­
tain qu*avant de former les id^es, il est impossible de 
connoitre les objets." (Op. cit. Ch. X).
285
267. Resp. II. defn. IX.
268. Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 4. Ch. VI. cf. "Les idees ne se 
representent point elles-mesmes; elles representent 
seulement leurs objets, et elles les representent aussi 
necessairement que les tableaux representent leur origi- 
naux, sans quoy nous serions bien assurez que nous auri- 
ons des id^es, mais non pas qu!il y eut aucune chose 
dans le monde qui repondit a ces idees; ce qui detruir- 
ont toute la certitude humaine." (P. S. Regis. Seconde 
Replique a la Reponse du R. P. Malebranche. 1694. p. 24).
✓269. v. E. Gilson. Commentaire Historique. p. 305.
270. Resp. II. Ax. 10.
271. Port-Royal Logic. Pt. 4. Ch. VII. Ax. II.
272. "Le Songe de Descartes." pp. 131-132.
273. For the deliberate separation of metaphysical truths 
and metaphysical things, and the detachment of the for­
mer from the existent, see the following text: "II y a
plusieurs Philosophes parmi les Anciens, qui ont trait^ 
de la Metaphysique; mais il faut avouer que jusqu*a a 
ce Siecle il ne § *en est trouve' aucun, qui ait connu 
assez distinctement l»objet de cette science, ayant tous 




propositions claires et evidentes, qui servent de regie 
pour juger de la verite" des choses, mais que ne nous 
font connoitre l1existence d !aucune, avee les choses 
Metaphysiques qui sont des substances intelligentes, 
separees de la matiere; et plutot connues que la matiere." 
(P. S. Regis. Cours Entier. Metaph. Avertissement).
As a result of this separation there are clearly 
two main questions for metaphysics: I. Is metaphysics
a measure of the truth? II. What are the natures of the 
things which are its objects, especially of minds?
274. A. T. VII. 62. 20-26.
275. A. T. VII. 63. 10-11.
276. A. T. VII. 63. 12-15.
277. A. T. VII. 71. 6-9.
278. A. T. VII. 20. 23-27.
279. "Mais j*ai bien de quoi me consoler, parce qufon joint 
ici ma Physique avec les pures Mathematiques, auxquelles 
je souhaite surtout qu»elle ressemble." A.T. IX. 212. 
30-213.2.
280. Pr. I. LX.
281. "Reponse aux Reflexions Critiques de M. du Hamel,"
Ch. XII.
287.
282. A.T. VII. 226. 3-5; Pr. I; LI; etc.
283. A.T. Ill, 476. 3-14; VII. 132. 7-133.4.
284. Resp. II. prop. IV; and earlier in this study.
285. Thus M. Gilson says that the real distinction implies
the existence of the things distinguished, in the sense 
that before we can prove that body and mind are really 
distinct we must prove that bodies exist (Commentaire 
Historique, p. 309).
But this cannot be upheld. The consecution of the 
Meditations, about to be traced, shows that the proof of 
the existence of bodies depends from the real distinc­
tions already being proved. Furthermore, the texts ad­
duced by M. Gilson do not really support his view. The 
reasons given by Descartes in these passages for not 
proving the real distinction of mind and body in the 
second Meditation are the hyperbolical doubts of which 
"una eousque process it ut de hoc ipso (nempe quod res 
juxta veritatem sint tales quales ipsas percipimus) cer- 
tus esse non possem." As a result of this doubt the 
reservation, quoted by M. Gilson, is made as a reason 
for not proving the real distinction in Meditation II; 
"quia nesciebam esset ne corpus idem quod mens necne." 




the proof of the truth of our ideas; but since, for 
Descartes, truth is not the correspondence of ideas with 
the existent but the possible, the real distinction is 
made between possible substances.
286. See the example of the basket of applies in Resp. VII 
(A.T. VII. 481). "Puer triennis posset respondere, 
nihil obstare quominus disceret ab iis quae olim nover- 
at, quia, etsi fuissent abdicata, cum dubia erant, poter- 
ant tamen resumi postea, cum vera esse constaret."
(A.T. VII. 514. 10-13).
Descartes1 replies to the misconceptions of the 
R. P. Bourdin on the nature of the doubt show quite 
clearly that the doubt affects my belief in the testi­
mony of my ideas rather than the proper nature of the
things thought about. 'Doubt is something separable from
uthe objects doubted.; My doubt being only a mode of my­
self, doubtfulness cannot be said to belong to the proper 
essence of anything merely because I happen to doubt it.
I cannot infer from my doubt to the dubious nature of 
the objects of my thought, for the very reason that my 
doubt reveals to me that I do not really know the nature 
of these objects. It is, therefore, always possible that 
my prejudices, dismissed by my doubt, may be reinstated 
as truths, since it would be itself a prejudice to judge 
that the objects of thought are not such that these pre­
judices may be true.
28.9.
287. A.T. VII. 45. 2-8.
288. A.T. V. 163.
289. Printed in Clerselier*s edition of Descartes* corres­
pondence, vol. III. lett. 125. It is reproduced in
Cousin X. 538 ff.
290. A.T. III. 693. 18-26.
291. A.T. III. 691. 20-692.3.
292. De Emend. IV. 21.
293. A.T. VI. 4. 6-10.
294. A.T. VII. 43.5.
295. A.T. XII. 414.
296. v. § 5 of this study.
297. A.T. VI. 3. 9-15.
298. A.T. VI. 3. 29-31.
299. A.T. VI. 2. 20-3.2.
300. A.T. VI. 3. 27-29.
301. It is hoped that what is said in this section may be




view taken here is that it was sown in corruption.
But whether or not it has been raised in incorruption 
is a further question on which no final judgment is 
I suggested here. It^is^too grave a matter in which to 
risk any_prejudice.
Among the followers of Descartes, Cordemoy devoted 
a whole work to the problem of the existence of other 
minds, in which he develops the suggestion of the Dis­
course on Method, in the fifth book of which speech is 
said to be the mark of a rational soul (Geraud de Cor­
demoy, ’’Discours Physique de la Parole,” 1668).
Malebranche opens the door to Romanticism wide by 
denying that we can have a clear and distinct idea of 
the soul. From the fact that we cannot have the sensory 
or affective experience of other men, through which con­
fused experience alone we have knowledge of the soul, he 
concludes that we know the minds of other men only by 
conjecture. (Recherche, Bk. III. ch. VII). We have no 
ideas of other souls since these ideas remain shut up 
in GodTs mind. We know that in God are immutable laws, 
and we must believe that by these he acts similarly in 
all minds.
In Leibniz the windows of the monad are still more 
firmly shut. But there is no need to follow the history 








philosophy we are not sure whether we are ourselves or 
someone else.
It is clear, however, that Idealism stands in sus­
picion of having carried on a heritage of self-sufficiency, 
which may prove disastrous to the person of the philoso­
pher, and that, imbrued as it is with Stoicism, it re­
presents the stand of Paganism against the spirituality 
of Christendom.
Eudoxus, it is true, declares himself free of the 
malady; but the point is that this declaration is itself 
a symptom of the disease.
In November, 1646, twenty seven years after his dream, 
Descartes writes to Chanut that the motto which guides 
him is:-
Illi mors gravis incubat 
Cui, notus nimis omnibus 
Ignotus moritur sibi. (Seneca, Thyestis.
A.T.IV. 53V. 11-13)
Still a Stoic, and still unknown to himself!
Clearly the cercle cartesien may be taken to be merely a 
particular case of something absolutely fundamental in 
the character of Descartes. The call to trust in some­
thing hypothetical is the legacy left by the Cartesian 
philosophy. Since then, philosophy, and often Protestant 
theology, has called upon us to live as if we knew the 




planted in the flesh. But clearly no one can wholly 
surrender himself to any reality while a part of him 
responds to a doubt of it. That is a false view of 
human nature.
305. A.T. VII. 18. 19-19.7.
306. There seems good reason to believe that the paranoia, 
present in every human mind as a normal feature of it, 
was exaggerated in Descartes’s, and that he separated 
thought from being because he himself had lost his grip 
upon reality. To doubt what he was, and then to produce 
a system of wonderful coherency in order to persuade him­
self that he was an immaterial substance - this is but 
the heroic and unsuccessful struggle of his mind against 
the tendency, deeply rooted in it, of finding no sure 
hold in the real, and taking refuge in a logic which has 
only mental states as its objects.
There is an interesting passage in the Discourse 
where Descartes speaks of those who in their conduct ”are 
apt to fall into the extravagances of the knights-errant 
of Romance, and to entertain projects that exceed their 
powers” (A.T.'VI,6.31-7.10). We think, of course, of Don 
Quixote, tilting at his own dreams; and we are right to 
think of him. If Don Quixote was a knight-errant for love 
of his delusions, Descartes was a philosopher for fear of 
them. We are fascinated by both because each expresses 
something tragic belonging to the very stuff of human 
nature.
